STATE, EX REL. PAUL C. ALBRITTON,
v.
J. M. LEE, AS COMPTROLLER; AND STATE, EX REL. M. G. ROWE, V. J. M. LEE, AS COMPTROLLER
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The Florida Supreme Court held that its Justices were not disqualified from hearing cases due to a lack of direct and substantial pecuniary interest, especially when disqualification would leave the court unable to function. The court ordered the cases to proceed to final determination.
No, the Justices are not disqualified. The court held that a lack of direct and substantial pecuniary interest means the Justices are not disqualified as a matter of law. Furthermore, the absence of a statutory mechanism for replacing disqualified Justices means they must proceed to avoid rendering the court incompetent.
“there being no direct and substantial pecuniary interest of any Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida in the outcome of, or in the judgment to be rendered in the course of deciding, the controversies involved in these several proceedings, that no Justice of this Court is disqualified, as a matter of law, from participating in, or deciding,' the several cases now before this Court”
Establishes the primary legal standard for disqualification based on lack of direct and substantial pecuniary interest.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSeveral legal proceedings were before the Florida Supreme Court. The core issue was whether the Justices of the Supreme Court were disqualified from h…
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The Court holds that there being no direct and substantial pecuniary interest of any Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida in the outcome of, or in the judgment to be rendered in the course of deciding, the controversies involved in these several proceedings, that no Justice of this Court is disqualified, as a matter of law, from participating in, or deciding,' the several cases now before this Court, especially in view of the circumstance that if the opposite view were expressed, there would be no Supreme Court,-as a competent judicial tribunal,.capable of deciding the said controversies, the Legislature having enacted no statute prescribing regulations for calling into the’ Supreme Court Judges of the Circuit Court to hear *808and determine matters pending before the Supreme Court in cases where each and all of the commissioned Justices of the Supreme Court shall hold themselves disqualified or disabled to act from interest or other cause. See Section 6, Article V, State Constitution; Section 2959 R. G. S., 4688 C. G. L.; Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup Ct. Rep. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887. Compare, Tumey v. Ohio, 273, U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, 71 L. Ed. 508, 50 A. L. R. 1243.
It is accordingly ordered that the several causes be proceeded with to final determination according to law, and that this Court direct the setting of same for final hearing and submission on a date to be indicated by the Chief Justice, and communicated to counsel for the respective parties.
Ellis, C. J., and Wi-iitfield, Terrell, Brown, Buford and Davis, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1927)
- Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (U.S. 1920)