HERMAN JENKINS, JR., PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, DIRECTOR DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this original habeas corpus proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court determined that when a trial court sentences a defendant to concurrent terms and explicitly grants jail-time credit for one count, that credit applies to both concurrent sentences, not just the first. The court rejected the Department of Corrections' interpretation as illogical and contrary to equitable principles.
The court held that the jail-time credit of 304 days applies to both concurrent sentences in Case No. 61250, resulting in a total sentence of ten years less the 304-day credit.
[1] When sentences are imposed concurrently, credit for time spent in jail awaiting sentencing is applied to all concurrent sentences unless otherwise specified.
[2] A sentencing court's intent to grant credit for jail time must be clear and unequivocal; otherwise, the language of the sentence will be interpreted to avoid illogical re…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“To conclude the sentencing judge only intended to grant Petitioner credit time on the first concurrent sentence and not on the other would necessarily result in Petitioner serving the longer sentence on Count II and in not having the benefit of the credit time granted him by the trial court.”
Establishes the court's rationale that the Department's interpretation would render the judge's credit grant meaningless.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJenkins was convicted on two counts in Case No. 61250: breaking and entering with intent to commit felony larceny (Count One) and breaking and enterin…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Concurrent Sentences cases and more on FLexlaw
ERVIN, Justice.
This cause is an original proceeding in habeas corpus wherein Petitioner seeks credit time toward concurrent sentences being served in the State Prison. We issued the writ pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(6), Florida Constitution, F.S.A., and Respondent filed his return thereto.
Petitioner Jenkins was tried and adjudged guilty on both counts in Case No. 61250 of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony and grant larceny. Jenkins was also tried and adjudged guilty in Case No. 61251 of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. On March 9, 1970, the Polk County Criminal Court of Record sentenced Jenkins in Case No. 61250 as follows:
“. . . as to Count One, to be confined in the State Prison of Florida, at hard labor for a term of Five (5) Years, and said Defendant is to be given credit for Three Hundred and Four (304) Days spent in County Jail awaiting sentence, and for your said offense as to Count Two, be confined in the State Prison of Florida at hard labor for a term of Five (5) Years, and said sentence to run concurrently with Count One.”
On the same date Jenkins was sentenced in Case No. 61251 to hard labor for a term of five years to run consecutively with Case No. 61250.
It is the wording of the concurrent sentences in Case No. 61250 that presents the question now to be decided.
Petitioner contends that he is to be credited with the time spent in the county jail awaiting sentence on both the five-year sentences in Case No. 61250, which run concurrently.
Respondent contends that in Case No. 61250 the Petitioner is entitled to receive credit for 304 days spent in the county jail awaiting sentence on the five-year sentence on Count I, but that Petitioner was also sentenced to an additional five years bn Count II, to run concurrently with the sentence on which jail time was credited. Respondent argues that no credit for jail time was granted on the second five-year concurrent sentence and that the net effect of these two sentences in Case No. 61250 plus an additional five-year consecutive sentence in Case No. 61251 is a total sentence of ten years in Respondent’s custody. With Respondent we cannot agree.
We agree with the Petitioner’s contention. To conclude the sentencing judge only intended to grant Petitioner credit time on the first concurrent sentence and not on the other would necessarily result in Petitioner serving the longer sentence on Count II and in not having the benefit of the credit time granted him. by the trial court. To adopt the interpretation of the Respondent would be tantamount to granting the Petitioner credit time and then taking it away, in short a meaningless act, resulting in no credit time whatsoever. We are not persuaded by such an absence of logic.
In support of his interpretation denying credit time on Petitioner’s sentence on the second count, Respondent cites Falagan v. Wainwright, 195 So. 2d 562 (Fla.1967). In Falagan we ordered recalculation of the Petitioner’s sentence, saying:
“The sentence appears to us to be unequivocal. Where the language of a sentence is clear we have no power to change it by speculating that the trial judge meant something else.” Supra, at 563.
In the instant case, however, the language of the sentences in issue is not clear and unequivocal and to accord it the interpretation urged by the Respondent would be illogical. The language giving credit for the 304 days county jail time is not restricted solely to the first sentence on Count I, but is susceptible to a reasonable interpretation that it has concurrent application to the sentence on the second count.
We hold, therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to credit time of 304 days spent in the county jail on both sentences of five years in Case No. 61250 to run concurrently, together with Petitioner’s sentence of five years in Case No. 61251 to run consecutively with Case No. 61250, for a total sentence of ten years less credit time of 304 days.
The Petitioner is remanded to the custody of the Respondent, with directions to calculate his sentence in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J, and ROBERTS and BOYD, JJ., concur. ADKINS, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., dissent.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Daniels v. State, 491 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1986)…sue would, effectively deny Daniels any credit whatsoever for the time he spent in jail while awaiting trial and thereby render meaningless the legislative directive that a defendant receive credit for all the time served. Cf. Jenkins v. Wainwright, 285 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1973). We distinguish this situation from one in which the defendant does not receive concurrent sentences on multiple charges; in such a case the defendant “is not entitled to have his jail time credit pyramided by being given credit on each s…
-
Buford A. Green v. State, 450 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…for presentence jail time need not be allocated to both of those sentences. We made no attempt in Fenn to distinguish between consecutive and concurrent sentences. The appellant’s reliance on the Florida Supreme Court case of Jenkins v. Wainwright, 285 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1973), is misplaced. The sentence in that case, which was imposed at a time when the granting of credit for time served was discretionary with the trial judge, was ambiguous, and the Supreme Court’s opinion merely dealt with the reasonable inte…
-
Shepard v. State, 459 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…or pre-sentence jail time need not be allocated to both of those sentences. We made no attempt in Fenn to distinguish between consecutive and concurrent sentences. The appellant’s reliance on the Florida Supreme Court case of Jenkins v. Wainwright, 285 So. 2d 5 (Fla.1973), is misplaced. The sentence in that case, which was imposed at a time where the granting of credit for time served was discretionary with the trial judge, was ambiguous, and the Supreme Court’s opinion merely dealt with the reasonable int…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Falagan v. Louie L. Wainwright, 195 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1967)