PEARLIE TAYLOR, APPELLANT,
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, AN ASSOCIATION ORGANIZED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLEE
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Pearlie Taylor, the defendant-purchaser in a used car installment contract, appealed a summary judgment entered against her for a deficiency balance after the vehicle was repossessed and sold. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, finding no usury violation and no abuse of discretion in denying Taylor's motion to vacate based on her attorney's absence at the summary judgment hearing.
The court held that the finance charges did not exceed the statutory maximum authorized for Class 3 used motor vehicles, and therefore no usury existed. The court also held that the denial of the motion to vacate the judgment did not constitute an abuse of discretion, as Taylor showed no prejudice beyond the lack of opportunity to present oral argument.
[1] A finance charge on a used motor vehicle sale is not usurious if it does not exceed the rates authorized by statute for the applicable vehicle class.
[2] Denial of a motion to vacate a summary judgment is not an abuse of discretion when the movant fails to show prejudice resulting from the attorney's absence at the hearing…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The automobile involved was within 'Class 3' as referred to in the statute applicable to this transaction. The finance charges were not in excess of those authorized therefor by statute.”
Establishes that the finance charges complied with statutory requirements, defeating the usury claim.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTaylor purchased a used 1965 Ford on August 27, 1969, under an installment contract with J.D. Ball Ford Incorporated. The seller assigned the contract…
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The appellant, the defendant below, filed this appeal from an adverse summary judgment for a deficiency balance on an automobile purchase installment contract. The contract was between the defendant and J. D. Ball Ford Incorporated, incident to purchase by the defendant on August 27, 1969, of a used 1965 Ford automobile. The contract was assigned by the seller to the plaintiff bank. Upon default by the purchaser the automobile was repossessed and sold, and the plaintiff filed this action for the established deficiency.
Appellee contends the contract on its face was usurious, and that there was a genuine triable issue as to usury; and further, that the court erred by denying defendant’s motion to vacate the summary judgment. On consideration thereof in the light of the record and briefs we hold no reversible error has been shown.
The automobile involved was within “Class 3” as referred to in the statute applicable to this transaction. The finance charges were not in excess of those authorized therefor by statute.1 See Nelson v. Scarritt Motors, Fla.1950, 48 So.2d 168.
By a separate motion and a motion for rehearing, filed six days after the entry of summary judgment, the defendant sought to set aside the summary judgment for excusable neglect, namely, that by oversight the attorney for defendant was not present at the noticed hearing on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. No prejudice was shown therefrom in the motions to vacate the judgment, other than that by failing to attend the hearing counsel for the defendant was precluded from presenting argument on behalf of the defendant in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In the circumstance presented we hold that the denial of the motions to vacate the judgment did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.