ELIZABETH C. ANGLE, APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGEA CROW, APPELLEE
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Elizabeth Angle, a married woman, signed a promissory note as maker along with her husband and another for a debt that benefited only her husband's business. The trial court held her liable as an accommodation party under Florida's negotiable instruments law, but the appellate court reversed, finding that her constitutional right to protect her separate property from her husband's debts takes precedence over the accommodation party statute.
A married woman's separate property is not subject to liability for her husband's debts when she signs a promissory note for debts that benefit only his business, unless her consent is evidenced by a writing executed according to law respecting conveyances by married women. The accommodation party statute is inapplicable to the extent it would conflict with a married woman's constitutional protection of her separate property.
“F.S.A. § 674.32, supra, is clear in all its terms and we hold it inapplicable to the extent it would apply to a married woman claiming her constitutional protections for her separate property. The statutory law of negotiable-instruments, F.S.A. Ch. 674 et seq., must be read and interpreted with the thought in mind that constitutional rights, such as here asserted, take precedence and on occasion may even cancel its terms.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that constitutional protections for married women's separate property override the accommodation party statute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElizabeth Angle signed a promissory note as a maker along with her deceased husband and another person. All borrowed funds went directly into her husb…
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This appeal is from a final judgment entered against the defendant, Elizabeth C. Angle, in a suit upon a promissory note. This defendant signed the note simply as a maker along with her now deceased husband and another. She did not sign the note in accordance with the formalities required by law respecting conveyances by married women.
Her answer denied indebtedness saying the debt was that of her husband with all the borrowed funds going directly into her husband’s business. She pled that she is a widow and that any property held by her is her separate property and not subject to plaintiff’s claim under the provisions of Article XI, Section 1, of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.1
Trial was had before the court with this defendant, the only witness, supporting her answer. Judgment in favor of plaintiff was based on the court finding as a matter of law that defendant was an accommodation party making her primarily liable under the terms of F.S.A. § 674.32.2 The trial judge further expressed the view that the case was governed by the principles of Furlong v. Leybourne, Fla.App.1962, 138 So. 2d 352. We believe this to be error and reversed.
F.S.A. § 674.32, supra, is clear in all its terms and we hold it inapplicable to the extent it would apply to a married woman claiming her constitutional protections for her separate property. The statutory law of negotiable- instruments, F.S.A. Ch. 674 et seq., must be read and interpreted with the thought in mind that constitutional rights, such as here asserted, take precedence and on occasion may even cancel its terms.
The case of Furlong v. Leybourne, supra, may be distinguished from the facts here present. There a widow and her deceased husband had executed a note and mortgage encumbering homestead property owned by the deceased with all the proceeds going to pay prior obligations of the deceased. The controversy was between the widow and her stepchildren as to liability for payment of the non-purchase money mortgage note. The widow owned a life estate and the stepchildren were remaindermen. The court dealt carefully with their rights to the homestead property, subrogation, and the *690law as concerns an accommodation maker. However, the widow there did not make claim to separate property or assert her rights under Article XI, Section 1, Constitution of Florida, and thus it affords no light or precedent helpful to the instant case.
Where a wife signs a promissory note for her husband’s debts, whether as co-maker, indorser, or guarantor, with the proceeds going into her husband’s business, her separate property is not subject to liability unless her consent is evidenced by an instrument in writing executed according to law respecting onveyances by married women. F.S.A.Const., Art. 11, Sec. 1, supra; Jette v. Harbison, 1947, 158 Fla. 418, 28 So.2d 858; Kovens v. Bluestone, Fla.1962, 145 So.2d 473; First National Bank of Melbourne v. Berg, Fla.App.1963, 153 So.2d 331; and Pilson v. Guillery, Fla. App. 1964, 168 So.2d 547.
Reversed.
ANDREWS, Acting C. J.; and STUR-GIS, WALLACE E., Associate Judge, concur.
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Am. Nat'l Bank OF Jacksonville v. Brantley, 204 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)…ision on the point. Having approved the trial judge’s ruling that the debt here sued upon was not the debt of the appellee wife, but rather that of her husband, it follows that judgment in favor of the appellee was correctly entered. Angle v. Crow, 184 So. 2d 688 (Fla.App. 4th 1966), and Pilson v. Guillery, 168 So. 2d 547 (Fla.App. 3d 1964). Affirmed. WIGGINTON, Chief Judge; and JOHNSON, J., concur.…
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United Nat'l Bank v. Dexheimer, 206 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on authority of Petersen v. Brotman, Fla.App.1958, 100 So. 2d 821. See also Angle v. Crow, Fla.App.1966, 184 So. 2d 688; Jette v. Harbison, 1947, 158 Fla. 418, 28 So. 2d 858. WALDEN, C. J. and CROSS and REED, JJ., concur.…
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Maxine Sanson Turek (formerly Maxine M. Sanson) v. The First Nat'l Bank AT Orlando, 228 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)…usively establish that she should recover a summary judgment as a matter of law citing: Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418, 28 So. 2d 858 (1947); American Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Brantley, Fla.App.1967, 204 So. 2d 251; Angle v. Crow, Fla.App.1966, 184 So. 2d 688; Pilson v. Guillery, Fla.App.1964, 168 So. 2d 547; First Nat. Bank of Melbourne v. Berg, Fla.App.1963, 153 So. 2d 331; and Kovens v. Bluestone, Fla.App.1961, 134 So. 2d 547. She alleges error when the trial court subsequently entered its order awar…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418 (Fla. 1947)
- Furlong v. Leybourne, 138 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- First Nat'l Bank OF Melbourne v. Berg, 153 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Kovens v. Bluestone, 145 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1962)
- Pilson v. Guillery, 168 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)