TAMIAMI TRAIL TOURS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
GREYHOUND LINES, INC., SOUTHERN GREYHOUND LINES DIVISION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Greyhound obtained a temporary injunction preventing competitor Tamiami Trail Tours from operating bus service on the Sunshine State Turnpike. The appellate court reversed, holding that the injunction improperly disturbed the status quo and that Greyhound failed to demonstrate irreparable injury, as business losses can be adequately remedied through damages.
The temporary injunction was improperly granted because it disturbed rather than preserved the status quo, and Greyhound failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. Mere loss of business to a competitor is insufficient to warrant a temporary injunction when any damages can be documented and assessed after final hearing.
“The general function of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until full relief can be granted following a final hearing.”
Establishes the primary purpose and legal standard for temporary injunctions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGreyhound Lines held certificated authority to operate bus service over the Sunshine State Turnpike between Fort Lauderdale and Yeehaw Junction. Tamia…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Preservation Of Status Quo cases and more on FLexlaw
This is an interlocutory appeal directed toward an order granting a temporary injunction.
Plaintiff, Greyhound Lines, Inc., filed a complaint against Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., seeking to prevent Tamiami from operating its bus service over that portion of the Sunshine State Turnpike between Fort Lauderdale and Yeehaw Junction.
Without framing the sophisticated issues that underlie, it is sufficient to note that the complaint alleged that Greyhound had certificated authority to operate over the Turnpike and that Tamiami did not; that Tamiami intended to initiate operations between West Palm Beach and Orlando over the Turnpike; and that Greyhound was thereby entitled to a temporary injunction restraining Tamiami.
After hearing, a temporary injunction was granted restraining Tamiami from use of the Turnpike between Fort Lauderdale and Yeehaw Junction. The order found that “use of a portion of the Parkway by Tamiami will result in irreparable damage to Greyhound, for which it has no adequate remedy at law. It is obvious that the unauthorized use of a bus route by a competitor would result in irreparable damage to the authorized user.”
We hold this finding to be erroneous and therefore reverse.
The general function of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until full relief can be granted following a final hearing.1 It is conceded by Greyhound that Tamiami has operated over the Turnpike between Fort Lauder-dale and Orlando for some three years. Thus, the effect of the injunction was to disturb, rather than preserve the status quo.
In order to support the granting of a temporary injunction it is also necessary for plaintiff to demonstrate irreparable injury; injury which cannot be redressed in a court of law.2 Mere loss of business because of a competitor will not suffice.3 Any loss Greyhound might suffer as a result of Tamiami’s operation over the route in question could be easily documented by ticket sales and use, and damages assessed after final hearing.
*367Because the temporary injunction has materially disturbed the status quo prior to a final hearing and adjudication upon the merits, and no irreparable damage has been shown, we reverse that portion of the order appealed granting temporary injunction against Tamiami.
Reversed.
REED and OWEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (26 total)
-
City OF Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 634 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…oversy in much the same way that enjoining collection of past fines does. The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final hearing when full relief may be granted. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 212 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). A preliminary injunction does not decide the merits of the case unless (1) the hearing is specially set for that purpose, (2) the parties have had a full opportunity to present their cases, University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451…
-
Ladner v. Plaza del Prado Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 423 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…nary stage before the parties have had an opportunity for a full hearing. The purpose of a temporary injunction1 is to preserve the status quo until a final hearing when full relief may be granted. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 212 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). A preliminary injunction does not decide the merits of the case unless (1) the hearing is specially set for that purpose, (2) the parties have had a full opportunity to present their cases, University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451…
-
3299 N. Fed. Hwy., Inc. v. Bd. OF Cnty. Comm'rs OF Broward Cnty., 646 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…en, do not constitute irreparable harm because the amounts lost or expended can be calculated after the fact and be fully compensated by money damages. South Florida Limousines, 512 So. 2d at 1062; Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 212 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). 3299 argues in its initial brief that it offered evidence that the value of these business losses could not be determined, seeking application of the principle discussed in Liza Danielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So. 2d 73…
Previewing 3 of 26 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Egan v. The City of Miami, 130 Fla. 465 (Fla. 1938)
- N. Dade Water Co. v. Adken Land Co., 114 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Stoner v. S. Peninsula Zoning Comm'n, 75 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1954)
- The Prof'l Golfers Ass'n OF Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 166 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Daniel v. Earlene V. Williams, 189 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)