MARWELL J. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Smith appealed his conviction for robbery and life sentence, arguing he was legally insane at the time of the offense. The court reversed because the prosecutor made a highly prejudicial remark stating there was "no possibility" of keeping an insanity acquittee confined for longer than 30-90 days, which misstated the law and likely influenced the jury's guilty verdict.
The trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor's remark to stand without correction. While the initial part of the prosecutor's argument about the defendant being put on the street was proper retaliation to defense counsel's comments, the statement that there was "no possibility of keeping him longer than" 30-90 days incorrectly stated the law and was so highly prejudicial that reversal was required unless the court could determine the remark did not prejudice the appellant.
[1] A prosecutor's closing argument that misstates the law regarding the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is improper and prejudicial.
[2] A trial court should correct prejudicial remarks made by a prosecutor, even if those remarks were provoked by opposing counsel.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“But the last phrase, 'because there is no possibility of keeping him longer than that,' incorrectly stated the law and was, therefore, not a fair comment or a justified reply.”
The court's analysis explaining why the prosecutor's statement, though partially responsive to defense argument, crossed the line into improper misstatement of law
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was charged with robbery and raised a legal insanity defense at trial. During closing arguments, defense counsel explained that a not guilty by …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Improper Argument To Jury cases and more on FLexlaw
Appellant appeals a judgment and sentence of life imprisonment entered upon a finding of guilty of the offense of robbery. His defense at trial was that he was legally insane at the time he performed the act charged.
Appellant urges that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial or, in the alternative, in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard certain improper remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument.
During defense counsel’s final argument to the jury he said:
“But that isn’t what we are asking you to say because not guilty by reason of insanity is not the same as not guilty. It isn’t the same. This man isn’t going to be put out on that street if you find him not guilty by reason of insanity. His disposition will be up to the Judge and I have no qualms about whatever disposition the Judge decides. It will be just.
“But I don’t want you to think for a moment if you find him not guilty by reason of insanity you give him the key to the street, because that isn’t the case, and it won’t happen.”
In his closing argument, the prosecuting attorney stated to the jury:
“You have got a man painted, by his own people, as dangerous, and he will do *415it again, and then, for them to tell you go ahead and find him not guilty by reason of insanity, not guilty by reason of insanity, because that is not going to put him on the street, you know as well as I know, people of everyday human experience and good common sense, that if you find him not guilty by reason of insanity, he will be on the street in thirty, sixty or ninety days, because there is no possibility of keeping him longer than that." (emphasis added)
Defense counsel objected to this remark, requested the court to instruct the jury to disregard it, and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for a mistrial.
The first part of the prosecutor’s argument, relating to the defendant being put out on the street if found not guilty by reason of insanity, was a fair comment in reply to statements made by defense counsel, and was therefore proper, Ricks v. State, Fla.App.1971, 242 So.2d 763; Sadler v. State, Fla.App.1969, 222 So.2d 797; Reyes v. State, 1905, 49 Fla. 17, 38 So. 257. But the last phrase, “because there is no possibility of keeping him longer than that,” incorrectly stated the law and was, therefore, not a fair comment or a justified reply. The trial court should have corrected such highly prejudicial remarks of the prosecuting attorney, Wright v. State, 1920, 79 Fla. 831, 84 So. 919; Pait v. State, Fla.1959, 112 So.2d 380, whether or not they were made in retaliation or provoked by remarks of opposing counsel.
The matter may have been critical in the minds of the jurors, and contributed to their finding of guilty as charged. Unless the appellate court can determine from the record that the offensive remark did not prejudice the appellant, the judgment must be reversed. Pait v. State, supra; Chavez v. State, Fla.App.1968, 215 So.2d 750; Thompson v. State, Fla.App.1970, 235 So.2d 354.
In view of our holding, it is unnecessary to consider appellant’s remaining point on appeal.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
MANN, C. J., and LILES, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Polite v. State, 934 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…98] requests for curative instruction, to disabuse the jury of this erroneous notion and to inform it of the correct law, with the result that it was affirmatively misled as to the only real defense in the case, requires a new trial. Smith v. State, 273 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 278 So. 2d 628 (Fla.1973); Quaggin v. State, 752 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), and cases cited; Mabery v. State, 303 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 756 (Fla.1975). The state’s reliance on…
-
State v. Marwell J. Smith, 278 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973)…Certiorari denied. 273 So. 2d 414. ROBERTS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN, ADKINS, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- In re Florida Appellate Rules, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959)
- Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Ricks v. State, 242 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Sadler v. State, 222 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Reyes v. State, 49 Fla. 17 (Fla. 1905)
- Demetra Thompson v. State, 235 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Hattie Wright v. State, 79 Fla. 831 (Fla. 1920)