THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, ET AL.,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.; THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ET AL., V. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission ordered eleven railroad carriers to maintain proportionate rate relationships between longer and shorter hauls as required by the long and short-haul clause of the Interstate Commerce Act, but the carriers sought judicial relief by filing in the Commerce Court. The Supreme Court reversed the Commerce Court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal, applying the same reasoning from related cases involving identical legal questions about the Commission's authority to regulate rail rates.
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Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.
The eleven carriers who are appellees on this record filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission applications to be relieved from the long and short-haul clause of § 4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 547. After full hearing the Commission entered an order granting in certain respects the relief prayed but establishing a proportionate relation to be maintained between the lower rate for the longer haul and the higher rate for the shorter haul upon the basis of percentages which were fixed with reference-to defined zones. The carriers refused to obey the order and filed their bill in the Commerce Court to enjoin its enforcement. An interlocutory injunction was ordered. The defendants moved to dismiss and on the overruling of the motions appealed from the interlocutory order, that case being No. 137. Subsequently upon the election of the defendants not to plead further, a final decree was entered and appealed from, that appeal being No. 163.
These cases are governed by the opinion in Nos. 136 and 162 just decided. They were tried in the court below with the other cases, were decided by the same opinion, and, although different localities áre involved, the questions presented are identical, • and for the reasons given in the other cases, Nos. 136 and 162, the decree must be reversed and remanded to-the proper District Court with directions to dismiss the bill for want of equity.
Reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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United States v. Maude, 481 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1973)…129 (“current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed”) ; Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 249-250, 42 S.Ct. 289, 66 L.Ed. 595 (1922) (“unjust and unreasonable rent”) ; United States v. Union Pac. R. R., 234 U.S. 495, 496, 34 S.Ct. 995, 58 L.Ed. 1426 (1914) (“long and short haul”) ; Baltimore & O. R. R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 619-620, 31 S.Ct. 621, 55 L.Ed. 878 (1911) (“emergency”). . Colton v. Kentucky, supra note 40, 407 U.S. at 111, 92. S.Ct. 1953; United Sta…1 / 2