FRANK L. YOUNG CO.
v.
MCNEAL-EDWARDS CO.
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A Virginia corporation sued a Massachusetts company for conversion of merchandise after the company had previously sued the corporation for breach of warranty arising from the same transaction. The Supreme Court held that under the Conformity Act and Massachusetts law, the federal district court had jurisdiction over the defendant because service of the counterclaim on the plaintiff's attorney of record was valid and Massachusetts's permissive counterclaim statute—which allowed defendants to be sued on related claims despite being nonresidents—applied to federal proceedings. The Court reversed the dismissal, rejecting the formalistic objection that characterizing a counterclaim as a separate suit should defeat application of local policy allowing defendants already in court to answer related claims.
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Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether under the Conformity Act, U. S. Code, Title 28, § 724, and the Massachusetts statute, Gen. Laws, c. 227, §§ 2, 3, the District Court acquired jurisdiction over the respondent. The Conformity Act provides that “the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, ... in the district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which such district courts are held.” By the Massachusetts Laws, § 2, supra, “ If an action is brought by a person not an inhabitant of the commonwealth ... he shall be held to answer to any action brought against him here by the defendant in the former action, if the demands are of such a nature that the judgment or execution in the one case may be set off against the judgment or execution in the other.” By § 3 “ The writ in such cross action may be served on the attorney of record for the plaintiff in the original action.” In this case the McNeal-Edwards Company, a corporation of Virginia, sold to the Frank L. Young Company of Massachusetts 1107 drums of Menhaden oil; buyers to return the drums. The buyers later sued the Virginia Company for breach of warranty of quality and attached the drums, but the attachment was inadequate security for damages and was the limit of the jurisdiction. Later the Virginia Corporation sued the buyers for the conversion of the drums, and thereupon at a still later date the buyers brought a second suit against the Virginia Corporation for the same cause of action as before, had the writ served upon the attorney of record in the Virginia Corporation’s suit, and discontinued its former action. The petitioner, in short, is plainly within the Massachusetts statute, for although there is some suggestion that by reason of the petitioner’s former suit the suit by the Virginia Corporation was not the ‘original action ’ within § 3 supra, we regard this as a mere quibble, and have no doubt that the Massachusetts law applies if the Conformity Act brings it in. The case was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for want of jurisdiction. 42 F. (2d) 362; 43 F. (2d) 99. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court.
We have to consider the Massachusetts law so far as it applies to counterclaims arising out of the same contract that was sued upon by the Virginia Company. If there should be any objections to a wider application, they do not affect the respondent and are not open here. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 160. Thus limited, the law is only a slight extension of the doctrine of recoupment recognized in Massachusetts apart from statute. Home Savings Bank v. Boston, 131 Mass. 277, 280. We take it that there is no doubt that the Massachusetts principle would be applied in the Courts of the United States, Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U. S. 630; and no greater doubt if the principle were established by a code. Clement v. Field, 147 U. S. 467, 475. Pacific Express Co. v. Malin, 132 U. S. 531. Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671. Giving the counterclaim the formality of a separate suit hardly is a sufficient reason for refusing to apply the local policy and law. Arkwright Mills v. Aultman & Taylor Machinery Co., 128 Fed. 195, 196. Mr. Langdell observes that there is no necessity for such ceremony in the nature of things “ for, the plaintiff being already in court qua plaintiff by his own voluntary act, it is reasonable to treat him as being there for all the purposes for which justice to the defendant requires his presence.” Langdell, Eq. Pleading, ch. 5, § 119. The' characterization of the contrary doctrine as pernicious by Mr. Justice Miller in Partridge v. Insurance Co., 15 Wall. 573, is repeated in Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Lindell, 281 U. S. 14, 17. We see no reason to doubt the constitutionality of the present application of the state law. The policy of it is embodied in equity rule 30. See Aldrich v. Blatchford, 175 Mass. 369; 56 N. E. 700.
The case is within the jurisdiction of the District Court in all other respects if the respondent has been served with process effectively. We are of opinion that the service was good and that the case should not have been dismissed.
Judgment reversed.
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Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (U.S. 1932)…of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit, including those pertaining to the counterclaim of the defendants, petitioners here. Equity Rule 30. See Langdell’s Eq.,Pleading, c. 5, § 119; Frank L. Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U. S. 398, 400. The decree upon the counterclaim bound the respondent personally. It was a decree which operated ..continuously and perpetually upon the respondent in relation to the prohibited conduct. The decree was binding upon the respondent, not simply w…
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Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (U.S. 1938)…treating him as being there for all purposes [*68] for which justice to the defendant requires his presence. It is the price which the state may exact as the condition of opening its courts to the plaintiff. Frank L. Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U. S. 398, 400; cf. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Lindell, 281 U. S. 14, 17. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. MR. Justice Cardozo took no part in the consideration or decisio…
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Roark v. Am. Distilling Co., 97 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1938)…that the trial court was right in quashing the service here and that the judgment should be and it is affirmed. See Consolidated Textile Corporation v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 86, 53 S.Ct. 529, 77 L.Ed. 1047; Frank L. Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398, 51 S.Ct. 538, 75 L.Ed. 1140; Munter v. Weil Corset Co., 261 U.S. 276, 278, 43 S.Ct. 347, 348, 67 L.Ed. 652; Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437, 443, 30 S.Ct. 125, 54 L.Ed. 272; Woods Bros. Const. Co. v. Yankton County, 8 Cir., 54 F…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- NEW York v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (U.S. 1907)
- Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Lindell, 281 U.S. 14 (U.S. 1930)
- Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 (U.S. 1887)
- Higgins & Another v. McCREA, 116 U.S. 671 (U.S. 1886)
- Partridge v. The Ins. Co., 15 Wall. 573 (U.S. 1872)
- Clement v. Field, 147 U.S. 467 (U.S. 1893)
- Pac. Express Co. v. Malin, 132 U.S. 531 (U.S. 1889)
- McNeal-Edwards Co. v. Frank L. Young Co., 42 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1930)
- McNeal-Edwards Co. v. Frank L. Young Co., 35 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1929)
- McNeal-Edwards Co. v. Frank L. Young Co., 43 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1930)