JAMES H. CRAGGS CONSTRUCTION CO., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A construction company appealed a summary judgment dismissing its tort claim for malicious interference with business against a surety bond company. The appellate court reversed, holding that the presence of malice is a question of fact for a jury and material factual disputes existed precluding summary judgment.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Material issues of fact existed that could only be determined by a jury, particularly whether malice existed as an element of the tort claim.
“This action on the part of the lower court necessarily results in the proposition that the acts alleged in appellant's complaint, if true, constituted the tort of malicious interference with the plaintiff's business.”
Establishes that denial of motion to dismiss implicitly recognized the validity of the tort theory
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCraggs Construction had used appellee as its surety bond supplier for seven years. In 1959-1960, appellee refused to issue further bid or performance …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Appellant-plaintiff asserts error on the-part of the trial court in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Appellant instituted this action against, appellee claiming that the appellee’s tortious-activity of maliciously interfering with appellant's business caused the appellant to-suffer great damage.
Appellant is in the general construction-business, and for a period of seven years the-appellee had supplied the surety bonds-necessary whenever appellant was awarded' a particular job. It is apparent from the record that in order to continue in appellant’s business it must have available a source of surety bid bonds and surety performance bonds.
During the period of time 1959-1960, some financial difficulty arose, and the ap-pellee refused to issue further bid or performance bonds. Appellant’s claim that ap-pellee was not satisfied with discontinuing business relationship, but induced other insurance companies to refuse to issue bid or performance bonds to appellants and committed other acts which destroyed appellant’s business.
The court denied appellee’s motion-to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. This action on the part of the lower court necessarily results in the proposition that the acts alleged in appellant’s complaint, if true, constituted the tort of malicious interference with the plaintiff’s business.1
We must now pass to the ruling by the trial judge that there were no material issues of fact, and those undisputed facts entitled appellee to judgment. We can not agree with this conclusion.2
*27Without belaboring the point, suffice it to say that our investigation of the record reveals material issues of fact capable of determination only by a jury.
In litigation of this nature, the crux of the case is whether malice, within the meaning of the law, existed. The presence of malice is generally a question of fact for a jury to resolve.3
Accordingly, the judgment appealed is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Dade Enters., Inc. v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70 (Fla. 1935)
- Wm. D. Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206 (Fla. 1887)
- Franklin v. Brown, 159 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
- Elva Buck and Lawrence Buck v. Hardy, 106 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)