SIGMUND T. JAWORSKI, APPELLANT,
v.
THE CITY OF OPA LOCKA, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Plaintiff Jaworski appealed a summary judgment dismissing his assault claim against the City of Opa Locka for injuries allegedly inflicted by a city police officer. The court reversed, holding that disputed facts regarding whether the assailant was a city employee precluded summary judgment and that, under Simpson v. City of Miami, municipalities could be liable for intentional torts by police officers.
Summary judgment was improper because the plaintiff's deposition testimony, combined with factual admissions and reasonable inferences, created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the assailant's employment by the city. The court rejected the city's contention that summary judgment was warranted due to the plaintiff's failure to prove the officer's employment status.
“On motion for summary judgment the party moved against is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts before the court.”
Establishes the standard for summary judgment, requiring that all reasonable inferences favor the non-moving party
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJaworski was unlawfully arrested by an Opa Locka police officer and charged with violating a city ordinance. He was taken to the city jail where he wa…
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The plaintiff appeals a summary final judgment for the defendant, City, in an action brought for an alleged assault by a City policeman. The final judgment appealed was entered prior to the decision in Simpson v. City of Miami, Fla.App. 1963, 155 So.2d 829, which held that a city could be liable for an intentional tort of a police officer. It is apparent from this record that the trial judge entered the summary^ judgment appealed because of a contrary interpretation of Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193, and cases construing the holding of that case.
However, it is necessary for us to discuss one of appellee’s contentions because, if appellee’s position is correct as related to this point, then the summary judgment must be sustained even though entered upon an erroneous ground. See State v. Florida Real Estate Commission, Fla.1956, 99 So.2d 582; Berkman v. Miami National Bank, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So.2d 535. The point raised is that the appellee, City, was entitled to a summary final judgment because the appellant, plaintiff, failed to show that the officer who allegedly beat him was .employed by the City of Opa Locka.
The summary judgment appealed was entered upon the basis of pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with affidavits. It appears without controversy that the plaintiff was unlawfully arrested by a police officer of the defendant, City, and charged with the violation of a City ordinance ; that he was then taken to the City jail where a police officer assaulted and beat him. It further appears that the jail facilities were also used by at least one other governmental entity. Police officers of the other governmental entity were present at the time the plaintiff claims to have been assaulted.
A review of the record reveals testimony by the plaintiff that the person or persons who assaulted him wore the same uniforms as that of the City of Opa Locka policeman who arrested him. In addition, it is admitted that the plaintiff was, at the time and the place designated, in the custody of the police of the City of Opa Locka and that he was incarcerated in a jail operated by the City.
On motion for summary judgment the party moved against is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from *486the facts before the court. Chapman v. Tison, Fla.App.1962, 137 So.2d 605; Bassell v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., Fla.App. 1963, 148 So.2d 298; Koplin v. Bennett, Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 568. It thus appears that there were sufficient statements in the deposition of the plaintiff, together with the admissions of fact, and the inferences therefrom, to constitute a genuine issue of material fact upon the question of whether the person or persons who allegedly assaulted the plaintiff were officers or employees of the defendant, City. See Goldie v. Dillon, Fla.App.1962, 140 So.2d 81. We conclude, therefore, that appellee’s contention, set forth above, is not sufficient as a ground for the entry of the summary final judgment.
The judgment appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
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Gen. Portland Land Dev. Co. & Greater Fla. Inv. v. Stevens, 395 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…such a finding. Because conflicting inferences can be drawn, Florida courts have wisely left the determination to a factfinder, making summary judgment inappropriate. Goldie v. Dillen, 140 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); Jaworski v. City of Opa Locka, 170 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), cert. denied 172 So. 2d 441 (Fla.1965). Under the assumption that Weber was Hembree’s employee, Old Port Cove contends that Hembree was a privy to Weber in Old Port Cove’s separate suit for indemnity against Weber for his neglig…
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Basden v. Lowery, 182 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…due attention to the roadway and area surrounding same. In determining the propriety of the motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the party moved against. See: Jaworski v. City of Opa Locka, Fla.App. 1964, 170 So. 2d 484; Anderson v. Morgan, Fla.App. 1965, 172 So. 2d 845. It is incumbent upon a defendant, when moving for a summary judgment, to show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, [See: Tucker v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, Fla.App.…
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Mimaroe, Inc. v. Sanitary Serv. Co., 185 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)…ecree in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See: Weinstein v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Company, Limited, Fla.App.1962, 141 So. 2d 318; Koplin v. Bennett, Fla.App.1963, 155 So. 2d 568; Jaworski v. City of Opa Locka, Fla.App. 1964, 170 So. 2d 484. The crucial question to be determined is whether or not, following the linen supply company exercising its option to raise prices, did the beauty shop voluntarily “consent” to this increase. The court notes that the demand for payment was made at…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ervine Hargrove v. Town OF Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957)
- Roce Simpson v. City OF Miami, 155 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Berkman v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 143 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Koplin v. Bennett, 155 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Charles J. Bodner v. Fla. Real Est. Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1956)
- Chapman v. Tison, 137 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Goldie v. Dillon, 140 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- The Babsdon Co. v. Thrifty Parking Co., 149 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Bassell v. AL Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., 148 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)