UNITED STATES EX REL. TISI, ALIAS CORTINA,
v.
TOD, COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION AT THE PORT OF NEW YORK
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An alien named Tisi was ordered deported under federal sedition laws for possessing printed matter advocating overthrow of the government, claiming he lacked knowledge of the materials' seditious character and was therefore denied due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the deportation order, holding that an administrative tribunal's factual findings in deportation proceedings do not violate due process merely because they may be erroneous, provided the alien received fair notice, a hearing with opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the tribunal did not act arbitrarily or in flagrant disregard of evidence.
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MR. Justice Brandéis delivered the opinion of the Court.
Tisi, an alien, was arrested in deportation proceedings as being within the United States in violation of law. The ground specified was knowingly having in his possession for the purpose of distribution printed matter which advocated the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force. Act of October 16, 1918, c. 186, §§ 1 and 2, 40 Stat. 1012, as amended June 5, 1920, c. 251, 41 Stat.
1008. The warrant of deportation issued after a hearing. Then this petition for a writ of habeas corpus was brought in the federal court, and heard upon the return and a traverse thereto. The order entered, without opinion, dismissed the writ, remanded the relator to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of New York, and granted a stay, pending the appeal to this Court. The case is here under § 238 of the Judicial Code, the claim being that Tisi was denied rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
Tisi’s claim to be discharged on habeas corpus rests wholly upon the contention that he has been denied due process of law. There was confessedly due notice of the charge and ample opportunity to be heard. What Tisi urges is that there was no evidence to sustain the finding that he knew the seditious character of the printed matter. Such knowledge is not, like alienage, a jurisdictional fact. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284; United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S.
149. But it is an essential of the authority to deport. There is no suggestion that the Secretary of Labor failed to recognize this requirement. The contention is that he erred in deciding that there was substantial evidence of such knowledge and in allowing the supposed evidence to convince him of the fact. The printed matter found consisted of leaflets in the English language. Tisi testified that he cannot read English; that he did not know the character of the leaflets; and that his presence in the company of other Italians who were seen folding the leaflets was accidental. The Secretary of Labor was not obliged to believe this testimony. The Government did not introduce any direct evidence to the contrary. But there was much evidence of other facts from which Tisi’s knowledge of the character of the leaflets might reasonably have been inferred. We do not discuss the evidence; because the correctness of the judgment of the lower court is not to be determined by enquiring whether the conclusion drawn by the Secretary of Labor from the evidence was correct or by deciding whether the evidence was such that, if introduced in a court of law, it would be held legally sufficient to prove the fact found.
The denial of a fair hearing is not established by proving merely that the decision was wrong. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 13. This is equally true whether the error consists in deciding wrongly that evidence introduced constituted legal evidence of the fact or in drawing a wrong inference from the evidence. The error of an administrative tribunal may, of course, .be so flagrant as to convince a court that the hearing had was not a fair one. Compare United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S.
673. But here no hasty, arbitrary or unfair action on the part of any official, or any abuse of discretion is shown. There is no claim that the lack of legal evidence of knowledge was manifest; or that the finding was made in wilful disregard of the evidence to the contrary; or that settled rules of evidence were ignored. The procedure prescribed by the rules of the Department appears to have been followed in every respect; and the legality of that prescribed is not questioned. There is no suggestion that Tisi was not allowed to prepare for the hearing, by prior examination of the written evidence on which the warrant of arrest issued; or that he was otherwise restricted in his preparation of the defense. The hearing was conducted orally. Tisi was present and was represented by counsel. He testified fully; and the many witnesses produced by the Government were cross-examined by his counsel. He was given ample time in which to present the evidence, the argument, and a brief. Under these circumstances mere error, even if it consists in finding an essential fact without adequate supporting evidence, is not a denial of due process of law.
Affirmed.
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Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (U.S. 1945)…cers or agencies, courts are without authority to set aside their findings if they are supported by evidence. This Court has not heretofore departed from that rule in reviewing deportation orders upon collateral attack by habeas corpus, Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131; Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 106; [*167] Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341, 343, and cases cited, and there is no occasion for its doing so now. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over the deportation of…1 / 3
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Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (U.S. 1985)…ility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could sup [*456] port the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. See ibid.; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133-134 (1924); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F. 2d 1011, 1018 (CA8 1974). We decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement. Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere, and prison adm…
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United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1927)…8; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454. But a want of due process is not established by showing merely that the decision is erroneous, Chin Yow v. United States, supra, 13, or that incompetent evidence was received and considered. See Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133. Upon a collateral review in habeas corpus proceedings, it is sufficient that there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced and that it committed no error so flagrant as to convince a court of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States Ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (U.S. 1923)
- NG Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (U.S. 1922)
- Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (U.S. 1908)
- Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1920)
- Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1912)
- Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (U.S. 1912)