WILLIAM A. DROMGOOLE, FREDERICK G. TURNBULL, AND CHARLES A. LACOSTE, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
THE FARMERS' AND MERCHANTS' BANK OF MISSISSIPPI

U.S. | 1844-01-01
2 How. 241 Supreme Court of the United States (1844) Caution
Also reported at: 11 L. Ed. 252 · 1844 U.S. LEXIS 327 · SCDB 1844-014
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

A Memphis bank brought suit in federal circuit court against Mississippi citizens on a promissory note, claiming diversity jurisdiction based on a Mississippi statute requiring all parties to the note be joined as plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over such suits by assignees of promissory notes when both the original payees and makers are citizens of the same state, as this falls within the statutory prohibition that assignments cannot create federal jurisdiction where none would have existed before the assignment.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice STORY

Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi. The original action was brought by the bank of Memphis, alleging the stockholders to be citizens of Tennessee, against the plaintiffs in’ error, (the original defendants,) alleging them to be citizens of Mississippi ; and it was founded upon a promissory note made by Dromgoole and Turnbull, (two of the defendants,) dated at Princeton, Washington county, Mississippi, May 17th, 1838, whereby on .the 1st of January, 1839, they, or either of them promised to pay to the order of Briggs, Lácoste and Co., .$2899 50, for value received, payable and negotiable at the Planters’ Bank of Mississippi, at Natchez. The declaration alleged title in the bank to the note by the endorsement of the payees, Lácoste using the name, and description of Briggs, Lácoste and Co. to them; and the suit was brought jointly against both the maker and the payee, in conformity to a statute of Mississippi, authorizing .such a proceeding. The defendants pleaded that they are citizens of Mississippi, and that the persons composing the firm of Briggs, Lacoste and Co. .were, and yet are citizens and residents of. Mississippi, and were so at the time of the supposed transfer and delivery of the promissory note to the bank. To this plea there was a demurrer and joinder, on which the Circuit Court gave judgment for the bank-; and the present writ of error is brought to revise that judgment.

The. 11th section of' the Judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, provides, “Nor shall any district.or circuit court have cognisance of any’suit to recover the contents of any promissory note j or alter those in action in favour-of an assignee, unless the suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents, if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.” Now, the present case falls directly within the prohibition of this clause. The spit is brought by the plaintiffs to recover the. contents of a promissory note of which they are the-endorsees of the payee, and the payee and the makers are all citizens of Mississippi. The ground on which the original judgment was given, probably, was that the statute of Mississippi required all-th'e-parties to the note to be joined in the suit; and as all the plaintiffs were citizens of Tennessee, and all, the defendants citizens of Mississippi, it was a case, falling'directly within the general provisions of the 11th section of the Judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, which gives jurisdiction to the Circuit Court in cases,where “ the suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state.” But it has been already decided by this court, that the statute of Mississippi is óf no forcé or-effect in the courts of the United States, and that independently of that statute-no such joint action is by law maintainable. This was decided in Keary v. The Farmers’ and Merchants’ Bank of Memphis, 16 Peters, 89. The other point, that the case falls within the prohibition of the 11th section of the. Judiciary act of 1789, ch. 20, was as fully recognised by this court in Gibson and Martin v. Chew, 16 Peters, 315.

There is nothing then in the present case which is open for argument. The,judgment of the Circuit Court of the southern district of Mississippi is, therefore, reversed, and the'cause remanded to that court with .directions-to. enter a judgment for the defendants.

order. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from, the Circuit Court' of the United States for die southern district ' of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel. Oh consideration whereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by-this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court, in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed with costs, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said ’ Circuit Court, with directions to that* court to enter judgment for the defendants.


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  • Kingman v. W. Mfg. Co., 170 U.S. 675 (U.S. 1898)
    …not seasonably sued out within [*679] section. 1007, Rev. Stat., sixty days having elapsed since the judgment was originally entered, and Mr. Chief Justice Waite, delivering the opinion of the court, said: “Under the ruling in Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 241, the motion made during the term to set aside the judgment of March 2 suspended the operation of that judgment, so that it did not take final effect for the purposes of a writ of error until May 20, when the motion was disposed of. In addition to th…
  • Memphis v. Brown, 94 U.S. 715 (U.S. 1876)
    …cause. The city was then for the first time required, in express terms', to subject this particular class of property to the adjudged taxation. The writ was, therefore, properly sued out upon the judgment. Under the ruling in Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 241, the motion made during the term to set aside the judgment of [*718] March 2 suspended the operation of that judgment, so that it did not take final effect for the purposes of a writ of error until May 20, when the motion was disposed of. In additio…
  • The President v. Moss, 6 How. 31 (U.S. 1848)

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