BANK OF HALLANDALE, APPELLANT,
v.
JOE W. SULLIVAN'S CONCRETE SERVICE, INCORPORATED, APPELLEE
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A bank challenged venue in a dishonored cashier's check dispute, arguing the action must be brought in the county where the bank conducts its business, not where the check was presented for payment. The court reversed the lower court's denial of the dismissal motion, holding that venue was improper in Dade County because the cause of action accrued and the property in litigation were located in Broward County where the bank was situated.
The court held that the action cannot be brought in Dade County because none of the venue provisions under § 47.051, Fla.Stat. permit it. The cause of action accrued in Broward County where the bank is located and where the check would be paid, and the property in litigation is located in Broward County, not Dade County.
“a check is a written contract to be performed at the place where is located the banking house or place of business of the person on whom it is drawn”
Establishes the legal principle that the place of performance and accrual of a cause of action regarding a check is at the drawee's place of business
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBank of Hallandale, which operates its only office in Hallandale, Broward County, issued a cashier's check payable to Central Bank of North Dade for c…
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The question raised on this interlocutory appeal is whether the Circuit Court in and for Dade County erred in denying the motion of the- Bank of Hallandale to dismiss the appellee’s complaint because of improper venue.
We reverse because none of the provisions in § 47.051,1 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., permits the action to be brought in Dade County.
The appellant transacts its customary business in Hallandale, Broward County, Florida, and has its only office there. It issued a cashier’s check payable “To the order of Central Bank of North Dade for credit to the account of Joe W. Sullivan Concrete Service, Inc.” The complaint alleges that the cashier’s check was dishonored by the appellant. The appellant moved to dismiss the complaint relying upon § 47.051, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., and Permenter v. Bank of Green Cove Springs, Fla.App.1962, 136 So.2d 377.
In Permenter the court held that “a check is a written contract to be performed at the place where is located the banking house or place of business of the person on whom it is drawn * * Under this rule the place of performance (payment) in the present case is the drawee-appellee’s place of business; the cause of action, if any, therefore accrued in Broward County. In Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Cassel, Fla.App.1966, 188 So.2d 351, we held that “cashier’s checks * * * should have been considered the same as cash by [a] garnishee.” But the fact that a cashier’s check must be regarded as the equivalent of cash in some circumstances does not change the law regarding the place where a check is to be paid as stated in the Permenter case. So far as that question is concerned, a cashier’s check is no different from an ordinary check.
Our final holding is that the property in litigation is located in Broward County, not in Dade County. A check is property and can be the basis of a prosecution for larceny. 2 Wharton Criminal Law, Larceny, § 491. But while the dishonored check is in Dade County, the check itself is not the property in litigation. The property in litigation is the alleged debt of which the cashier’s check is evidence. See Clark v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 186 Ill. 440, 57 N.E. 1061, 53 L.R.A. 232 (1900), cited in Amos v. Baird, 96 Fla. 181, 117 So. 789 (1928).
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Blair v. Davis, 281 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)…sented for payment to the drawee bank and default is made in payment, a cause of action accrues then and there against the drawer. Permenter v. Bank of Green Cove Springs, supra; Bank of Hallandale v. Sullivan’s Concrete Service, Inc., Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 260. Analyzing the Permenter and Hallandale cases, supra, which appear to hold that when the drawee bank defaults in payment of a check the cause of action accrues at that time and place, we think it may be said equally and conversely that where a chec…
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Shindler v. State Wide Recovery & Research Corp., 330 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)…nty. The appellate court reversed, sustaining the venue in Duval county, holding the check was a written contract to be performed at the place of business of the drawee. In Bank of Hallandale v. Joe Sullivari's Concrete Service, Inc., Fla.App.1968, 216 So. 2d 260, this court followed Permenter. In the Hallandale case, the Bank of Hal-landale, located in Broward county, as maker, issued a check made payable “To the order of Central Bank of North Dade, for credit to the account of Joe W. Sullivan Concrete Serv…
Authorities Cited
- Permenter v. Bank OF Green Cove Springs, 136 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)
- Amos v. Baird, 96 Fla. 181 (Fla. 1928)
- The Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y OF the United States v. Marwin S. Cassel, 188 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)