THE WATER WITCH-CLIFTON, CLAIMANT; SHELDON, LIBELLANT

Mi\ Justice GRIER. The decree in favor of the libellant in the Circuit.Court was for a much larger sum than that ren.-. deied in the District Court,.and as there was no cros3 appeal by the libellant, the decree of the Circuit Court is now challenged as erroneous for that reason; but this apparent inconsistency will be found not to exist in reality, by a short reference to the history pf the case, as exhibited by the record.

The libellant claimed as consignee of two hundred bales of cotton shipped on board the Water Witch, to be carried from Lavacca, in Texas, to New York. The libel charged that the cotton had been greatly' injured by reason of bad stowage and want of caie on the part of the master and crew of the vessel.'

As an excuse for not tendering freight, the libel alleged that the damage to the cotton'far exceeded the freight and primage. Another consignee filed his libel at the same time for that portion of the cotton consigned to him, with the same allegations, and the claimants of .the ship filed their libel against the cotton for freight and primage. These three suits, all depending on, the same facts, were tried as one.

The great question of the case was, whether the damage, which it was admitted the cargo had-received, was caused by. the fault of the vessel, or before it was received on board— that is, whethér it was sea damage, or country damage; and,, if sea damage, whether the vessel was liable for it. The District Court decided that'the vessel was liable for -the sea dam age, and sent the cases to a master to report the amount of sea damage suffered by the cotton, and the sums severally due by, the consignees for freight. Having these data by the report, that court, instead of entering a decree for each libellant for. the sum found due to him, made a set-off* of the freight due. the ship against the amount of damage suffered by the cotton, giving a decree for each consignee for the balance, deducting, freight, and dismissing the libel of the owners. The claimant of the ship appealed, in all the cases, to the Circuit .Court. The several amounts found due by the master’s report were adopted by that court, and the decree in each case corrected, so that the decree for the several consignees was for the whole damage, without set-off, and a decree in favor of .the ship for. freight found to he due on the cotton, leaving the set-off to be made by the parties, or by order of the District Court. The amendmént made by the Circuit Court was iu fact beneficial to the owners of the ship, as they recovered costs in their own suit. The court rightly decided “that the parties could-not split up the claim for damages by applying a portion in extinguishing the freight money, and then ask a decree for the excess of this sum.”

The appellants have, therefore, no reason to eo*mplain of the decree on this ground.

The amount of sea damage, as assessed in the report, was admitted to be correct. The refusal of the master of the ship to sign bills of lading could not affect the case. The ship having received the cargo, and carried it to the consignees in New York, and.then libelled tbe cargo for freight, is estopped to deny her liability to deliver in like good order as received, with the usual exceptions.

It has been contended, that the language of the written contract between Mitchell and Eorbes permitted the cargo to be carried on deck, aud that the phrase “capacity of the vessel” admitted of such construction; but the fact that the owners of cargo refused to have such an agreement made a part of the bills of lading, and the agreement to pay u'nder-deek freight, repel any such doubtful inference from the phrase. The evidence does not support the allegation of any agreement by the shippers, that the cotton, or any portion of it, should be carried on deck. The objection that Sheldon was not consignee, or if so, had do title to support the action, has no foundation in fact orón law. The claimants treated him as such, and as such he had made advances on the cargo.

Whether this sea damagé was caused, as charged in the libel, by the fault of the master or the ship, was a question of fact, and encumbered, as usual, with a mass of conflicting testimony and opinions. The weight of the testimony, as decided by the judges of both courts, inclined in favor of the libellant, and we see no reason to differ from them. The weight of testimony is not always with numbers, and this court should not have their time spent in hearing arguments whether the eleven deponents on one side ought to be believed rather than ten on the other. In such cases, the concurrent finding of two courts ought to satisfy the losing party. '

The.decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs.