R. H. DIXON
v.
CITY OF MIAMI
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a six-month waiting period between municipal bond elections applies only when an election results in disapproval of bonds, not when an election is abortive due to insufficient voter participation. The court affirmed the lower court's decision allowing Miami to hold a second freeholders' election within six months of the first failed election.
The six-month limitation does not apply to abortive elections lacking sufficient voter participation. The statute's waiting period applies only when an election results in a final decision disapproving the bonds, not when the first election fails to produce any valid decision due to lack of quorum.
“a majority of the freeholders who were qualified electors residing in the municipality did not participate in said election, so as to make it effective as an expression of the public will”
Establishes the reason the first election was abortive—insufficient voter participation despite majority approval of the measure
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA special freeholders' election was held in Miami on October 7, 1936, regarding bond issuance. Although a majority of votes cast favored the propositi…
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A special freeholders’ election was called and held in the City of Miami pursuant to Sections 457 (1), et seq., C. G. L. (Permanent Supplement) Chapter 14715, Acts 1931. The election was abortive in that a majority of the freeholders who were qualified electors residing in the municipality did not participate in said election, so as to *250make it effective as an expression of the public will under amended Section 6 of Article IX of the Constitution, although a majority of the votes cast was in favor of the proposition voted upon.
The question presented by this injunction suit instituted by appellant in the Circuit Court of Dade County, and resulting in a decree for appellee in favor of permitting a second election to be called and held December 4, 1936, notwithstanding six months has not elapsed since October 7, 1936, the date of the holding of the abortive election, is whether or not the six months limitation specified in Section 457 (13) C. G. L. (Permanent Supplement) (Section 13 of Chapter 14715, Acts of 1931) is applicable where the first election is merely abortive, because of the failure of a sufficient percentage of the qualified freeholder electors to participate therein.
The proposition involved is entirely one of construction of the meaning of the 1931 statute. The statutory provision required to be construed is found in Section 13 of Chapter 14715, Acts of 1931, and is as follows:
“That in the event any election shall be called and held for the purpose of issuance of bonds for a particular purpose and such election shall not result in the approval of said bonds, then another election for the approval of bonds for the same purpose shall be called for at least a period of six months thereafter.”
We hold with the Circuit Court on the authority of State, ex rel. Evans, v. Barker, 121 Fla. 350, 163 Sou. Rep. 695, where a similar statutory provision having a like design, was held not to preclude the holding of the second election when the first election was merely abortive of a final decision in the premises.
*251Affirmed. .
Whitfield, C. J., and Ellis, Terrell and Brown, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Special TAX Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Duval Cnty. v. State, 16 Fla. Supp. 110 (Duval Cty. Cir. Ct. 1960)…as a majority of the qualified freeholder electors did not participate, the election is abortive. State v. Barker, 121 Fla. 350, 163 So. 695; Board of Public Instruction for Escambia County v. State, 122 Fla. 19, 164 So. 516; Dixon v. City of Miami, 126 Fla. 249, 170 So. 845. It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the petition to validate the $35,000,000 issue of bonds of Special Tax School District No. 1 be, and the same is hereby, denied, and said petition is dismissed.…
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State v. Se. Palm Beach Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 90 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1956)…f Buchanan County v. Peter, 253 Mo. 520, 161 S.W. 1155. Langley v. Southern Broward Hospital District, supra, was affirmed by this Court per curiam upon the authority of State v. City of Port St. Joe, Fla.1950, 47 So. 2d 584; Dixon v. City of Miami, 126 Fla. 249, 170 So. 845; State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Indian River Mosquito Control District v. Board of County Commissioners of Indian River County, 103 Fla. 946, 138 So. 625; Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839; Crowder v. Phillips, supra. C…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Geo. A. Barker, Sr., 121 Fla. 350 (Fla. 1935)