STATE OF FLORIDA, EX REL. OSBORNE WENDELL PRYOR, RELATOR,
v.
SAMUEL S. SMITH, CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR COLUMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A defendant charged with first degree murder seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent his retrial after a mistrial was declared, arguing the mistrial was unnecessary and therefore constituted a prohibited double jeopardy acquittal. The Florida appellate court denies the writ, holding that a trial judge has discretion to declare a mistrial when unadmitted evidence is improperly introduced into the jury room.
The court held that a mistrial was properly declared. The trial judge has discretion to declare a mistrial when there is a legally sufficient reason, including the impermissible intrusion of unadmitted evidence into the jury's deliberative process. Such a mistrial does not operate as an acquittal precluding retrial.
[1] A trial court has discretion to declare a mistrial when faced with circumstances that may impermissibly intrude upon the jury's deliberative process.
[2] The introduction of unadmitted evidence into the jury room constitutes an impermissible intrusion that may warrant a mistrial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The entry into the jury room of the unadmitted evidence amounted to an impermissible intrusion of the jury's deliberative process in violation of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Larkins v. Lewis, 54 So. 2d 199 (Fla.1951).”
Establishes the legal violation that justified the mistrial declaration
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRelator was indicted and tried for first degree murder. During jury deliberations after a four-day trial, four photographs of the murder victim and a …
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This is an original action in prohibition by which relator seeks to prevent his trial on first degree murder charges on the constitutional ground of double jeopardy.
Relator was indicted and tried for first degree murder. While the jury was deliberating the case after a four-day trial, four photographs of the murder victim and a deposition of one of the State’s witnesses, neither of which was entered into evidence, were allowed into the jury room. After the matter of such spurious evidence was brought to the court’s attention by defense counsel who stated to the court in chambers that the evidence was such that a mistrial should be granted, inquiry relating thereto was made of the bailiff and court reporter. The trial judge started to call the jury in but the defendant, relator here, objected to the matter being the subject of the jury’s special attention for the reason that “ * * if the purpose of the Court in bringing the jury back is for the purpose of inquiry, we would object to it as to this evidence because if the Court denies a motion for a mistrial, * * * it would put us in the untenable position that the evidence that was in the jury room was now brought forcibly to the attention of the jury, * * ”
Upon polling the jury as to whether the evidence was looked at in the jury room, the court declared a mistrial. *86Relator contends that a mistrial was not required and unnecessary in the circumstances and, therefore, the discharge of the jury operated as an acquittal. We do not agree and deny the writ. The entry into the jury room of the unadmitted evidence amounted to an impermissible intrusion of the jury’s deliberative process in violation of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Larkins v. Lewis, 54 So.2d 199 (Fla.1951).
In determining what is a legally sufficient reason for which .to declare a mistrial, the court must be armed with discretion since he is conducting the trial and is familiar with the circumstances, tensions and conditions which may be present in the courtroom. Adkins v. Smith, 205 So.2d 530 (Fla.1967). See also Smith v. State ex rel. Hamm, 225 So.2d 417 (Fla.1969), reversing State ex rel. Hamm v. Smith, 209 So.2d 876 (Fla.App.1968), upon which relator relies.
The suggestion for prohibition is denied.
JOHNSON, C. J., and RAWLS and SPECTOR, JJ., concur.
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Slaughter v. State, 301 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1974)…alleged indirect statement by one of the appellants, on the failure of the others to testify, is not sufficiently supported by the record. Furthermore in this case the final point fails to qualify as prejudicial error. State ex rel. Pryor v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 85 (Fla.App.1970); Gagnon v. State, 212 So. 2d 337 (Fla.App.1968) and Borst v. Gale, 99 Fla. 376, 126 So. 290 (1930). [*768] At most any error committed, if at all, is deemed harmless. Fla.Stat. §§ 59.041 and 924.33 (1971). For the foregoing reasons,…
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McCLOUD v. State, 208 So. 3d 668 (Fla. 2016)…ersarial process. See Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d 594, 600 (Fla.1957) (prohibiting jurors from receiving or adjudicating one’s guilt based on evidence independent of that properly received in the course of trial); see also State ex rel. Pryor v. Smith, 239 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970) (“The entry into the jury room of the unadmitted evidence amounted to an impermissible intrusion of the jury’s deliberative process in violation of the rule announced by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Larkins v. Lewis, 54…
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Donnie Lee Ivory v. State, 330 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…to the jury room, “(d) all things received in evidence other than depositions.” The entry into the jury room of unadmitted evidence amounts to an impermissible intrusion of the jury’s deliberative process. State ex rel. Pryor v. Smith, Fla.App.1970, 239 So. 2d 85. See Smith v. State, Fla.1957, 95 So. 2d 525, wherein the judge gave the jury, out of the presence of the defendant and defense counsel, a dictionary which was not in evidence. It is provided in Rule 3.410, RCrP, entitled “Jury Request to Review Ev…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Adkins v. Smith, 205 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1967)
- State Ex Rel. Larkins v. Lewis, 54 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1951)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Clayton Alvin Hamm v. Smith, 209 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Smith v. State of Fla. ex rel. Clayton Alvin Hamm, 225 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1969)