UNITED STATES

v.

SEBASTIAN AHMED

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

A jury convicted Sebastian Ahmed of healthcare fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering in a trial that took place during the initial days of the coronavirus pandemic. Ahmed appeals his conviction, raising a number of constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural challenges. Ahmed argues that he was deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because, among other things, his lawyer, fearing coronavirus exposure, refused to visit him in jail throughout the trial. He also posits that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly questioning one of his witnesses. On top of all that, Ahmed contends that the district court abused its discretion and violated his right to present a defense by making erroneous evidentiary rulings. Ahmed believes the district court's cumulative errors denied him a fundamentally fair trial. We disagree and affirm.

I.

We start with the facts of the case. Ahmed&#x²⁷;s conviction stems from his ownership of two substance abuse treatment centers, Jacob&#x²⁷;s Well and Medi MD, LLC. Ahmed also operated multiple residential sober homes—collectively known as Serenity Ranch Recovery or Serenity Treatment Centers intended to provide safe, drug-free residences for Jacob&#x²⁷;s Well and Medi MD patients.

Ahmed and his co-defendants concocted a scheme for Serenity to submit insurance claims for substance abuse treatment services never rendered. Serenity would recruit young patients using

gimmicks like free flights, phones, vapes, and cigarettes. After enrolling patients, Serenity would provide shoddy treatment services, doling out drugs in plastic baggies and allowing behavior health technicians to engage in sexual relationships with the patients. Living conditions at Serenity deteriorated into squalor, and several patients overdosed. Between July 2016 and July 2019, Serenity submitted over $37,000,000 in fraudulent claims to insurance companies, eventually receiving more than $6,000,000.

The government charged Ahmed with conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud, in violation of¹⁸ U.S.C. § 1349; ten counts of healthcare fraud, in violation of¹⁸ U.S.C. § 1347; conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of¹⁸ U.S.C. § 1956; and eleven counts of money laundering, in violation of¹⁸ U.S.C. § 1957. Ahmed&#x²⁷;s trial commenced in February 2020 and continued through the first days of the coronavirus pandemic, ending in late-March 2020.

Central to this appeal, Ahmed&#x²⁷;s counsel orally moved for a mistrial a couple of weeks into the trial, expressing concern that the emerging coronavirus would impact the jury and prevent him from visiting Ahmed in jail. The district court denied the motion. Ahmed&#x²⁷;s counsel renewed the motion for mistrial twice more, echoing his previous concerns. The district court denied the motions. At the close of evidence, the jury unanimously voted to deliberate, despite the evolving coronavirus situation.

Ahmed raised a slew of other concerns during the trial. A few days into the trial, the district court learned that the jail was

not providing Ahmed with his prescribed Adderall. After an in camera competency hearing, the district court found Ahmed responsive enough to proceed. Still, the district court took steps to ensure Ahmed received his medication, such as allowing him to take it at the beginning of court each day and reminding the jail to give it to him on the weekend. Ahmed also expressed concern about injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall accident at the jail, shackles cutting into his ankles during the trial, and the jail&#x²⁷;s confiscation of his legal materials.

A few other issues relevant to this appeal arose as well. One related to the government&#x²⁷;s characterization of Florida law during cross-examination of one of Ahmed&#x²⁷;s witnesses. The others involved the district court&#x²⁷;s exclusion of certain documentary and testimonial evidence.

After a twenty-five-day trial, a jury convicted Ahmed of one count of conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud and wire fraud, five counts of healthcare fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, and eleven counts of money laundering. The district court sentenced Ahmed to 210 months&#x²⁷; imprisonment. Ahmed timely appealed.

II.

This appeal turns on several standards of review. We review claims of constitutional error at a criminal trial de novo. United States v. Cavallo, 790 F. 3d 1202, 1213 (11th Cir. 2015).

If a criminal defendant does not object to a district court&#x²⁷;s shackling determination, we review for plain error. United States v. Moore, 954 F. 3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2020). Plain error requires "(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. (quoting United States v. Baker, 432 F. 3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005). And we may notice the error only if it "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. (quoting Baker, 432 F. 3d at 1203).

We uphold a district court&#x²⁷;s decision not to grant a mistrial unless we detect an abuse of discretion. United States v. Newsome, 475 F. 3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). A district court should grant a mistrial "if the defendant&#x²⁷;s substantial rights are prejudicially affected." Id.

When a district court allows a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, we review its decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Perez, 661 F. 3d 568, 580 (11th Cir. 2011). We usually review a district court&#x²⁷;s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion too. United States v. Todd, 108 F. 3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1997).

III.

Ahmed raises three groups of issues on appeal. First, he argues that the coronavirus pandemic impacted his ability to communicate with counsel, meaningfully participate at trial, and confront the witnesses against him. He believes the district court&#x²⁷;s refusal to grant a mistrial on those grounds violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Second, he contends the government

committed prosecutorial misconduct by alleging that one of his witnesses violated Florida prescription drug law. The district court allowed the testimony and later found that any mischaracterizations of Florida law by the government did not seriously undermine Ahmed&#x²⁷;s defense. Third, Ahmed posits that the district court committed several evidentiary errors, depriving him of his ability to present a defense. These cumulative errors, he argues, denied him a fundamentally fair trial. We address each group of issues in turn.

A.

We start with the coronavirus. Ahmed argues that the emerging coronavirus pandemic pervaded his trial and deprived him of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, he contends that he could not meaningfully participate in his defense, confront witnesses against him, or benefit from effective assistance of counsel because of several incidents that transpired during trial. He believes the district court should have granted his many motions for a mistrial. We disagree.

1.

Ahmed&#x²⁷;s lawyer, supposedly fearing coronavirus infection, said on the record during trial that he would not visit his client in jail during overnight recess. Ahmed argues that this refusal deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), because he could not effectively communicate with his lawyer. We disagree.

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Applying the Sixth Amendment in Geders, the Supreme Court held that a court cannot preclude defense counsel from communicating with a defendant “about anything” during an overnight recess. 425 U.S. at 91. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[n]ot every restriction on counsel&#x²⁷;s time or opportunity to investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant&#x²⁷;s Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S.¹, 11 (1983). But the Court has observed that overnight "recesses are often times of intensive work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed.” Geders, 425 U.S. at 88. The overnight recess period "gives the defendant a chance to discuss with counsel the significance of the day&#x²⁷;s events." Id. Thus, a court order prohibiting a defendant from consulting counsel "about anything" during an overnight recess conflicts with the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 91.

For our part, we have held that a court must provide a defendant with a "reasonable opportunity" to communicate with counsel. United States v. Vasquez, 732 F. 2d 846, 848 (11th Cir. 1984). That is, “a court may not deny a defendant all opportunity to consult counsel." Id. (emphasis added). A Geders violation "presum[es] prejudice" when "an unconstitutional statute or court order" hinders “a defense attorney [from] rendering assistance of counsel to his client." United States v. Roy, 855 F. 3d 1133, 1148 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Still, “a criminal defendant must demonstrate that he

and his counsel actually intended to confer during the recess and would have done so” but for an interference by the court, government, or criminal justice system. United States v. Nelson, 884 F. 3d 1103, 1109 (11th Cir. 2018).

Ahmed argues that a Geders violation occurred because his attorney refused to visit him in jail due to coronavirus fears. Not so. To secure a reversal under Geders, Ahmed must establish that the government or a court—not his own lawyer-deprived him of the opportunity to communicate. See Roy, 855 F. 3d at 1148. But neither the government nor the court nor the criminal justice system prohibited overnight communication. Instead, Ahmed&#x²⁷;s lawyer informed the district court that, out of concern for his own health, he would not meet with Ahmed at the jail during the overnight recess. Moreover, there is no evidence on this record that Ahmed&#x²⁷;s lawyer "actually intended to confer" with his client during the overnight recess, irrespective of the pandemic concerns. See Nelson, 884 F. 3d at 1109. For instance, Ahmed&#x²⁷;s lawyer also told the district court that he did not have time to visit the jail.

Finally, we note that the district court went to great lengths to facilitate communication between Ahmed and his lawyer. It allowed them to communicate in writing during the trial and while Ahmed was incarcerated at the county jail. And nothing precluded Ahmed&#x²⁷;s lawyer from attempting to communicate electronically or via telephone with his client. Ahmed&#x²⁷;s lawyer even acknowledged that he was able to consult with Ahmed during the overnight recess period once, though he did not specify how he did so.

The district court did not deny Ahmed "all opportunity to consult counsel" and provided him with a "reasonable opportunity" to strategize with his lawyer. See Vasquez, 732 F. 2d at 848. The communication deficiencies about which Ahmed complains resulted from his lawyer&#x²⁷;s caprice, not from the court, government, or criminal justice system. Accordingly, no Geders violation occurred.

2.

As an alternative to his Geders claim, Ahmed argues that his lawyer&#x²⁷;s failure to communicate with him (among other things) amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). That claim is not properly before us.

The right to counsel means "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)) (emphasis added). But a defendant usually cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal without a sufficiently developed record. See United States v. Griffin, 699 F. 2d 1102, 1107–09 (11th Cir. 1983); accord United States v. Bender, 290 F. 3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that we generally do not consider ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal "where the district court did not entertain the claim nor develop a factual record"). Though an insufficient record may bar direct appeal, a defendant may challenge the effectiveness of counsel in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, where the district court may grant an evidentiary hearing

to develop the record. See Griffin, 699 F. 2d at 1109 (citing²⁸ U.S.C. § 2255).

Ahmed never raised ineffective assistance of counsel at the district court. He advances the argument for the first time on appeal, but there is no record to support his claims. Although Ahmed&#x²⁷;s lawyer made statements on the record about communication, these statements were not made under oath, they were not subject to cross-examination, and there is no way to assess whether any communication difficulty prejudiced Ahmed&#x²⁷;s defense. Because there is no relevant record from the district court related to this challenge, we cannot consider the merits of Ahmed&#x²⁷;s claim on direct appeal. See id. at 1107–09.

Citing United States v. Rodriguez, Ahmed contends that an exception applies to our presumption against direct appeal for ineffective assistance claims when the case involves a conflict of interest. 982 F. 2d 474 (11th Cir. 1993). According to Ahmed, an irreconcilable conflict doomed his case because his lawyer had to choose between zealous advocacy for his client and protecting his own health. We need not plumb the merits of that contention because Ahmed misreads Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, we rejected two defendants&#x²⁷; claims that joint representation created a conflict of interest and violated their right to effective counsel. Id. at 476–78. We reached that conclusion based on the transcript from the pretrial hearing at which both defendants consented to joint representation. Id. at 475–77. In other words, the record from the district court was sufficiently developed to review the defendants&#x²⁷; direct

appeal. Cf. Griffin, 699 F. 2d at 1107–09; Bender, 290 F. 3d at 1284. Notably, we declined to address another conflict-of-interest issue that the defendants failed to raise at the district court because it was not "developed factually.” Rodriguez, 982 F. 2d at 476 n.3.

Ahmed cannot direct us to any developed portion of the record that would allow us to review the merits of his ineffective assistance claim. Thus, without prejudice to a future Section 2255 petition, the claim is not properly before us, and we refuse to consider it.

3.

Finally, Ahmed raises a panoply of miscellaneous complaints lack of Adderall, slip-and-fall injuries, confiscated legal materials, tight shackles, and an unengaged jury—that he believes compounded the district court&#x²⁷;s supposed error in denying a coronavirus-based mistrial. These complaints lack merit. We will address each in turn.

The Fifth Amendment&#x²⁷;s “Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant&#x²⁷;s &#x²⁷;right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if [the defendant&#x²⁷;s] presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” United States v. Brown, 879 F. 3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)). The right to be present includes the right to confront witnesses too. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985). A defendant&#x²⁷;s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses ordinarily applies during

the government&#x²⁷;s case-in-chief, whereas the Fifth Amendment supplements that right with a broader protection for a defendant&#x²⁷;s presence at all critical stages of the criminal proceeding. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F. 3d 968, 997–98 (11th Cir. 2001) (tracing the root of a criminal defendant&#x²⁷;s right to be present to the Sixth Amendment&#x²⁷;s Confrontation Clause, the Fifth Amendment&#x²⁷;s Due Process Clause, and Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).

First, Ahmed argues that he could not meaningfully participate in his defense or confer with counsel because the jail would not administer his prescribed Adderall. Ahmed claims that he did not receive his medication until the seventh day after trial commenced and never received it on the four weekends during the trial.

Ahmed&#x²⁷;s intermittent access to Adderall did not violate his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. As soon as the district court learned that Ahmed was not receiving his medication, it took several steps to remedy the situation. For starters, the district court held an in camera competency hearing, finding that Ahmed was responsive despite his lack of Adderall. Still, the district court asked marshals to administer Ahmed&#x²⁷;s Adderall at the jail, allowed Ahmed to take his medication at the beginning of court each day, and personally contacted the jail about the issue.

Ahmed argues that the Supreme Court&#x²⁷;s holding in Riggins v. Nevada supports his argument. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). But Ahmed&#x²⁷;s case is not like Riggins. In Riggins, the Supreme Court held that a

defendant cannot receive a full and fair trial when forced to take an antipsychotic drug. Id. at 133–38. Here, the opposite occurred. Ahmed requested the Adderall—the district court acquiesced and rectified his inability to access it, so no Fifth or Sixth Amendment violation occurred.

Second, Ahmed asserts that he sustained injuries to his back, shoulder, and wrist after a slip-and-fall accident at the jail. He asserts that the jail failed to treat him, which hindered his ability to focus at trial, participate in his defense, and consult his lawyer. After Ahmed’s lawyer alerted the district court to these injuries, the district court, via the marshal service, instructed the jail to conduct a medical examination of Ahmed. A healthcare provider examined Ahmed shortly thereafter. Nothing in the record suggests that Ahmed’s injuries impacted his ability to concentrate, participate in his defense, or communicate with his lawyer. Again, no constitutional violation occurred.

Third, Ahmed contends that the jail confiscated his highlighted legal materials, which impeded his ability to participate in his defense and violated his due process right to be apprised of the evidence against him. But Ahmed’s lawyer told the district court that he—not Ahmed—annotated those materials. And Ahmed could still review his lawyer’s copy of those materials during trial. The district court even dispatched marshals to retrieve the confiscated documents immediately upon learning of the seizure. This argument is meritless.

Fourth, Ahmed argues that his shackling at trial interfered with his ability to confer with his lawyer and participate in his defense. Ahmed separately posits that the district court abused its discretion by allowing him to remain shackled, entitling him to a new trial.

Shackles “may confuse the defendant, impair his ability to confer with counsel, and significantly affect the trial strategy he chooses to follow.” Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F. 2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1983); accord Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631–32 (2005). Restraints, if visible, may prejudice the jury. United States v. Durham, 287 F. 3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 2002). We grant a district court "reasonable discretion to decide whether to shackle or otherwise restrain the defendant.” Zygadlo, 720 F. 2d at 1223. Ordinarily, "the record should reflect why restraints are necessary.” Moore, 954 F. 3d at 1330.

Ahmed concedes that he did not object to his shackling at the district court, so we review for plain error. Id. at 1329. Plain error requires Ahmed to establish (1) error that is (2) plain and (3) impacted his substantial rights. See id. Even if Ahmed establishes all three conditions, the forfeited error must have "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings" for us to notice it. Id. (quoting Baker, 432 F. 3d at 1203).

Ahmed’s shackles were not visible to the jury during trial, and the district court had them removed before Ahmed testified. Though the district court did not memorialize on the record its reasons for shackling Ahmed, it did not plainly err because the jury

never saw the restraints. See id. at 1329–30 (holding that the district court did not plainly err by restraining the defendant without stating its reasoning on the record mainly because nonvisible shackles did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights). In this sense, even if the district court should not have restrained Ahmed during the trial, the shackling did not affect Ahmed’s substantial rights—such as the presumption of innocence—or prejudice the jury because the shackles were never visible. Nor did it impact his decision to testify. To be sure, Ahmed says that the shackles hurt his ankles when he was not wearing socks. But nothing in the record indicates that this transient discomfort prevented him from communicating with his lawyer or participating in his defense. Accordingly, the decision to restrain Ahmed with nonvisible restraints during trial was not plain error.

In a final salvo, Ahmed speculates that the jury could not devote adequate attention to the proceedings because of anxiety related to the coronavirus pandemic. Here too, the record belies Ahmed’s contention. In response to Ahmed’s concerns about continuing the trial in March of 2020, the district court asked the jurors whether the evolving coronavirus situation would prevent them from focusing on the evidence or properly applying the law. No juror voiced concern. And at the close of evidence, the jury unanimously voted to proceed with deliberations. There is no reason to believe that the jury was anything but attentive and engaged throughout the trial.

In short, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying Ahmed&#x²⁷;s motions for a mistrial. On the contrary, we commend the district court for its wise, efficient, and patient administration of justice during the early days of the pandemic.

B.

Ahmed next argues that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct. Ahmed&#x²⁷;s prosecutorial misconduct claim requires him to establish that the prosecution (1) made an improper statement that (2) affected his substantial rights. United States v. Cooper, 926 F. 3d 718, 739 (11th Cir. 2019). He says the government misrepresented Florida law during its questioning of defense witness Kay Stevens, which suggested that she illegally prescribed psychotropic medication at Serenity. According to Ahmed, this insinuation of illegality rebutted his defense that he hired competent medical staff to run Serenity, undermined the legitimacy of his operation, and denied him a fundamentally fair trial. Again, we disagree.

Under Florida law, advanced practice registered nurses, like Stevens, may perform certain acts within their specialty. Fla. Stat. § 464.012(4). Relevant here, “psychiatric nurse[s] . . . may prescribe psychotropic controlled substances for the treatment of mental disorders." Id. § 464.012(4)(e). Moreover, the state&#x²⁷;s regulatory board must "establish a committee to recommend a formulary of controlled substances that an advanced practice registered nurse may not prescribe or may prescribe only for specific uses or in limited quantities." Id. § 464.012(6)(a). That committee "may recommend

an evidence-based formulary applicable to all advanced practice registered nurses which is limited by specialty certification . . . or is subject to other similar restrictions.” Id. That formulary “must restrict the prescribing of psychiatric mental health controlled substances for children younger than¹⁸ . . . to advanced practice registered nurses who also are psychiatric nurses.” Id. It “must also limit the prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances . . . to a 7- day supply,” but that limitation “does not apply to controlled substances that are psychiatric medications prescribed by psychiatric nurses.” Id. A psychiatric nurse “means an advanced practice registered nurse . . . who has a master’s or doctoral degree in psychiatric nursing, holds a national advanced practice certification as a psychiatric mental advanced practice nurse, and has² years of postmaster’s clinical experience under the supervision of a physician.” Id. § 394.455(36).

During cross-examination, Stevens testified that she prescribed antipsychotics, like Seroquel and Subutex, and benzodiazepines to Serenity patients. The government asked Stevens whether she was aware that only psychiatric nurses could prescribe such drugs under Florida law. Stevens responded that the government misunderstood Florida’s limitations on nurse practitioners and that she was authorized to prescribe the medications at issue. The government reprised this point about Stevens’s alleged lack of prescription authority during its cross-examination of Ahmed and closing argument. Ahmed argues that this line of questioning amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because the government misinterpreted Florida law and erroneously accused Stevens of illegality.

After trial, the district court concluded that the government had been wrong about Florida law but that the error was harmless. We need not probe the soundness of the district court’s interpretation of Florida law because we agree that any error was harmless and did not prejudice Ahmed’s substantial rights. See Cooper, 926 F. 3d at 739.

Ahmed’s defense did not hinge on Stevens’s prescription practices or whether they complied with Florida law. Instead, the crux of his defense was that, as a passive investor, he relied on the expertise of his medical team and other employees to operate Serenity lawfully. The government undermined his defense by eliciting testimony from several witnesses that Ahmed called the shots at Serenity. Any intimation that a single advanced practice registered nurse may have prescribed psychotropic drugs without authorization had little bearing on whether Ahmed and his co-conspirators committed healthcare fraud. Moreover, Stevens responded to the government’s questions by denying that her prescription practices violated Florida law, explaining to the jury that the government’s lawyer misunderstood Florida’s limitations on nurse practitioners. Even if the government improperly cross-examined Stevens, the government’s statements did not prejudice Ahmed’s substantial rights. Accordingly, Ahmed’s prosecutorial misconduct claim fails.

C.

Ahmed posits that three evidentiary rulings by the district court deprived him of his right to present a defense. These rulings

concern the district court’s exclusion of testimony by Ahmed’s expert, certain documentary evidence, and testimony by Ahmed’s former attorney. Once again, we disagree that the district court erred.

“The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” United States v. Nunez,¹ F. 4th 976, 991 (11th Cir. 2021). But that right remains “subject to reasonable restrictions.” Id. (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). Still, “[a]n evidentiary ruling may violate the right if it ‘infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of the accused.’” Id. (quoting Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)) (second alteration in original). A district court “does not infringe a weighty interest” by excluding testimony that “only ‘would have been helpful.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Gillis, 938 F. 3d 1181, 1195 (11th Cir. 2019)). Nor does the district court’s exclusion of cumulative evidence violate the right to present a complete defense. See id. at 991–92. The Supreme Court has never held that application of “a federal rule of evidence violated a defendant’s right to present a complete defense.” United States v. Mitrovic, 890 F. 3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2018).

We generally review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. Todd, 108 F. 3d at 1331. If “a party failed to object to an evidentiary ruling at trial,” however, we conduct a plain error review. United States v. Clotaire, 963 F. 3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2020). A district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence receives de novo review. Doe No. 1 v. United States, 749 F. 3d

999, 1003 (11th Cir. 2014). Even if the district court makes an incorrect evidentiary ruling, we will not reverse harmless error. See United States v. Henderson, 409 F. 3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(a) (stating that “[a] party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party”).