BRINKS SIGNAL CO., INC., APPELLANT,
v.
GROVER C. CRISWELL, D/B/A CRISWELL'S MONEY MUSEUM, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Brinks Signal Co. appeals a judgment against it for failing to protect a money museum from a burglary. The burglar gained entry through a vermiculite concrete roof that fell within Brinks' contractual obligations to protect all ceilings and floors "not constructed of concrete," and the appellate court reversed, holding that vermiculite concrete is concrete as a matter of law.
Vermiculite concrete is concrete as a matter of law. Brinks undertook no obligation as an insurer and breached no duty to Criswell, as the roof was constructed of concrete and therefore outside the scope of Brinks' protection obligations.
[1] A security company is not liable for a loss resulting from a burglary if the system was installed as contracted and the method of entry was not excluded by the contract's…
[2] A contract for a security system that specifies protection for "all ceilings and floors not constructed of concrete" does not exclude ceilings constructed of vermiculite…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Webster defines concrete as "an artificial building material made by mixing cement and sand with gravel, broken stone, or other aggregate, and sufficient water to cause the cement to set and bind the entire mass."”
Establishes the definition of concrete that encompasses vermiculite concrete, the critical issue in the case.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCriswell operated a money museum in St. Petersburg Beach and contracted with Brinks to install a Grade B Central Station burglar alarm system. The con…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Duty To Disclose cases and more on FLexlaw
With consummate skill, appellee’s counsel persuaded a jury that vermiculite concrete is not concrete.
Criswell ran a money museum at St. Petersburg Beach. He needed a burglar alarm system and consulted with appellant and another company in the business. He rejected the most expensive type of installation which would have detected movement within the building regardless of the method of entry, but contracted with Brinks to furnish a Grade B Central Station system. Brinks undertook to protect “with traps all inaccessible windows, and with screens (or foils or traps) all accessible windows (except stationary show windows) doors, transoms, skylights, and other openings leading from the premises, and (protect) all ceilings and floors not constructed of concrete, and all hall, partition, and party walls enclosing the premises.”
The burglars cut a hole in the vermiculite concrete roof, dropped to the top of the rest room and gained entrance through an air conditioning duct. They removed a valuable coin collection on loan to Criswell.
There is nothing in this record to show that Brinks did not install exactly what it agreed to, nor is there the slightest evidence that the system was incorrectly installed. The plans for the building, formerly used by a bank, called the roof structure “vermiculite concrete.” There is no evidence that vermiculite concrete is not concrete, nor is there any suggestion that the word “concrete" is used in the specifications for the system except in a generic sense. Webster defines concrete as “an artificial building material made by mixing cement and sand with gravel, broken stone, or other aggregate, and sufficient water to cause the cement to set and bind the entire mass.” Vermiculite may make concrete lighter, but it is still concrete.
The pivotal question is one of interpretation, not of fact, and the trial judge, who expressed doubt at the time, should have directed a verdict for failure of the plaintiff Criswell to prove a cause of action.
We need not consider the other questions raised. Brinks undertook no obligation as an insurer, breached no duty to the plaintiff, and was not negligent so far as this record shows.
Reversed and remanded.
PIERCE, C. J., and BEACH, ROBERT E., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Moskovitz v. Brinks Signal Co., Inc., 245 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)…[*267] PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Brinks Signal Co. v. Criswell, Fla.App., 245 So. 2d 265, opinion filed February 19, 1971. PIERCE, C. J., and MANN, J., and BEACH, ROBERT E., Associate Judge, concur.…
-
Grover C. Criswell v. Brinks Signal Co., Inc., 262 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1972)…PER CURIAM. By petition for writ of certiorari, we are requested to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, 245 So. 2d 265, which allegedly conflicts with prior decisions of this Court. Our initial examination of the petition and record suggested a possible jurisdictional conflict. We issued the writ and have heard arguments on both jurisdiction and merits. After a th…