DONALD DWAYNE JONES, PETITIONER,
v.
J. B. O'CONNOR, M.D., SUPERINTENDENT, FLORIDA STATE HOSPITAL, CHATTAHOOCHEE, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1966-04-06
No. 34757
ROBERTS, DREW, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
185 So. 2d 167 Florida Supreme Court (1966) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Jones seeks habeas corpus release from a state mental hospital where he was committed after being found criminally insane for murder charges. The Florida Supreme Court holds that the entry of a nolle prosequi terminated the circuit court's jurisdiction and removed its requirement for approval before release, leaving release decisions to the medical judgment of the hospital staff.


Holding

The court held that the entry of the nolle prosequi terminated the circuit court's jurisdiction over the petitioner and eliminated the necessity of obtaining the court's approval as a condition of release. Release decisions are now governed solely by the medical judgment of the hospital staff under Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, not by the committing court's requirement under Section 917.01(2).


Key Quotes

“The entry of the nolle prosequi terminated circuit court jurisdiction over the petitioner... It also effectively eliminated the necessity of obtaining that court's approval as a condition of release.”

Establishes the critical legal effect of the nolle prosequi in terminating court jurisdiction and its approval requirement

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

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Facts & Procedural History

On January 2, 1963, Jones was indicted for first degree murder. After a medical committee examination, the circuit judge found Jones criminally insane…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

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Opinion of the Court
THORNAL, Chief Justice.

THORNAL, Chief Justice.

By an application for a writ of habeas corpus the petitioner Jones seeks release from the Florida State -Hospital.

We must decide whether the custody of the petitioner is subject to the restrictions prescribed by Section 917.01(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.

On January 2, 1963, Jones was indicted for the crime of first degree murder. Pursuant to the recommendation of a committee of doctors, appointed under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the Circuit Judge found that the petitioner was insane. He committed Jones to the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida. The order provided that he was “to be held until further order of this court.” Section 917.01 (2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that no defendant committed to an institution under that section “shall be released therefrom, without the consent of the court committing him.” The petitioner remains in the custody of the respondent pursuant to the above mentioned order.

On March IS, 1965, the state attorney filed a nolle prosequi in the original murder proceeding. He recited the examination by the committee of doctors and the findings to the effect that, when the offense was committed the petitioner was criminally insane. In view of these findings he concluded that “prosecution is not justified”. Despite the foregoing, the circuit judge has declined to authorize either the temporary or permanent release of the petitioner when in the judgment of the staff *168of the Florida State Hospital he would otherwise be entitled thereto. We issued the writ and a response has been filed. The response reports "that the petitioner is still insane but his mental condition has become stabilized * * It is indicated that a release to the custody of petitioner’s father on a trial basis appears justifiable. However, the respondent is confronted by the restrictive provision of the commitment order which precludes release, except with permission of the committing court. Such permission the court declines to give, despite the nolle prosequi and regardless of the medical judgment of the respondent and the hospital staff.

By his memorandum in support of his response, the respondent concedes that the entry of the nolle prosequi terminated circuit court jurisdiction over the petitioner. It also effectively eliminated the necessity of obtaining that court’s approval as a condition of release. Trippodo v. Rogers, Fla., 54 So.2d 64, 65. The respondent takes the position that the release of the petitioner, either temporarily or permanently, should be governed by the judgment of the medical staff of the hospital after the fashion prescribed by Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Such release, he claims, should not be restricted by the necessity of obtaining an authorizing order from the committing circuit judge.

Trippodo v. Rogers, supra, is directly controlling. It eliminates the necessity of a circuit court order as a condition precedent to the petitioner’s release from custody when in the medical judgment of the respondent and the hospital staff, such release is found justifiable. We therefore hold:

1. The petitioner is lawfully held by the respondent at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida.

2. The provision of the circuit court’s commitment order and the provision of Section 917.01(2), requiring the approval of the circuit court as a condition precedent to the release of the petitioner is no longer of any force and effect.

3.The petitioner is remanded to the custody of the respondent who is authorized to retain such custody, subject to the ultimate judgment and decision of the medical staff of the Florida State Hospital.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, DREW, CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Powell v. Genung, 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974)
    …nt, expressly provided procedures and guidelines for discharge as well as commitment. In failing to so construe the Rule and the Act together, the trial court erred and exceeded its jurisdiction. Petitioner relies upon Jones v. O’Connor, Fla. 1966, 185 So. 2d 167, and Trippodo v. Rogers, Fla.1951, 54 So. 2d 64, as authority for his release. The facts show' Petitioner’s reliance thereon is misplaced. In Jones, supra, this Court held that a nolle prosequi of a first degree murder charge where the defendant was…
    1 / 2
  • State v. Heidrick, 707 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …if applicable, this Court’s holding would be the same. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson, the Florida Supreme Court had the opportunity to address a similar issue in Trippodo v. Rogers, 54 So. 2d 64 (Fla.1951), and Jones v. O’Connor, 185 So. 2d 167 (Fla.1966). In Trippodo and Jones, the trial courts found that the defendants were insane and incapable of standing trial. The defendants were committed to a Florida state hospital and the commitment orders also provided that the defendants could no…

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