NELDA S. CAULFIELD, ALSO KNOWN AS NELDA S. HUMPHRIES, APPELLANT,
v.
HUBERT E. CAULFIELD, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed a lower court's order, finding that the appellant received adequate notice of a hearing and that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in amending a final divorce decree. The court also denied the appellant's attorney's motions for fees for prosecuting the appeal.
No, the appellant received adequate notice of the hearing, thus not being denied due process. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in amending the final divorce decree.
“However, the record discloses that appellant was given adequate notice of the hearing, and thus appellant was not denied due process of law.”
Establishes the court's finding regarding the appellant's due process claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant contended she was not notified of a hearing affecting her rights, and that the chancellor abused his discretion in amending a final divo…
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At the .outset, appellant contends that she was not notified of a hearing at which an adjudication was made affecting certain of her rights. However, the record discloses that appellant was given adequate *268notice of the hearing, and thus appellant was not denied due process of law.
Appellant, in her other points on appeal, contends that the chancellor abused his discretion by making certain amendments to a final decree of divorce. Upon considering those contentions of appellant which are not now moot, we believe that she has failed to show that the chancellor committed reversible error. Therefore, the order is affirmed.
Attorney for appellant has filed motions for attorney’s fees for prosecuting this appeal. Upon consideration, the motions are denied.
Affirmed.
LILES, C. J., and ALLEN and HOB-SON, JJ., concur.