ROLLIE C. MCDONALD, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1971-06-15
No. 70-1016
Before PEARSON, C. J., and CHARLES CARROLL and HENDRY, JJ.
249 So. 2d 77 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1971) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Rollie McDonald was convicted of robbery after a bench trial and sentenced to twenty years. He filed a motion for relief under Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 1.850 based on allegedly new evidence of another person's confession, arguing his conviction was based on mistaken identification. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that appellate review is limited to determining whether there is a reasonable basis for the trial judge's findings.


Holding

The trial court did not err in denying the motion for relief. An appellate court reviewing such motions must reverse the trial court's findings of fact only when it clearly appears there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion reached by the trial judge. The evidence presented was not so compelling that the appellate court could say the trial judge erred as a matter of law in failing to grant a new trial.


Headnotes

[1] A motion for relief from judgment and sentence is not ordinarily available for a second review of the sufficiency of the evidence on an issue of fact tried at the origina…

[2] An appellate court will reverse a trial court's findings of fact only when there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion reached.

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Key Quotes

“Proceedings pursuant to CrPR 1.850 are not ordinarily available for a second review of the sufficiency of the evidence upon an issue of fact tried at the time of the movant's trial upon the criminal charge concerned.”

Establishes the limited scope of CrPR 1.850 motions as a procedural matter

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Facts & Procedural History

McDonald was tried before the court without a jury on a robbery charge and adjudicated guilty, receiving a twenty-year sentence. At an evidentiary hea…

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Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Chief Judge.

PEARSON, Chief Judge.

The appellant was tried before the court without jury upon a charge of robbery. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to twenty years in the state penitentiary. Subsequently, he filed a motion for relief pursuant to CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A. The motion was denied after an evidentiary hearing. Appellant urges on this appeal that the trial court erred in not granting him a new trial upon the evidence presented at his evidentiary hearing upon his CrPR 1.850 motion.

*78The basic argument of the appellant is that the weight of the evidence before the trial judge at the evidentiary hearing on his motion for relief from judgment and sentence was such that the trial judge should have found that appellant’s conviction was based upon a mistaken identification. Proceedings pursuant to CrPR 1.850 are not ordinarily available for a second review of the sufficiency of the evidence upon an issue of fact tried at the time of the movant’s trial upon the criminal charge concerned. Swindle v. State, Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 132; Murray v. State, Fla.App.1966, 191 So.2d 292. In the present instance, the trial judge saw fit to hold an evidentiary hearing upon appellant’s motion pursuant to CrPR 1.850 because of the extraordinary circumstance that another person had allegedly confessed to the crime for which the appellant was convicted. No issue is raised on this appeal as to the propriety of appellant’s use of the procedure pursuant to CrPR 1.850 for the purpose sought to be accomplished. But compare, Falagon v. State, Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 62.

Since every human institution is fallible it is true that mistakes in identification are sometimes made. An appellate court does not try the issues of fact which are made when a prisoner alleges that such a mistake has been made. It is our function to review the judgment of the trial court and to reverse such findings of fact only when it clearly appears that there is no reasonable basis for the conclusion reached by the trial judge. The evidence on behalf of the appellant in the eviden-tiary hearing is not so compelling that we can say that as a matter of law the trial judge erred in failing to grant a new trial. Coleman v. State, Fla.App.1967, 193 So.2d 699.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ruel Lanier v. State, 709 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …rial judge’s conclusion, compare Cash v. State, 207 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), and the evidence was sufficiently compelling to permit a conclusion “as a matter of law that the trial judge erred in failing to grant a new trial.” McDonald v. State, 249 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). [*118] Moreover, the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the second prong, or “prejudice” prong, of Strickland, also refuting any claim of conflict with prior opinions. Compare State v. Oisorio, 657 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…
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