RHODA GLASSER, APPELLANT,
v.
SEYMOUR GLASSER, APPELLEE
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A wife appealed a divorce decree that required her to convey her interest in jointly owned residential property and corporate stock to her husband. The court reversed these provisions, holding that absent pleadings and proof showing the property was not her separate property or subject to the husband's equitable interest, the trial court erred in awarding it to the husband.
The court held that the provisions requiring the wife to transfer her property interests to the husband were erroneous absent allegations and proof that the property was not her separate property or subject to an equitable lien or interest of the husband. Under Florida law, upon divorce from an estate by the entirety, the parties become tenants in common, and either party's determination to transfer must be voluntary. The denial of additional attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion.
“in cases of estates by entirety, the tenants, upon divorce, shall become tenants in common.”
Establishes the statutory framework governing property division upon divorce for jointly owned property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were divorced and the decree awarded the wife custody of their child, child support, and lump sum alimony. The trial court required the wi…
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This is an appeal by a wife, the defendant below, from a final decree in a divorce suit. The decree awarded the wife custody of a child of the parties, child support and lump sum alimony. Her appeal challenges provisions of the decree which required her to convey to her husband her interest in their jointly owned residence premises, and her stock in a business corporation and a *750denial of her request for fees for the services of her attorney on a rehearing.
There were no pleadings or proof . upon which to predicate a decree depriving the wife of her interest in the residence premises or of her stock in the corporation. The residence was owned by the parties in an estate by the entirety. Section 689.15, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. provides that “in cases of estates by entirety, the tenants, upon divorce, shall become tenants in common.” As stated in Valentine v. Valentine, Fla.1950, 45 So.2d 885, 886, “Once the marriage contract was dissolved and the proportionate share of each in the estate was fixed, appellant and appellee became tenants in common, and thereafter it was for them to determine whether the property should be partitioned or whether one should purchase the interest of the other.” See also Bolles v. Bolles, Fla.1952, 59 So.2d 871 and Latta v. Latta, Fla.App.1960, 121 So.2d 42. In the absence of allegations and adequate proof that stock of American Merchandise Co. which stood in the name of the wife was not her separate property, or was subject to some equitable lien or interest of the husband, it was error to confer that property of the wife upon the husband. See Bell v. Bell, Fla.App.1959, 112 So.2d 63; Banfi v. Banfi, Fla.App.1960, 123 So.2d 52; Helsel v. Helsel, Fla.App.1962, 138 So.2d 99.
In the final decree the wife was awarded $1,500 for the services of her attorney. She now contends that it was error for the chancellor to refuse to make an additional allowance for attorney fees on certain proceedings which took place on a rehearing granted. On considering the record we are by no means convinced that such ruling by the chancellor was an abuse of discretion.
The provisions of the decree which required the wife to transfer to the husband her interest in the residence property and her separately owned corporate stock are held to be error. However, as the amount of the lump sum alimony award may have been gauged or influenced by the provisions for the transfer of property and corporate stock by the wife to the husband which we here reverse, on remand of the cause the chancellor may review and revise the provisions of the decree as to alimony, or allow the alimony provision as presently fixed to stand, as he may in his sound discretion determine from the circumstances presented.
Accordingly the decree is reversed in part, in the respects set out above. In other respects the decree stands affirmed, but the cause is remanded for further proceedings as indicated.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Rankin v. Rankin, 258 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)…$5,000 withdrawn from a joint account, he was attempting to make an equitable division of the property. This influenced his decision. Upon remand we reverse that portion of the final decree also on the authority of Glasser v. Glasser, Fla.App.1965, 178 So. 2d 749, 750, wherein the court said: “However, as the amount of the lump sum alimony award may have been gauged or influenced by the provisions for the transfer of property and corporate stock by the wife to the husband which we here reverse, on remand of…
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Owen v. Owen, 284 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1973)….1972, 264 So. 2d 476; Hegel v. Hegel, Fla.App.1971, 248 So. 2d 212; Horne v. Horne, Fla.App.1971, 247 So. 2d 99; Lubarr v. Lubarr, Fla.App.1967, 199 So. 2d 123; Weinstein v. Weinstein, Fla.App.1963, 148 So. 2d 737; Glasser v. Glasser, Fla.App.1965, 178 So. 2d 749; Latta v. Latta, Fla.App.1960, 121 So. 2d 42.1 Thus, the trial court erred in directing conveyance by the petitioner to the respondent of the real properties above referenced. Accordingly, certiorari is granted and the decision of the District Cou…
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Payne v. Payne, 201 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…created in Julia Payne vested property rights incapable of being modified or destroyed. In this respect, we rely on the case of Helsel v. Helsel, Fla. App.1962, 138 So. 2d 99, which is supported by the later case of Glasser v. Glasser, Fla.App.1965, 178 So. 2d 749. This court, in the Helsel case, stated at 138 So. 2d page 100: “The appellant further contends that the chancellor erred in making disposition of the marital property in his decree. We conclude that the appellant’s contention in this regard has me…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Banfi v. Enrico Luigi Banfi, 123 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Valentine v. Valentine, 45 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1950)
- Latta v. Parker A. Latta, 121 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)
- Bell v. Bell, 112 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959)
- Helsel v. Helsel, 138 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Boles v. Boles, 59 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1952)