PETER PANTAGES, APPELLANT,
v.
CONSTRUCTION TRADES QUALIFYING BOARD OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1970-02-03
No. 69-507
Before CHARLES CARROLL, BARK-DULL and HENDRY, JJ.
231 So. 2d 236 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1970) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

The court held that the dismissal of the petition for writ of mandamus was proper because the issues raised could have been, or were, addressed in prior proceedings.


Headnotes

[1] A prior circuit court judgment denying certiorari, from which no appeal was taken, renders subsequent claims regarding the underlying administrative order res judicata.

[2] A petition for writ of mandamus is an improper procedural vehicle to seek review of a prior circuit court judgment that denied certiorari.

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Facts & Procedural History

An electrician's certificate was suspended pending re-examination. He sought review by certiorari, which was denied, and a subsequent motion for relie…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

On and prior to May 13, 1965, the appellant Peter Pantages held a valid countywide certificate of competency as a master electrician issued to him by Metropolitan Dade County. On May 13, 1965, after a hearing based on certain complaints relating to the manner of performance of such work by Pantages, the Metropolitan Dade County Electric Contractors’ Examining Board rendered a unanimous decision suspending his certificate of competency “pending re-examination” by the Board. That ruling specified it was taken under Chapter 10-14(a) (1) of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County.1

*237Pursuant to the provision in section 10-15 of the code for review of such decisions by certiorari in the circuit court of Dade County, Pantages timely sought review of the suspension order by petition for certio-rari filed in the circuit court. That proceeding was terminated by a judgment denying certiorari, entered by the circuit court on August 11, 1966. No appeal was taken therefrom, but later Pantages applied to the circuit court, under Rule 1.540, RCP, 31 F.S.A., for relief from the suspension order, contending that the order was void. That motion was denied by the circuit court.

Thereafter, on September 24, 1968, Pan-tages filed in the circuit court a petition for alternative writ of mandamus, the object of which was to compel the respondent Board “to enter a legal judgment” in accordance with the applicable provision of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County. The circuit court issued a rule to show cause as to why an alternative writ of mandamus should not issue. The Board filed a response, contending the matter was res judicata because of the prior proceedings referred to above, and contending that the action in mandamus was improper in that it was an untimely effort to review the 1966 judgment of the circuit court, from which no appeal had been taken. Upon hearing on the rule to show cause the circuit court entered an order dismissing the petition for alternative writ of mandamus. Pantages then filed this appeal from the last mentioned order of the circuit court.

The appellant contends that the order of the Board, suspending his certificate “pending re-examination” was not a lawful order in that it is not one which the Board was authorized to make under the code.2 In support of that contention the appellant argues that the provision of the code which, as to suspension, specifies that the “decision” shall be “Suspension of the certificate, stating time,” requires that a suspension decision must fix a time period (in days or months) ; that a suspension “pending re-examination” does not meet the requirement of the code for such suspension order to fix the “time” thereof, but in effect amounts to a revocation of the certificate, in that it places the appellant in the status of one not holding a certificate, who must apply and be examined in order to obtain a certificate; and appellant points out that, as a revocation, the Board’s order was not in the form required by the code for a revocation decision.

The appellee contends, and we agree, that the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the mandamus action must be affirmed, aside from any consideration of the merits of the appellant’s contentions which are listed above. Section 10-15 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County provided for review of the Board’s suspension order by petition for certiorari in the circuit court. That conferred avenue of review was pursued by Pantages, resulting in a judgment adverse to him, which had the effect of leaving the Board’s suspension ruling undisturbed. The defects in the Board’s order which are suggested here either were or could have been contended for in seeking relief from the order in the initial proceeding for review in the circuit court. In addition, those matters were brought to the attention of the circuit *238court by a subsequent motion for relief, which was denied.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court denying mandamus is affirmed.


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  • Morse Diesel Int'l, Inc. v. 2000 Island Boulevard, Inc., 698 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …ed any such allegation. The fact that Williams Island was unsuccessful in its attempts to have the bond reduced and/or released with these motions did not render such remedies inadequate. See Pantages v. Constr. Trades Qualifying Bd. of Dade County, 231 So. 2d 236, 237-38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). We further find that the writ was improvidently issued where Morse Diesel was an interested party to this proceeding but was given no notice and opportunity to be heard on the issues raised in the petition. “[W]here it a…
  • Maynard Witherspoon v. State, 710 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …a. 5th DCA 1996). This court’s ruling on direct appeal cannot be changed or challenged by collateral attack, through whatever form Witherspoon may chose to formulate his challenge. See Pantages v. Construction Trades Qualifying Board of Dade County, 231 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). We caution Witherspoon that bringing any more successive collateral attacks raising these same issues may result in his loss of gain time. Tillery v. State, 705 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). See Davis v. State, 705 So. 2d 133 (…

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