SOUTHERN COTTON OIL COMPANY
v.
TEXAS
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The Southern Cotton Oil Company, a New Jersey corporation operating in Texas under a state permit, challenged the forfeiture of that permit by Texas for allegedly violating the state's Anti-Trust Statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the forfeiture judgment, applying the same reasoning it had used in the immediately preceding case involving the National Cotton Oil Company and upholding the state's authority to enforce its antitrust laws against the corporation.
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Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court.
The Southern Cotton Oil Company is a New Jersey corporation doing business in the State of Texas by virtue of a permit issued June 3, 1897, under the laws of the State. The object of this suit is to forfeit the permit of the company for the violation of the Anti-Trust Statutes of the State. The violation of the statutes alleged against it is the same as that alleged against the National Cotton Oil Company; the preceding case. The defenses are the same, and were presented by demurrer. The demurrer was overruled, and, the Southern Cotton Oil Company declining to plead further, judgment was entered forfeiting its permit to do business, in the State, except such as might be and constitute interstate commerce. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. A rehearing was denied, and a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the State refused. This writ of error was then sued out.
The questions are identical with those presented in the preceding case, and on its authority the judgment -of the Court of Civil Appeals is
Affirmed.
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