WILLIAM CROTTS, PETITIONER,
v.
MONTGOMERY WARD & COMPANY AND THE FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS
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Crotts received permanent total disability compensation for a back injury caused by an industrial accident. The Florida Industrial Commission attempted to reverse the award and apportion disability to his pre-existing Parkinson's disease, but the Florida Supreme Court held that apportionment is only permitted when pre-existing disease is accelerated or aggravated by the injury, which the record did not establish here.
The court held that apportionment is only permitted under Florida Statute Section 440.02(19) when a pre-existing disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident. Where, as here, the evidence clearly shows the pre-existing disease was not accelerated or aggravated, and the back disability causing unemployment is solely caused by the industrial injury, apportionment is not permitted.
“limiting apportionment thereunder to the situation "where a pre-existing disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident"”
Establishes the statutory condition required for apportionment under F.S. Sec. 440.02(19)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCrotts suffered a back injury from an industrial accident. He had a pre-existing Parkinson's disease. The Industrial Commission found that his Parkins…
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Petitioner in this case was awarded permanent total disability compensation for a back injury based on findings (1) that his pre-existing Parkinson’s disease was not accelerated or aggravated by the injury, and (2) that the back disability which on the basis of his education and experience makes him unemployable “is solely caused by the industrial injuries.”
The Commission has reversed and remanded for apportionment of disability from disease to the extent it had progressed at the time of the award, on authority of Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission, Fla. 1967, 196 So.2d 748. That decision, however, does not alter the provision of the statute, F.S. Sec. 440.02(19), F.S.A., limiting apportionment thereunder to the situation “where a pre-existing disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident * *
The record evidence in this case clearly sustains the finding that claimant’s preexisting disease was not accelerated or aggravated by his accidental injury, and that the back disability which makes him unemployable is caused by the industrial injury and not by the disease. This conclusion in the present case is not, in our opinion, affected by evidence that claimant’s diseased condition prevents rehabilitation and corrective surgery. The statute does not provide for apportionment when a com-pensable injury is aggravated by disease, but attempts only to define the measure of apportionment when a compensable disability is attributable in part to aggravation or acceleration of pre-existing disease. The Evans decision in no way impinges that statutory condition by holding that when pre-existing disease is in fact aggravated by accident so that the resulting loss of earning capacity is attributable to or caused in part by the disease, then that apportiona-ble part shall be measured by and limited to disability caused by disease independent of aggravation and existing at the time of the accident or through normal progress *98“at the time permanent disability is determined and an award is made.”
The order of the Commission is therefore quashed and the cause remanded with directions for reinstatement of the award.
CALDWELL, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
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Lane v. Pipeline Constr. Co. & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 222 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1969)…l Corporation v. Coleman (Fla.1968), 216 So. 2d 193; Genereux v. Caribbean Concessions, Inc. (Fla.1968), 211 So. 2d 1; Fisher v. Carroll Daniel Fisher Construction Company (Fla.1968), 212 So. 2d 289; Crotts v. Montgomery Ward and Company (Fla.1968), 208 So. 2d 97, and Holloway v. Curcie Brothers, Inc. (Fla.1967), 203 So. 2d 499. It is quite apparent from this record that Lane’s injury falls into a category resulting solely from the accident or from acceleration of aggravation of his pre-existing disease or…
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Randall v. Wolfson & Diamond & the Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 215 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1968)…nclusion that the full commission was in error in reversing the deputy in this respect. It should be pointed out that subsequent to the Stephens and Evans cases this Court handed down two opinions, viz. Crotts v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Fla.1968, 208 So. 2d 97, and Robinette v. E. R. Jahna Industries, Inc., Fla.1968, 208 So. 2d 104. Both of these cases related to apportionment of disability for pre-existing disease or condition and further amplified the decisions of this Court in Stephens and Evans and in…
Authorities Cited
- Evans v. Fla. Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967)