HERNANDEZ ET AL.
v.
VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION ET AL.

U.S. | 1974-03-04
No. 72-700
Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a statement concurring in the result, post, p. 393.
415 U.S. 391 Supreme Court of the United States (1974) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 39 L. Ed. 2d 412 · 94 S. Ct. 1177 · 1974 U.S. LEXIS 109 · SCDB 1973-068
Cited by 28 cases

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Holding

The Court held that 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) does not bar judicial review of constitutional challenges to veterans' benefits legislation.


Facts & Procedural History

Class I-O conscientious objectors who completed alternative civilian service were denied educational benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Benefit…

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Brennan

Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, like the appellee and his class in Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 361, are Class I-O conscientious objectors who, upon completion of alternative civilian service pursuant to § 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.

S. C. App. § 456 (j), and the governing regulations of the Selective Service System, 32 CFR, Part 1660, applied for educational benefits provided by the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966. The Veterans’ Administration denied petitioners’ application for the reasons upon which appellee Robison’s request was denied, i. e., because a Class I-O conscientious objector who has performed alternative civilian service does not qualify under 38 U.

S. C. § 1652 (a)(1) as a "veteran who . . . served on active duty” (defined in 38 U.

S. C. § 101 (21) as “full-time duty in the Armed Forces”), and is therefore not an “eligible veteran” entitled under 38 U.

S. C. § 1661 (a) to veterans’ educational benefits provided by the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966.

Alleging that those sections of the 1966 Act discriminate against conscientious objectors in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and infringe the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, petitioners filed two actions seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief and requesting the convening of a three-judge district court. The District Court consolidated the two cases and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that “plaintiffs’ requests for affirmative relief are not within the jurisdiction of this Court due to the mandate of 38 U.

S. C. § 211 (a) ... [and] the plaintiffs’ challenge . . . based on alleged violations of the Fifth and First Amendments to the United States Constitution are [sic] insubstantial and without merit.” 339 F. Supp. 913, 916 (ND Cal. 1972). Notwithstanding the District Court’s dismissal of petitioners’ constitutional claims on the ground of insubstantiality, the Court of Appeals, as we read that court’s opinion, construed the order of dismissal as based solely upon the jurisdictional bar of §211 (a), and af firmed the District Court on that ground. 467 F. 2d 479 (1972). We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument with Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 361. 411 U. S. 981 (1973).

We have held today in Johnson v. Robison that § 211 (a) does not bar judicial consideration of constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion hi Johnson v. Robison.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Robison, ante, p. 386.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1980)
    …, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-1169, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974), .the Supreme Court held that section 211(a) does not preclude judicial review of the constitutionality of veterans’ benefits legislation. Hernandez v. Veterans’ Administration, 415 U.S. 391, 393, 94 S.Ct. 1177, 1178, 39 L.Ed.2d 412 (1974); Moore v. Johnson, 582 F. 2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1978). The Court stated: [*1084] The prohibitions [of § 211(a)] would appear to be aimed at review only of those decisions of law or fact that arise i…
    1 / 2
  • Wayne State Univ. v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1978)
    …and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise. . See companion case of Hernandez v. Veterans’ Administration, 415 U.S. 391, 94 S.Ct. 1177, 39 L.Ed.2d 412 (1974). . See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. at 366 n. 8, 94 S.Ct. 1160, and accompanying text. . In 1970 Congress amended § 211(a) to its present form. Prior to that time it stated in pertinent part that the decision…
  • Isobel Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1978)
    …May 1974, we reversed by means of a brief memorandum in which we “remanded to the district court for further consideration in light of Johnson v. Robison, [415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974)]; Hernandez v. Veterans’ Administration, [415 U.S. 391, 94 S.Ct. 1177, 39 L.Ed.2d 412 (1974)]; Arnett v. Kennedy, [416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974)]; and Scheuer v. Rhodes, [416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)].” On remand the district court, as previously indicated, dism…

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