THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
LEEVY CARLTON MEARS, JR., APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's grant of post-conviction relief under Rule 3.850, claiming the trial court erroneously vacated a robbery conviction and sentence based on allegations that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory line-up results. The court reverses, finding no showing of knowing use of perjured testimony and concluding any trial court error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court reversed the grant of post-conviction relief, holding that the petitioner failed to show knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution and that any trial court error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overwhelming competent and substantial evidence of guilt.
[1] To warrant relief under Rule 3.850 CrPR, a petitioner must show the prosecution made a knowing use of perjured testimony.
[2] An alleged trial court error is harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt if there is overwhelming competent substantial evidence of guilt.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The principle is well-settled in Florida that knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution at the time of trial must be shown to warrant relief under Rule 3.850.”
Establishes the legal standard required for post-conviction relief based on prosecutorial misconduct involving perjured testimony.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter Mears was booked in 1965 for robbery, police conducted a series of line-ups. In one line-up, witness Murray failed to identify Mears but did ide…
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The appellee-petitioner moved, under Rule 3.850 CrPR, 33 F.S.A. to vacate a judgment and sentence earlier entered. The state seeks review of an order granting the motion and awarding a new trial; the order was entered after an evidentiary hearing.
The underlying conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Kish v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 315, and a denial of motion under Rule 1.850 CrPR (now renumbered 3.850) was affirmed in Mears v. State, Fla.App.1970, 232 So.2d 749, which indicates appellee has sought other relief.
The instant (second) petition for relief alleged that the trial court deprived him of due process by failing to order the prosecution to produce the results of a line-up in which a key witness for the State had failed to identify him. Attached to the petition was an order entered by U.S. District- Judge Joe Eaton directing the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor had knowledge of that line-up at the time of trial.
After he was booked in 1965, the police began holding a series of line-ups. In one, Murray was unable to identify Mears, although he did identify Kish.
Petitioner moved for disclosure of all favorable evidence, and the results of the line-ups. The court denied the motion without making a determination that favorable evidence existed. The prosecution at the trial stated: “We only intend to use that line-up in which the Murrays identified these people.” At the trial, the state did not adduce testimony concerning the line-ups viewed by the Murray family. Mr. Murray identified Mears as being a robber.
*218We express the view that the petitioner-appellee did not make a showing that the prosecution made a knowing use of the allegedly perjured testimony. We further express the view that there was such overwhelming competent substantial evidence of guilt, that the alleged error of the trial court was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
Our disposition of the instant cause renders unnecessary any resolution of the state’s arguments that the doctrines of res judicata or waiver apply.
The principle is well-settled in Florida that knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution at the time of trial must be shown to warrant relief under Rule 3.850. E. g., Cash v. State, Fla.App.1968, 207 So.2d 18; Barber v. State, Fla.App.1971, 257 So.2d 581.
For the reasons stated the order appealed is reversed.
Reversed.
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Matrascia v. State, 384 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Garmise, 382 So. 2d 769 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); State v. Matera, 266 So. 2d 661 (Fla.1972); State v. Mears, 256 So. 2d 217 (Fla.3d DCA 1972), and Gammage v. State, 162 So. 2d 529 (Fla.3d DCA 1964).…
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Ashley v. State, 433 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…relief by coram nobis may be appropriate where false testimony on a material issue at trial was induced by the prosecuting officer or was known by him to be false when given. Barber v. State, 257 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). Cf., State v. Mears, 256 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Where a defendant is no longer “in custody” and thus cannot obtain relief under Rule 3.850, Fla.R.Crim.P., or by way of petition for writ of habeas corpus, it has been held that coram nobis is the appropriate vehicle to attack a…
Authorities Cited
- Cash v. State, 207 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Kish v. State, 192 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Leevy Carlton Mears, Jr. v. State, 232 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Barber v. State, 257 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)