LUKE HOLLAND
v.
STATE
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a manslaughter conviction, finding insufficient evidence for the charge of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, despite evidence supporting a separate charge of culpable negligence.
No, the evidence does not prove that the defendant committed the unlawful act while intoxicated.
“While the evidence tends strongly to sus [*143] tain the charge of culpable negligence in the first count, the evidence does not prove that the defendant committed the unlawful act tuhile intoxicated under the second count of the indictment.”
Establishes the court's finding regarding the sufficiency of evidence for each count.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was indicted on two counts of manslaughter: one for culpable negligence in operating a car, and another for operating a car while intoxi…
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In this case the indictment charged manslaughter in two counts, viz.: (1) by culpable negligence in operating an automobile; (2) in operating an automobile while intoxicated. The jury found the defendant guilty on the second count. While the evidence tends strongly to sus*143tain the charge of culpable negligence in the first count, the evidence does not prove that the defendant committed the unlawful act tuhile intoxicated under the second count of the indictment. As' the effect of the verdict is to acquit the defendant on the first count and as the evidence does not prove the charge stated in the second count of the indictment, the judgment should be and is reversed for a new trial on the second count of the indictment.
It is so ordered.
Whitfield, C. J., and Terrell, Buford, and Davis, J. J., concur.
Ellis, P. J., and Brown, J., dissent.