CALLOWAY BROWN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The court held that the penalty actually imposed for a crime, rather than the statutory classification of the crime itself, determines whether it constitutes a felony for purposes of a second offender charge.
The opinion discusses a defendant charged as a second offender. The first offense was under F.S. Section 810.05, which could be a felony or misdemeano…
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This case comes here by petition for certiorari supported by a certificate of the District Court of Appeal that the decision there passes upon a question of great public interest.1
No useful purpose would be served by an extended opinion of this Court. All facets of this troublesome question have been fully explored by the district court in the able majority and dissenting opinions and the copious authorities referred to in both opinions.
We are of the view that the majority opinion — a view supported by the majority of the courts over the country — should be and the same is hereby approved in all respects and adopted as the decision of this Court.
Much of the uncertainty concerning the question of what constitutes a felony under the constitution and laws of the state seems to have arisen out of the opinion of this Court in the case of Adams v. Elliott.2 Whatever is stated in that case or whatever inferences may be drawn from that case contrary to the conclusions reached in the majority opinion below are hereby receded from and overruled.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, THORNAL and CARLTON, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, C. J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority opinion herein to the extent of agreeing that the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor under F.S. Section 810.05, F.S.A., may be a felony dependent upon the penalty actually imposed. I do not believe it is necessary in this case or similar cases where second offender situations are involved to rigidly determine the *130status of the person charged for a second offense only by the nature of the language of the statute under which the first offense was charged.
It appears to me that when one is charged with a crime which may be punished either as a felony or as a misdemeanor, as e. g., under F.S. Section 810.05, F.S.A., the penalty actually imposed — either imprisonment in the state prison denoting the crime committed constituted a felony; or imprisonment in the county jail, or a fine, denoting the crime to be a misdemeanor— would be conclusive in determining later whether the convicted person could be charged as a second felony offender. If he was imprisoned in the state prison he could be so charged; if not, he could not be. Compare People v. Hamilton, 1948, 33 Cal.2d 45, 198 P.2d 873; People v. Trimble, 1936, 18 Cal.App.2d 350, 63 P.2d 1173. See also 95 A.L.R. 1112.
It seems harsh that one drawing a $50.00 fine under F.S. Section 810.05, F.S.A., would have that count as a first offense felony in a second offender case.
ERVIN, Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority opinion herein to the extent of agreeing that the crime of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor under F.S. Section 810.05, F.S.A., may be a felony dependent upon the penalty actually imposed. I do not believe it is necessary in this case or similar cases where second offender situations are involved to rigidly determine the status of the person charged for a second offense only by the nature of the language of the statute under which the first offense was charged.
It appears to me that when one is charged with a crime which may be punished either as a felony or as a misdemeanor, as e. g., under F.S. Section 810.05, F.S.A., the penalty actually imposed — either imprisonment in the state prison denoting the crime committed constituted a felony; or imprisonment in the county jail, or a fine, denoting the crime to be a misdemeanor— would be conclusive in determining later whether the convicted person could be charged as a second felony offender. If he was imprisoned in the state prison he could be so charged; if not, he could not be. Compare People v. Hamilton, 1948, 33 Cal.2d 45, 198 P. 2d 873; People v. Trimble, 1936, 18 Cal.App.2d 350, 63 P. 2d 1173. See also 95 A.L.R. 1112.
It seems harsh that one drawing a $50.00 fine under F.S. Section 810.05, F.S.A., would have that count as a first offense felony in a second offender case.
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Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Jenkins v. State, 267 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)…aking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor is a misdemeanor and not a felony, and therefore he was illegally convicted of a felony. He relied upon Brown v. State, Fla.App. 1970,232 So. 2d 55. Upon rehearing in Brown v. State, Fla. 1970, 237 So. 2d 129, however, the Fourth District Court concluded that breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor under F.S. § 810.05 F.S.A. is a felony, and this decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 237 So. 2d 129. This contention, therefore, i…1 / 2
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5F, LLC v. Dresing, 142 So. 3d 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…Elliott, 128 Fla. 79, 174 So. 731, 733 (1937) (“Riparian or littoral upland owners may construct appropriate piers or whar[ves] over and across the beach to reach the water for authorized purposes ....), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. State, 237 So. 2d 129 (Fla.1970). The riparian privilege or right is qualified not only by the necessity of obtaining a license from the State but by the predominant rights of the public in navigable waters such that “even when the title [to submerged lands] is in privat…
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Rogers v. State, 239 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)…n”. Rogers obviously relies upon the dissenting opinion of Judge McCain of the 4th District Court in the case of Brown [*119] v. State, Fla.App., 232 So. 2d 55. But the Supreme Court of Florida, upon further review of the same case, Brown v. State, 237 So. 2d 129, 1970, specifically overruled Judge McCain’s dissenting opinion, holding that an indictment or information charging a crime in essentially the same language as used in the instant case sufficiently stated a felony. This disposes of the only questio…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Calloway Brown v. State, 232 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Adams v. Elliott, 128 Fla. 79 (Fla. 1937)