CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES
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The City of Miami's appeal of summary judgment in favor of the Florida East Coast Railway was affirmed because the City was estopped from imposing new permit conditions after the railroad satisfied the original conditions.
A municipality that passes a resolution authorizing a permit under specified conditions is estopped from creating new conditions after the original conditions have been satisfied.
[1] A municipality that authorizes a permit under specified conditions in a resolution is estopped from imposing additional conditions after the original conditions have been…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Miami brought an eminent domain suit against the Florida East Coast Railway. During the pendency of that suit, the railroad sought to impr…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment for the Florida East Coast Railway as counterclaimant. The issue presented by the counterclaim was the railroad’s right to improve its property during the progress of an eminent domain suit brought by the City of Miami. Error is also assigned upon an order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim, and upon an order denying petitioner’s motion to stay hearing on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We have examined the points presented in petitioner’s argument upon the order denying its motion to dismiss, and we find that no error has been committed. As to the order denying petitioner’s motion to stay hearing, we hold that this order is within the bounds of discretion allowed to the trial judge in such matters. See Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corporation, 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 126 (1925).
The summary judgment appealed was granted by the trial court upon a holding that the City, having passed a resolution authorizing the issuance of a permit under certain conditions, was estopped to create new conditions after those created by the first resolution had been met. We think that this proposition is fully supported in the law. See Texas Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, Fla.1950, 44 So. 2d 808; City of Hialeah v. Allmand, Fla.App.1968, 207 So. 2d 9; City of Gainesville v. Bishop, Fla.App.1965, 174 So. 2d 100.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By
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Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. City OF Miami, 299 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…to review our decision is now pending in that court. A second appeal to this court was brought by the City to review the order of the trial court which had directed the issuance of the fill permit. We affirmed that order with an opinion reported at 286 So. 2d 253. The City did not seek certiorari in the Supreme Court upon that decision. The permit was issued and fill operations were begun by the Railway Company. The City of Miami then sought to stop the fill operation by the filing of the instant suit, entit…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corp., 89 Fla. 446 (Fla. 1925)
- Shuron Hester v. State, 312 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
- Tex. Co. v. Town of Miami Springs, 44 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1950)
- City OF Gainesville v. Bishop, 174 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)
- City OF Hialeah v. Allmand, 207 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)