FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
O'NEAL HENRY JOHNS, APPELLEE
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Ford Motor Credit Company appeals a jury verdict awarding $25,000 compensatory and $30,000 punitive damages to O'Neal Henry Johns for an assault committed by Ford's agent. The court affirms the judgment, holding that Johns could recover separately against both the agent and the employer, and that punitive damages could be awarded against the employer despite the agent receiving only compensatory damages.
The court affirms the judgment in all respects, holding that res judicata and estoppel do not bar a plaintiff from recovering against a joint tort-feasor after obtaining judgment against another tort-feasor, and that an employer may be assessed punitive damages for an employee's assault even when the employee is assessed only compensatory damages.
[1] A prior judgment against a joint tortfeasor does not preclude a plaintiff from relitigating all issues in a subsequent suit against another joint tortfeasor.
[2] A jury may award punitive damages against an employer for an assault committed by an employee, even if the employee was only assessed compensatory damages in a separate a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It seems clear to us that the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment do not operate to bar a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against one tort-feasor from relitigating all issues in a subsequent suit against a joint tort-fea-sor.”
Establishes that a plaintiff can recover against multiple joint tort-feasors in separate suits without bar from res judicata or estoppel
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn agent of Ford Motor Credit Company, named Mowry, perpetrated an assault upon O'Neal Henry Johns. Johns initially brought an action against Ford Mot…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment founded upon jury verdicts in favor of ap-pellee in the amount of $25,000 compensatory damages and $30,000 punitive damages in an action arising out of an assault perpetrated by an agent of appellant upon the appellee. For a full detail of the facts, see this Court’s earlier opinion in Johns v. Ford Motor Credit Company, Fla.App., 226 So.2d 403.
Appellant contends that the judgment for compensatory damages should be reversed on authority of Hutchins v. City of Hialeah, 196 So.2d 741 (Fla.1967), for the reason that following our decision in Johns v. Ford, supra, Johns had prosecuted a separate action against appellant’s agent, Mowry, which resulted in a jury verdict of $1,850 compensatory damages and no punitive damages. However, appellee contends that this issue is controlled by our decision in Gerardi v. Carlisle, Fla.App., 232 So.2d 36, wherein we held:
“It seems clear to us that the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment do not operate to bar a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment against one tort-feasor from relitigating all issues in a subsequent suit against a joint tort-fea-sor. ...”
Appellee’s contention that the instant case is governed by the above principle elaborated by us in Gerardi is correct. Our examination of the Hutchins case relied on by appellant convinces us that it is inapplicable here because Hutchins was postured differently than the case at hand. Therefore, it is not dispositive of the res judicata and estoppel issue raised by appellant.
By its remaining issue, appellant contends that the jury’s refusal to render a verdict for punitive damages against its agent Mowry in the separate action against him serves as a bar to a punitive damage verdict against it. This contention was rejected by the court in Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So.2d 291 (Fla.App.1971). In Joab, as in the case at bar, there was involved an assault and battery committed without legal justification. The court held that the plaintiff could properly be awarded punitive damages from an employer even though the employee who committed the assault and battery was assessed only for compensatory damages. In so holding, the court stated:
“In awarding punitive damages the jury may properly punish each wrongdoer by exacting from his pocketbook a sum of money which, according to his financial ability, will hurt, but not bankrupt; and the verdict shall state separately the amount of punitive damages. Lehman v. Spencer Ladd’s, Inc., Fla.1966, 182 So.2d 402; and Rule 1.481 R.C.P., 30 F.S.A.”
Accordingly, the judgment reviewed herein is affirmed in all respects.
WIGGINTON and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
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Parsons v. Weinstein Enters., Inc., 387 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…larly, since an intentional assault and battery without legal justification supplies proof of malice upon which a punitive damage award may rest, the issue of punitive damages must be left for the jury to resolve. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Johns, 269 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). Accordingly, since there was evidence adduced that could in law support a verdict for Parsons, see Mullis v. City of Miami, 60 So. 2d 174 (Fla.1952), we reverse the trial…
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Mystery FUN House, Inc. v. Magic World, Inc., 417 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…matter and remanded for trial on that issue alone. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part. ORFINGER, C. J., and COBB, J., concur. . See, e.g., Parsons v. Weinstein Enterprises, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Johns, 269 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So. 2d [*787] 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Holland v. Glass, 213 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Wrains v. Rose, 175 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Bryson v. Swank, 166 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), cert. de…
Authorities Cited
- Lehman v. Spencer Ladd's, Inc., 182 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1965)
- Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Gerardi v. Carlisle, 232 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)
- Hutchins v. City OF Hialeah, 196 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1967)
- O'Neal Henry Johns v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 226 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)