RACHEL MILLER, APPELLANT,
v.
BLUE CROSS OF FLORIDA, INC., AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA, INC., FLORIDA CORPORATIONS, APPELLEES
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The court held that substantial, competent evidence supported the trial court's finding that the plaintiff's hospitalization was not covered under the insurance policies due to policy exclusions.
The appellant sought to recover under two insurance policies issued by the appellees. The facts of the confinement and expenses were not disputed, but…
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The appellant sought to recover under two policies of insurance issued by the appellees. The trial judge was called upon to construe certain provisions of the policies. (1) In the Blue Cross Policy:
“Section I(j) ‘Hospital Service’ means * * * hospital services * * * for and during such time only as the subscriber IS NECESSARILY AN INPATIENT IN THE HOSPITAL, ifc jf: >7
“Section 111(b) * * * primarily for rest or rest cure, primarily for diagnostic purposes, * * * ”
(2) In the Blue Shield Policy:
“Section I(p) * * * an inpatient in a hospital * * * for treatment. * * ”
* * * * * *
“Section IV(b) * * * primarily for diagnostic purposes, primarily for rest or rest cure, or primarily for observation.”
The facts of the actual confinement and the expenses incurred by the plaintiff were not in dispute. The trial judge found for the defendants, and we affirm.
There is substantial, competent evidence to support the finding of the trial court, either that the plaintiff was not “necessarily an inpatient in a hospital” or that she was hospitalized “not for treatment” but was in fact hospitalized “primarily for diagnostic purposes, primarily for rest or rest cure, or primarily for observation”, which would activate the exclusions and prevent coverage.
Finding that there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s ruling, same will not be dis*132turbed on appeal. See: LaFrance Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., v. Argenio, Fla.App.1962, 147 So.2d 330; Dade County, By and Through Bd. of County Com’rs v. Pepper, Fla.App.1964, 168 So.2d 198; Wash Bowl, Inc. v. Miami Coin-O-Wash No. 3, Inc., Fla.App.1966, 184 So.2d 674; Leeb v. Read, Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 830.
Therefore, the final judgment here under review is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
CHARLES CARROLL, J., dissents.
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Keyes v. Rymer Realty Corp., 219 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…rated therein, and is clearly an enterprise that is indivisible. We find substantial competent evidence to support the prayer for relief. Dade County, etc. v. Pepper, Fla.App.1964, 168 So. 2d 198; Miller v. Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., Fla.App.1967, 199 So. 2d 131; Reserve Insurance Company v. Earle W. Day & Company, Fla.App.1968, 209 So. 2d 709. As to the third point, there was no error in the trial judge striking the allegations which went to the family relationship and financial status of the several part…
Authorities Cited
- Dade Cnty. v. Pepper, 168 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Leeb v. Read, 190 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- LaFRANCE Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Argenio, 147 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- State of Fla. on the relation of Joseph B. Sidman & Jack P. Bluestein v. Fink, 147 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Wash Bowl, Inc. v. Miami Coin-O-Wash #3, Inc., 184 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)