STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. RICHARD H. PRICE, AS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OF THE DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICE OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, RELATOR,
v.
HONORABLE GORDON A. DUNCAN, JR., AND HONORABLE CLIFFORD B. SHEPARD, JR., CIRCUIT JUDGES OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY IN THE JUVENILE DIVISION OF SAID COURT, RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court held that Circuit Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over juvenile cases involving "children in need of supervision" under Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, despite the statutory language limiting explicit mention to dependent and delinquent children. The Court rejected the lower courts' refusal to exercise jurisdiction over this third class of juveniles.
Circuit Courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all three classes of juvenile cases under Chapter 39, including children in need of supervision, because the Legislature created this class of cases without vesting jurisdiction in county courts, and under the Florida Constitution, such jurisdiction automatically lies in the Circuit Courts.
[1] Circuit courts have original jurisdiction over cases involving children in need of supervision when jurisdiction is not vested in county courts.
[2] The Florida Constitution grants circuit courts original jurisdiction over matters not vested in county courts.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Chapter 39, when taken as a whole, clearly evidences a Legislative intent that the Circuit Courts have jurisdiction of all of the types of juvenile cases established therein.”
Establishes that the statute's overall structure demonstrates legislative intent to grant Circuit Courts jurisdiction over all three classes of juveniles despite the explicit mention of only two in § 39.02(1)(a).
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe relator, District Supervisor of the Division of Youth Service, sought a writ of mandamus to compel Circuit Court judges to take jurisdiction of ju…
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In this original proceeding, relator, by way of petition for writ of mandamus, seeks to require the respondent Circuit Court judges to take jurisdiction of juvenile cases involving “children in need of supervision”, as defined in Fla.Stat. § 39.-01(10) (a), F.S.A. Respondents have refused to exercise such jurisdiction because Fla.Stat. § 39.02(1)(a), F.S.A., provides that, “The juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of dependent and delinquent children . . . ” and does not mention the third class of children — those in need of supervision — which is defined and dealt with in Chapter 39. We are of the opinion, nevertheless, that Chapter 39 clearly confers jurisdiction over all three classes in the Circuit Court.
Article V, Section 5(b), Florida Constitution, F.S.A., gives the Circuit Court “original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts . . . . ” Since there is no general law giving county courts jurisdiction over cases involving children in need of supervision, it must lie in the Circuit Courts.
The original jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts is set out in Fla.Stat. § 26.012(2), F.S.A., as being, inter alia:
(a) In all actions at law not cognizable by the county courts;
and
(c) In all cases in equity including all cases relating to juveniles [except traffic offenses as provided in chapters 39 and 316;]. (Brackets added.)
The brackets were added above to emphasize that the “as provided” clause in subsection (c) relates to the traffic exception, not to the phrase, “including all cases relating to juveniles”.
Nevertheless, Chapter 39, when taken as a whole, clearly evidences a Legislative intent that the Circuit Courts have jurisdiction of all of the types of juvenile cases established therein. We decline, however, to detail here all the provisions of Chapter 39 which lead to this conclusion. Such a justification is not necessary, since, as noted above, there is no general law vesting jurisdiction of these cases in the county courts. Under our Constitution, if the Legislature recognizes a class of cases or creates a cause of action without specifying which of our two levels of trial court has jurisdiction, that jurisdiction automatically lies in the Circuit Courts.
Accordingly, the peremptory writ is issued, and respondents shall henceforth exercise their jurisdiction in all cases filed by relator involving children in need of supervision.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, ERVIN, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.