LUISA VICTORIA SIMKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
LEON J. SIMKINS, APPELLEE
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Wife appeals from a final divorce decree granted to her husband based on uncorroborated testimony. The Florida appellate court reverses the divorce decree because Florida law requires corroboration of grounds for divorce, but affirms the denial of suit money for investigative expenses.
A divorce decree cannot be granted on uncorroborated testimony of the party seeking the divorce, and the decree must be reversed and remanded. The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying suit money for investigative expenses.
“The law is well settled that a divorce may not be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the parties seeking the divorce.”
Establishes the governing legal principle that uncorroborated testimony is insufficient for a divorce decree.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband sought a divorce and testified regarding grounds, but his testimony was uncorroborated. The chancellor stated he did not think the husband…
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The plaintiff below, Luisa Victoria Sim-kins, appeals from a final decree of divorce *649granted to her husband, Lepn J. Simkins, defendant below.
The wife raises four separate points foi reversal on appeal. The first point is predicated upon the chancellor’s having granted the final decree of divorce solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant husband.
The record reveals that after sole testimony of the husband was introduced, the chancellor made the following statement:
“I. don’t think he has shown any grounds, that I am willing to accept at all, but I am going to divorce them. They both want it, don’t they ?”
There was no corroboration of any of the husband’s testimony concerning his grounds for divorce. The wife attempted to offer testimony to rebut that submitted by the husband, but the court refused to allow it into the evidence.
The law is well settled that a divorce may not be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the parties seeking the divorce. Martin v. Martin, Fla. 1953, 66 So.2d 268; Morgan v. Morgan, Fla. 1949, 40 So.2d 778; Garland v. Garland, 158 Fla. 643, 29 So.2d 693 (1947); Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483 (1933); Lentz v. Lentz, Fla.App. 1960, 120 So.2d 815.
The final- decree therefore must be reversed, inasmuch as the record reveals insufficient testimony of the husband to establish grounds for divorce, and because there was no corroboration whatsoever of his testimony.
This ruling makes it unnecessary for us to decide the second and third points raised, which concern primarily the alleged inadequacy of the alimony and support for the minor children granted in the final decree. These may be re-examined and properly . determined by the chancellor upon remand.
The last point raised by the wife concerns the denial by the chancellor below of certain expenses incurred by her for the services of private investigators, which she claims were necessary to defend herself against the charges made by the husband and to properly prepare her case against the husband.
It is our opinion that the chancellor had authority to award “suit money” to the wife within his discretion.1 We are not convinced that the chancellor clearly abused his discretion in denying suit money to the wife for this purpose and we therefore do not find that reversible error was committed by the chancellor in this regard.
For the reasons stated, the final decree of divorce herein appealed be and the same is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further action consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Foster v. Foster, 220 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…here, are to be considered “suit money” has never been expressly decided in Florida. However, we have considered expenses incurred for private investigators to ,be suit money as within the Chancellor’s discretion, Simpkins v. Simpkins, Fla.App.1967, 198 So. 2d 648; and suit money has also been broadly defined as those costs necessary to defend or prosecute a divorce pendente lite, Orr v. Orr, 141 Fla. 112, 192 So. 466, 467. Other jurisdictions have, expressly decided that suit money is to include travel expen…
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Varvel v. Varvel, 35 Fla. Supp. 87 (Lake Cty. Cir. Ct. 1971)…“suit money”, under Foster v. Foster, 220 So. 2d 447 (3rd D.C.A. Fla. 1969). The Florida courts have considered expenses incurred for private investigators to be suit money as within the chancellor’s discretion, Simpkins v. Simpkins, Fla. App. 1967, 198 So. 2d 648; and suit money has also been broadly defined as those costs necessary to defend or prosecute a divorce pendente lite, Orr v. Orr, 192 So. 466, 467. Other jurisdictions have expressly decided that suit money is to include travel expenses to the atto…
Authorities Cited
- Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469 (Fla. 1933)
- Tomasello v. Nisbet, 110 Fla. 256 (Fla. 1933)
- Tomasello v. Nisbet, 111 Fla. 620 (Fla. 1933)
- Garland v. Claud Garland, JR., 158 Fla. 643 (Fla. 1947)
- Morgan v. Morgan, 40 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1949)
- Kaplan v. Hamilton, 66 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1953)
- Martin v. Martin, 66 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1953)
- Lentz v. Lentz, 120 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)