NANCY M. DOWD, APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, APPELLEE
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Nancy Dowd appealed a chancery court decree holding that she owned an automobile prior to an accident, thus disqualifying her from coverage under an uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy issued to the vehicle's former owner. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's factual finding that ownership had passed to Dowd before the accident occurred.
The chancery court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that Dowd purchased the motor vehicle prior to the accident and that ownership passed to her before the collision occurred. Therefore, she was not entitled to coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy issued to Pan American Motors.
“The intention of the parties, coupled with the actual delivery of the motor vehicle and the tender and acceptance of the down payment made by the plaintiff, leaves no doubt that the sale had been completed for the purposes of this case, before the accident occurred.”
The chancellor's reasoning for finding that ownership passed to Dowd prior to the accident
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDowd was injured in an automobile accident on May 6, 1964, while driving a 1959 Oldsmobile at the intersection of N.W. 27th Avenue and N.W. 14th Stree…
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Nancy M. Dowd, plaintiff below, appeals from a final decree in chancery, in which the court found that title to an automobile had passed to her prior to an accident, and therefore she could not recover under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance policy issued by the defendant, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, to a third party, who was the former owner of the motor vehicle.
The plaintiff sued the insurance company for a declaratory decree to determine her rights under the policy. At final hearing, the testimony of the two witnesses present was in conflict as to the essential facts. A final decree was entered against the plaintiff, which stated as follows:
“THIS CAUSE came on for Final Hearing upon the Plaintiff’s Petition for Declaratory Decree, on Thursday, April 8, 1965. The plaintiff, NANCY M. DOWD, and a representative of Pan American Motors, one George Pa-riso, appeared and testified before this Court.
“The Plaintiff, NANCY M. DOWD, was injured in an automobile accident on May 6, 1964, while driving a certain 1959 Oldsmobile. The accident occurred at the intersection of N.W. 27th Avenue and N.W. 14th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. The other vehicle involved, a 1951 Plymouth, was uninsured.
“The Plaintiff alleged that the vehicle she was driving at the time of the above accident was owned by Pan American Motors and insured by the Defendants, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, a Maryland corporation, and that she was negotiating for the purchase of said vehicle. Said Insurance Company insured Pan American Motors, and contained in the policy of insurance was a Family Protection Clause providing uninsured motorists, coverage. The Defendant, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, alleged that the vehicle driven by the Plaintiff, NANCY M. DOWD, at the time of the within accident was owned by the plaintiff; that she had purchased said vehicle prior to the accident; and that, therefore, the Defendant, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, was not liable under the terms of its policy of insurance.
“After considering the evidence offered by the parties, including the testimony of the plaintiff and said George Pariso, it is clear that the plaintiff purchased said motor vehicle prior to the accident in question, and that ownership of said vehicle passed to the plaintiff prior to said accident. The intention of the parties, coupled with the actual delivery of the motor vehicle and the tender and acceptance of the down payment made by the plaintiff, leaves no doubt that the sale had been completed for the purposes of this case, before the accident occurred. * * * >f
******
We are governed by certain guidelines in the disposition of a cause even *560though we might have decided the matter differently from the trier of facts. The chancellor’s finding of fact will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless such a finding is clearly shown to be erroneous. Budd v. Tison, Fla. 1950, 47 So.2d 12; Grantham v. Grantham, 1939, 140 Fla. 120, 191 So. 197. These findings are entitled to the same weight as is given to the findings of a jury, Ames v. Ames, Fla.App.1963, 153 So.2d 737; and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment on issues of fact as found by a jury unless those findings are manifestly unreasonable and clearly against the weight of the evidence. Willis v. Clark, Fla.App.1961, 135 So.2d 260.
We have studied the entire transcript and have determined that the finding of the chancellor was not shown to be manifestly unreasonable and clearly against the weight of the evidence.
The final decree is therefore
Affirmed.
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Alter v. Finesmith, 214 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)…the trial judge, the appellate court will not set the finding aside unless it is demonstrated that the finding is manifestly unreasonable and clearly against the weight of the evidence. Dowd v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., Fla.App. 1966, 183 So. 2d 558. The appellant urges that the finding that a fiduciary relationship existed among the parties is manifestly unreasonable because the parties entered into a written agreement which did not provide for joint control, joint proprietory interest, or jo…
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Dutch Inns OF Am., Inc. v. Jenkins, 301 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)…the court found from the evidence that the claimed cost limitation was not proved. See Petrus v. Bunnell, Fla.App.1961, 129 So. 2d 702. Upon the record we will not reverse this finding. Dowd v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., Fla.App.1966, 183 So. 2d 558. Appellant’s third point and appellee’s cross-appeal each challenge the court’s finding as to the amount due. Each point fails to show error. There was extensive and conflicting testimony as to extra work performed fo,r revisions and changes. The c…
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Copeland v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)…ception of the naked legal title Copeland had transferred all rights of possession and ownership to Mobley, and cites Highway Insurance Company v. Peterson, 186 So. 2d 48 (Fla.App. 1st, 1966), and Dowd v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 183 So. 2d 558 (Fla.App. 3d, 1966). These cases are founded upon theories pertaining to tort liability and are not applicable to that portion of the instant policy relating to theft of the insured chattel. We pretermit any discussion as to damages. The trial cour…
Authorities Cited
- Ames v. Ames, 153 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Grantham v. Grantham, 140 Fla. 120 (Fla. 1939)
- Ponte v. Lattin, 135 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)