CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
A. J. CUMMINGS AND SADIE BELK CUMMINGS, HIS WIFE, ET AL., APPELLEES
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The City of Miami Beach appealed a judgment for attorney's fees in an eminent domain proceeding. After the appellate court affirmed the judgment, the trial court entered an additional judgment for interest on the original judgment based on appellees' motion. The appellate court reversed, holding that once a judgment is appealed and affirmed, the trial court lacks authority to take further action beyond executing the appellate court's mandate.
The trial court was without authority to enter a second judgment upon the appellees' motion to determine liability for interest. After a judgment is appealed and affirmed by an appellate court, the trial court may only carry out the appellate court's mandate and has no authority to take further action in the cause or to amend such judgment.
[1] After an appellate court affirms a judgment, the trial court's authority is limited to carrying out the appellate court's mandate.
[2] A trial court may not amend a judgment after it has been affirmed on appeal.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“After the appeal of a judgment and its affirmance by an appellate court, the trial court is without authority to take any further action in the cause other than to carry out the mandate of the appellate court.”
Establishes the central holding that trial courts lack authority beyond executing the appellate mandate once a judgment is affirmed on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Miami Beach was ordered to pay attorney's fees to A.J. Cummings and Sadie Belk Cummings in an eminent domain proceeding. The City appealed…
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This appeal by the City of Miami Beach presents a question as to the validity of a judgment against the City. Essentially the point raised is one of procedure. It arose in the following manner: (1) A judgment for attorney’s fees supplemental to a proceeding in eminent domain was entered in favor of the appellees against the City. (2) The City appealed judgment without supersedeas bond. (3) The judgment was affirmed. (4) Appellees demanded interest on the judgment from the date of the judgment to the proposed payment thereof. (5) Appellant tendered the amount of the judgment and the payment was accepted. (6) Appellees filed in the completed eminent domain proceeding a motion “to determine liability of petitioner for interest on judgment for attorney’s fees and costs.” (7) The “motion to determine” was heard over the objection of the City that the procedure was improper. (8) The trial judge entered an additional judgment in the cause for the amount of interest that he determined was due on the original judgment for attorney’s fees.
We hold that the trial judge was without authority to enter a second judgment in the cause upon appellees’ motion “to determine liability.” After the appeal of a judgment and its affirmance by an appellate court, the trial court is without authority to take any further action in the cause other than to carry out the mandate of the appellate court. Berger v. Leposky, Fla.1958, 103 So.2d 628; Klein v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., Fla.App.1963, 153 So.2d 344; King v. L & L Investors, Inc., Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 671. It may not amend such a judgment.1 Eisenburg v. Cornblum, 156 Fla. 702, 24 So.2d 236 (1945).
As pointed out by the appellees, the court always has jurisdiction to supervise the enforcement of its own judgments. Cf. Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, Fla.*717App.1969, 221 So.2d 214. This power is limited to lawful means of enforcement and upon a common law judgment the lawful method is execution and proceedings supplemental to execution. In the case of a judgment against a City, a petition for writ of mandamus may be employed. Peacock v. State ex rel. American Mortgage & Finance Co., 122 Fla. 25, 164 So. 680 (1935).
The judgment appealed is reversed.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Berger v. Leposky, 103 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1958)
- Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- King v. L & L Invs., Inc., 136 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Eisenburg v. Cornblum, 156 Fla. 702 (Fla. 1945)
- Peacock v. State, 122 Fla. 25 (Fla. 1935)
- Klein v. Newburger, 153 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)