NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
v.
DIXIE TOBACCO COMPANY

U.S. | 1913-05-12
No. 265
228 U.S. 593 Supreme Court of the United States (1913) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 57 L. Ed. 980 · 33 S. Ct. 609 · 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2401 · SCDB 1912-192
Cited by 17 cases

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Synopsis

Norfolk & Western Railway Company sought to overturn a judgment requiring it to compensate the Dixie Tobacco Company for damage to tobacco shipped on a through route from Virginia to Texas, claiming that a 1906 amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act—which made the initial carrier liable for losses caused by any carrier in a through shipment and prohibited contractual limitations on such liability—was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the statute was constitutional and that the railroad's contractual stipulation limiting its liability to damages occurring only on its own portion of the route was unenforceable, finding no material distinction from its prior decisions upholding similar statutory requirements for through carriers.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action brought by the defendant in error to recover for damage to tobacco shipped by it on the railroad at Bedford City, Virginia, to Marshall, Texas. The plaintiff got a verdict and judgment, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals (111 Virginia, 813), the case having, been taken there on the ground that the act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595, amending § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 386, is unconstitutional. This section requires any common carrier receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another to issue a receipt or bill of lading for the same; makes the receiving carrier liable for loss caused by any common carrier in transitu; and provides that no contract shall exempt it from the liability thus imposed.

The bill of lading stipulated that no carrier should be liable for damages not occurring on its portion of the through route. There was evidence that the tobacco was damaged after it left the railroad company’s hands; and the defendant asked an instruction that if the jury believe that it delivered the tobacco in good order to the next carrier the verdict should be in its favor. This instruction was refused and the défendant excepted. There was evidence also that the plaintiff chose the route for the tobacco, being partly by sea and a different one from that which the railroad would have adopted, which would have been all rail. The railroad had no through route or rate established with the line of steamers by which the tobacco went. Instructions were asked and refused, subject to exception, that the bill of lading controlled, and that the above statute, so far as it attempts to invalidate limitations or liabilities like that quoted above, is void.

The Supreme Court of Appeals followed the ruling in Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186 (to which may be added Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481), as conclusive. The plaintiff in error contends that these cases may be distinguished on the ground that in both of them it was to be presumed that the carrier was a voluntary party to a through route and rate, whereas here the stipulation against liability beyond its line and the fact that it had no through route with the steamship company exclude that, presumption. It argues that as it was bound to accept goods destined beyond its line for delivery to the next carrier and was required by the statute to give a through bill of lading, if on such compulsory acceptance it is made answerable for damages done by others its property is taken without due process of law. But in the former case there was the same stipulation in the bill of lading, and the supposed through routes were only presumed. In’ the second case the carrier is spoken of as voluntarily accepting goods for a point beyond its line, but there too there was the same attempt to limit liability, and in the present case the acceptance was voluntary in the same degree as in that. There is no substantial distinction between the earlier decisions and this.

Judgment affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Boston and Maine Railroad v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1914)
  • Missouri v. Ward, 244 U.S. 383 (U.S. 1917)
    …antic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wall, 241 U. S. 87, 92. And provisions in the bill of [*387] lading inconsistent with that liability are void. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593. While the receiving carrier is thus responsible for the whole carriage, each connecting road may still be sued for damages occurring on its line; and the liability of such participating carrier is fixed by the applicable valid terms of the original…
  • …R. R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 615, 631; Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257; Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific Railroad v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287. Compare Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593, 595; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 491.…

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