JAMES R. LYDICK, FRESSA ANNE BARBER AND JAMES RUDOLPH BLIZZARD, APPELLANTS,
v.
MARJORY MAE CHANCE AND HARRY ARTHUR CHANCE, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1968-10-25
No. 68-14
PIERCE, A. C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
214 So. 2d 885 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1968)

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Synopsis

In this negligence case, the court affirmed a jury verdict against Mr. Chance, finding him liable for striking Mrs. Barber's disabled vehicle on a highway. The appellants challenged the verdict, arguing Mrs. Barber was contributorily negligent for leaving her car on the roadway rather than moving it, but the court held that the preservation of life outweighed the preservation of evidence.


Holding

The court held that Mr. Chance is liable; Mrs. Barber was not required by statute to preserve the car on the highway and made a reasonable, honest decision to wait for the trooper. Blizzard and Lydick are also liable as the drivers and owner respectively. The jury verdict against Chance was supported by sufficient evidence.


Key Quotes

“The preservation of life is more important than the preservation of evidence.”

Establishes the court's reasoning that Mrs. Barber's decision to wait for the trooper rather than move her disabled car was reasonable as a matter of law.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lydick's car, driven by Blizzard, struck Mrs. Barber's car, which was then left disabled on the outside lane of a four-lane highway with its lights on…

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Opinion of the Court
MANN, Judge.

MANN, Judge.

Mrs. Chance was a passenger in her husband’s car when it struck Mrs. Barber’s car, which was left, lights on but motionless, in the outside lane of a four-lane highway after Lydick’s car, driven by Blizzard, struck it. The inside lane was almost completely clear, and traffic flowed through it without incident on this wet night for several minutes before Chance came along. He saw the Barber car, but thought it was moving. The jury found against Mr. Chance, on evidence of contributory negligence which might have justified summary judgment. Parker v. Hyndman, 207 So.2d 39 (Fla.App.1968). The uncontradicted evidence was that he had had “a couple of drinks”.

Nothing in the statutes compelled Mrs. Barber to leave her car on the highway until the trooper arrived. It was driveable. See Fla.Statutes §§ 317.071, 317.081 and 317.442 (1967), F.S.A. The preservation of life is more important than the preservation of evidence. She made an honest, but in this case mistaken, decision. Blizzard may be held liable for the reasons best expressed in Ellingson v. Willis, 170 So.2d 311 (Fla.App.1964), and Lydick is liable because he owned the car and consented to Blizzard’s driving it.

Appellants’ reliance on Sims v. Apperson Chemicals, Inc., 185 So.2d 179 (Fla.App.1966) is misplaced. Unlike other cases cited by them in which drivers were denied recovery, Sims involved passengers, as *887here. But there was no proof there of causation. Plaintiffs’ mother collided with a truck parked on a Jacksonville street and founded negligence on an ordinance forbidding parking for the night. That ordinance might well have related as much to street cleaning as accident prevention, and no causative agency was shown.

Appellants contend that a continuance should have been granted because Blizzard was on naval duty in Viet Nam. But one postponement had been given them, the case had been pending for more than two years, during which time Blizzard was home for nearly a month. His testimony could have been taken under Rule 1.290(d), 30 F.S.A. Denial of further continuance was not an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

PIERCE, A. C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.


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