SEAB ALLEN JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1970-03-30
No. 69-219
CROSS, C. J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
233 So. 2d 668 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1970)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Johnson appealed a denial of his motion to vacate a 60-year robbery sentence, alleging the trial court breached a plea agreement under which the prosecutor promised to recommend a 20-30 year sentence and appear at sentencing to communicate that recommendation. The appellate court found the allegations legally sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of the guilty plea.


Holding

The trial court erred in denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing because the unrebutted allegations were legally sufficient to raise the issue of voluntariness of the plea and therefore an evidentiary hearing was required.


Headnotes

[1] Allegations of a broken plea agreement, including the state's failure to make a sentencing recommendation and appear in court as promised, are legally sufficient to prese…

[2] A motion to vacate judgment and sentence based on allegations of a broken plea agreement requires an evidentiary hearing when the allegations are unrebutted by the record…

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Key Quotes

“the motion alleged an agreement between appellant and the county solicitor whereby appellant would plead guilty to one of the three counts of robbery with which he was charged, in exchange for which the county solicitor would submit a recommendation to the court that the defendant be sentenced to somewhere between twenty and thirty years maximum”

Establishes the core terms of the alleged plea agreement regarding sentencing recommendations.

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Facts & Procedural History

Johnson was charged with three counts of robbery. He allegedly agreed with the county solicitor to plead guilty to one count in exchange for the solic…

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Opinion of the Court
OWEN, Judge.

OWEN, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order denying without evidentiary hearing appellant’s motion filed pursuant tó CrPR 1.850, 33 F.S.A. seeking to vacate judgment and sentence.

Succinctly stated, the motion alleged an agreement between appellant and the county solicitor whereby appellant would plead guilty to one of the three counts of robbery with which he was charged, in exchange for which the county solicitor would submit a recommendation to the court that the defendant be sentenced to somewhere between twenty and thirty years maximum and would be present in court at the time the plea was entered in order to advise the court of such recommendation; that thereafter the appellant appeared in court and withdrew his previous plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty; that the court accepted the plea, withholding adjudication and sentence until a presentence investigation could be ordered; that subsequently, appellant appeared before the court for sentencing and was sentenced to sixty years, but the county solicitor failed to appear (either at the time the plea was entered or at the time of sentencing) to advise the court of the county solicitor’s recommendation for maximum sentence.

These allegations, unrebutted by the record, were legally sufficient to present the issue of voluntariness of appellant’s *669plea so as to require an evidentiary hearing on such allegations. See Broxson v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 511.

The order denying the motion to vacate is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court with directions that appellant be afforded an evidentiary hearing on the allegations contained in the motion to vacate.

Reversed and remanded.

CROSS, C. J., and WALDEN, J., concur.


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