GEAN LAMONT SHELDON AND MINNIE SPERA, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1965-08-10
No. 64-758
Before HENDRY, C. J., and CARROLL and BARKDULL, JJ.
178 So. 2d 34 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1965)

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Synopsis

This case addresses whether a defendant can be convicted of both conspiracy to commit a crime and the commission of that crime in the same information. The court held that separate convictions for conspiracy and the underlying offense are permissible.


Holding

No, it was not error to deny the motion. The state may charge both conspiracy and the commission of the underlying offense in separate counts of a single information, and a defendant may be convicted of both.


Key Quotes

“While it is true that the state may be required to elect as to which count of a two count information it chooses to rely upon for conviction, where the two counts are inconsistent or charge inconsistent offenses, Griswold v. State, 77 Fla. 505, 82 So. 44 (1919), the counts in the information in this case evince no such inconsistency.”

Establishes the general rule for election of counts and notes its inapplicability here.

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Facts & Procedural History

The defendants were charged with conspiracy and grand larceny in a two-count information. The grand larceny charge was reduced to attempted larceny. T…

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Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Chief Judge.

HENDRY, Chief Judge.

The defendants were tried on a two count information charging them in count one with conspiracy and in count two with grand larceny. At the conclusion of the state’s case the grand larceny charge was reduced to attempted larceny. Prior to submission of the case to the jury, the defendants moved that the state be required to elect as to which count it would rely upon for conviction. The motion was denied and the jury found each defendant guilty on both counts. Appellants contend on appeal that it was error to deny their motions to require the state to elect as to which count it would rely upon for conviction.

While it is true that the state may be required to elect as to which count of a two count information it chooses to rely upon for conviction, where the two counts are inconsistent or charge inconsistent offenses, Griswold v. State, 77 Fla. 505, 82 So. 44 (1919), the counts in the information in this case evince no such inconsistency. It has been held that the state may, in a single information, charge in one count the conspiracy to commit a crime and, in another count, the actual commission of the crime. See Brown v. State, 130 Fla. 479, 178 So. 153 (1938). This rule rests on the principle that conspiracy to commit a crime is a separate and distinct offense from commission of the crime which is the eventual object of the conspiracy.

Appellants’ contentions are without merit and the final judgments, from which these appeals were taken, should be and hereby are affirmed.

Affirmed.


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