ANTONIO J. NAVARRA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE CENTRAL NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF OMAHA, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In an insurance coverage dispute, the plaintiff appealed a judgment on the pleadings entered by the trial court in favor of the defendant insurer. The appellate court reversed because the trial court lacked authority to enter judgment on the pleadings before the defendant had filed its answer, making the pleadings not yet closed.
The trial court lacked authority to enter the judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings were not closed when the judgment was entered—the defendant had not yet filed its answer and its motion to dismiss had not been ruled upon. The court declined to decide whether a motorscooter constitutes a motorcycle under the policy language.
“After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
This quote from Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(c) establishes the requirement that pleadings must be closed before judgment on the pleadings can be entered.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Navarra was injured while operating a motorscooter in a parking lot and sought hospital benefits under a group hospitalization insurance pol…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Judgment On The Pleadings cases and more on FLexlaw
The plaintiff in an action upon an insurance policy has appealed from a final judgment on the pleadings entered by the Circuit Court for Volusia County in favor of the defendant.
The primary question presented for our determination in this appeal is whether, under our procedural rules, the said judgment was properly entered prior to the defendant’s filing of its answer to. the plaintiff’s complaint.
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendant, an insurer, issued its group hospitalization policy covering him and that within the coverage period he was injured and hospitalized as a result of a vehicle collision in a cetrain parking lot while he was operating “a motorscooter (a scooter, not a motorcycle) * * * ” and that he demanded that the defendant pay hospital benefits in accordance with the said policy but the defendant denied coverage.
The policy sued upon, a copy of which is attached to the complaint, provides for coverage of insured persons injured in automobile accidents while “ * * * riding within or driving any private automobile of the exclusively pleasure type (motorcycles excepted) * * * ”
The intriguing question of whether a mo-torscooter constitutes a motorcycle under the quoted policy provision is not necessary to be determined in this appeal if we hold, as we do, that the trial court had no authority to enter the judgment appealed from. In this appeal we do not pass upon the said question one way or the other.
A trial court’s authority to enter a judgment on the pleadings is grounded upon the following provision of Rule 1.140(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure:
“Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
It is well established by the decisions of this court that both the letter and the spirit of the quoted provision require that the pleadings be closed before the trial court can properly enter a judgment on the *613pleadings. In effect, we so held in Davis v. Davis, Fla., 123 So.2d 377 (1960). See also Reinhard v. Bliss, 85 So.2d 131 (Fla.1956). Rule 1.140(c), however, requires no judicial construction because the rule specifically states that a party may move for a judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed.
On the date when the court entered the judgment on the pleadings, the defendant had not filed its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint nor had the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint been ruled on by the court, so the pleadings were not then closed.
Under these conditions we think that the court prematurely and without authority entered the final judgment on the pleadings appealed from herein. That judgment, therefore, must be, and it is, reversed and the cause remanded with directions for further proceedings consistent with the views above set forth.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
WIGGINTON, C. J., and RAWLS, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Drs. M.N. Farag and S.T. Iranpur v. Nat'l Databank Subscriptions, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…even though the judgment favored White and he needed only to file his answer in order to close the pleadings. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Vanguard Insurance Company, 400 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Navarra v. Central National Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. GRIMES, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.…
-
Metro. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Vanguard Ins. Co., 400 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)…though the judgment favored the defendant and the defendant needed only to file its answer in order to close the pleadings. J & S Coin Operated Machines, Inc. v. Gottlieb, 362 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Navarra v. Central National Insurance Co., 213 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). In any event, the documents relating to the motion to strike as sham could not provide a basis for a judgment on the pleadings. Moreover, the allegations of the initial complaint were irrelevant because they were superseded by s…
Authorities Cited
- Reinhard v. Bliss, 85 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1956)
- Davis v. Davis, 123 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)