UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

RAFAEL EDUARDO FREYRE-LAZARO, ORESTES MIGUEL DIAZ-GONZALEZ, AND EUFEMIO RUBEN LLERENA-ACOSTA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

HOBBS, Senior District Judge: Appellants are three defendants who raise an assortment of challenges to their convictions for their roles in a conspiracy to purify contaminated cocaine.

Defendants Orestes Miguel Diaz-Gonzalez, Eufemio Ruben Llerena-Acosta, and Rafael Eduardo Freyre-Lazaro were each indicted on four counts and tried together. The jury found all three guilty of Count I, possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of²¹ U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and Count II, conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of²¹ U.S.C. § 846.

The jury convicted Diaz-Gonzalez of Count III, possession with intent to distribute cocaine within¹,000 feet of a school in violation of²¹ U.S.C. § 845a.

We affirm the convictions of Llerena-Acos-ta and Freyre-Lazaro and the conviction of Diaz-Gonzalez on Counts II and III.

However, we vacate Diaz-Gonzalez’ conviction on Count I and remand his case to the district court for resentencing. I.

FACTS Defendant Diaz-Gonzalez owned a farm in northwest Dade County, Florida.

In 1990, Miguel Oliva, a twice-convicted felon who became a DEA confidential informant in January, 1991, began working at Diaz-Gonzalez’ farm as a cattle tender. Through Diaz-Gonzalez, Oliva met Diaz-Gonzalez’ son, Diaz-Acosta.

Diaz-Acosta owned the Botánica El Valle Azul in Hialeah, Florida.

The Botánica sold religious artifacts, cement garden statues, herbs, and other objects associated with the Santería religion.

The second floor of the Botánica housed offices and an area where the statues were painted.

The ground floor served as the retail store and was adjoined by an outdoor work area with a shed.

At the Botánica, Oliva met defendant Freyre-Lazaro (Freyre), the father-in-law of Diaz-Acosta, and defendant Llerena-Acosta (Llerena), a nephew of Diaz-Gonzalez.

Both defendant Freyre and defendant Llerena were employed at the Botánica.

During a three week period beginning on January 18, 1991, Oliva met with the defendants and recorded approximately twenty-three hours of conversation by means of a surveillance device that he wore.

On January 20, 1991, Oliva and Diaz-Gonzalez met at Diaz-Gonzalez’ house and discussed the possibility of Oliva purchasing 30 kilograms of cocaine from Diaz-Acosta.

The total price of $360,000 was to include Oliva’s $500 per kilogram broker’s fee.

Because the DEA would not agree to this arrangement, the deal was never consummated.

The following day Oliva met with Diaz-Acosta at the Botánica.

Their tape-recorded conversation revealed that Diaz-Acosta had 50 kilograms of cocaine and that his “friend” had 40 kilograms of cocaine which had been contaminated with diesel fuel.

In order to fetch a full price, Diaz-Acosta planned to decontaminate the “dirty” cocaine by removing the diesel fuel.

Oliva agreed to assist Diaz-Gonzalez and Diaz-Acosta in the purification process.

The cocaine purification was to take place at the Botánica with Oliva being paid $500 for each decontaminated kilogram.

Two methods of purification were contemplated.

The first method involved soaking the cocaine in a solution of ammonia and water in a trash can, filtering it, and then drying the cocaine under light bulbs or in a clothes dryer. The second method involved immersing the cocaine in an acetone solution containing hydrochloric acid, which caused the diesel fuel to separate from the cocaine.

The first cocaine treatment occurred at the Botánica on January 30, 1991, when three kilograms of cocaine were transformed to cocaine base through the first method of purification.

Diaz-Acosta and defendants Llerena and Freyre participated in the conversion process.

Llerena assisted in the pouring and filtering steps.

Freyre brought rope and helped tie a sheet to filter the cocaine.

Part of the drying was done in a clothes dryer in Diaz-Gonzalez’ house.

On February 7, 1991, Oliva, Diaz-Acosta, Freyre, and Llerena all helped decontaminate cocaine at the Botánica by following the second treatment method.

Diaz-Acosta told Oliva that 7.4 kilograms of cocaine were in the solution and that 35 more kilograms of cocaine were awaiting purification.

When Oliva arrived at the Botánica on February 12, 1991, for another round of cocaine decontamination, he discovered 17 kilograms of cocaine already soaking in acetone.' Both Llerena and Freyre assisted in the process.

When the cocaine was in its finished form, it was pressed into kilogram blocks and then placed in a large box which Diaz-Acosta loaded into the front of his car. Diaz-Acosta then drove his car to Diaz-Gonzalez’ house and parked it.

Upon entering the driveway, Diaz-Acosta was stopped by a police detective who asked Diaz-Acosta for identification and the ear’s registration. A search of Diaz-Acosta’s car yielded thirteen kilograms of cocaine and a .380 caliber semiautomatic firearm. A subsequent inventory search of the car yielded a small package of cocaine.

Shortly after Diaz-Acosta was arrested, law enforcement officers converged on the Botánica and arrested Llerena and Freyre.

Diaz-Gonzalez was arrested at his farm.

An inventory search of the truck Diaz-Gonzalez was driving at the time of his arrest (conducted by DEA agents) yielded a .9 mm automatic pistol.

Pursuant to warrants, searches were conducted of the Botánica and of Diaz-Acosta’s home.

These searches yielded over $126,000 of cash, four firearms, a kilogram press, a cash counting machine, and a microwave oven with cocaine residue.

In a search of Diaz-Gonzalez’ house, officers found three guns and aluminum pans with cocaine residue.

II.

DISCUSSION 1.

Pretrial A.

Motion to Suppress Diaz-Gonzalez first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence on the ground that his wife, Doris Diaz, did not voluntarily consent to a search of their house on the day of his arrest.

Diaz-Gonzalez contends that because his wife was shaken by the arrest of her son (Diaz-Acosta) at the house, “she was in no state to give consent.”

At a pretrial hearing on the motion, the district court heard testimony from two Hialeah Police Department Detectives and from Doris Diaz.

Detective Carlos Diaz testified that Doris Diaz appeared “rational” and “lucid” and that he asked her in Spanish if she would consent to a search of her house.

Detective Diaz explained to Mrs.

Diaz that the search was connected to her son’s arrest and that the officers would be looking for evidence of narcotics crimes.

Detective Diaz also testified that he advised Doris Diaz that she was not required to consent.

Detective Lee Mock testified that Mrs.

Diaz, although “nervous” and “concerned,” was not sobbing or broken down.

Detective Mock read the consent form in Spanish to Mrs.

Diaz.

The form, which stated that no promises, threats, or coercion had been used to extract the consent, was signed by Mrs.

Diaz with detectives Diaz and Mock as witnesses.

The detectives did not have then-guns drawn nor did they raise their voices during their conversation with Mrs.

Diaz.

Doris Diaz testified that she had not read the consent form, nor was the form explained to her. The district court ruled that Mrs.

Diaz’ consent was given “freely, voluntarily and intelligently” and judged that her testimony was not believable.

It is “well-settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043-44, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

The determination of voluntariness is a question of fact to be decided from the totality of the circumstances.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48.

The district court’s factual finding that consent was given voluntarily will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous.

Blake, 888 F. 2d 795, 798 (11th Cir.1989). “This is true because the trial judge usually bases his finding on credibility choices resulting from conflicting testimony.”

Garcia, 890 F. 2d 355, 359 (11th Cir.1989).

We conclude that the district court’s factual finding that Doris Diaz voluntarily consented to a search of her house was not clearly erroneous.

After listening to conflicting accounts of the circumstances surrounding Mrs.

Diaz’ consent, the district court determined that “the little lady’s testimony is not worthy of belief.”

The district court instead chose to accept the testimony of police detectives Diaz and Mock.

Their testimony established that Mrs.

Diaz, a woman of rational demeanor, had witnessed the arrest of her son outside her home.

Although Mrs.

Diaz was upset over her son’s arrest, both detectives testified that she was not too distraught to comprehend the implications of the search and had signed the consent form after being advised in her native tongue that her consent was not mandatory.

Because Doris Diaz gave valid consent to the search, the warrantless search of the home did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the district court properly held that a plastic dryer shelf, aluminum pans with cocaine residue, and three firearms found in the house, could not be suppressed as trial evidence. B.

Severance Defendant Freyre criticizes as an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of his motion for severance.

He asserts that because the government’s case against Diaz-Acosta and Diaz-Gonzalez was “overwhelming and highly prejudicial,” the jury drew unreasonable inferences resulting from his mere presence and association with the co-conspirators.

This, he says, denied him a fair trial.

The law of this circuit is clear that the denial of a motion for severance will be reversed only for abuse of discretion since, particularly in conspiracy eases, “persons who are charged together should also be tried together.”

Morales, 868 F. 2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir.1989). “To establish an abuse of discretion the defendant must demonstrate that without severance he was unable to receive a fair trial and that he suffered compelling prejudice against which the trial court could offer no protection.”

Id. (quoting Magdaniel-Mora, 746 F. 2d 715, 718 (11th Cir.1984)).

This court has also said that a defendant does not suffer compelling prejudice “simply because much of the evidence at trial is applicable only to codefendants.”

Smith, 918 F. 2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir.1990) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 151, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991).

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Freyre’s severance motion.

The jury’s ability to consider the evidence pertaining to each defendant separately is reflected by the verdict.

Although all three appellants were indicted on four counts, the jury acquitted Freyre and Llerena on Counts III and IV, possession with intent to distribute cocaine within¹,000 feet of a school, and use of firearms during drug distribution.

Furthermore, the district court’s jury charge militates against Freyre’s complaint that the jury neglected to weigh separately the evidence against each defendant.

The district court instructed the jury as follows: The prejudice that Freyre alleges resulted from the joint trial was not “clearly beyond the curative powers” of this cautionary instruction.

Garrett, 727 F. 2d 1003, 1014 (11th Cir.1984) (quoting Phillips, 664 F. 2d 971, 1017 (6th Cir.Unit B 1981)).

Defendant Freyre’s challenge to the refusal of the court to grant his severance motion is without merit. A separate crime or offense is charged against one or more of the defendants in each count of the indictment.

Each offense and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately.

Also, the case of each defendant should be considered separately and individually.

The fact that you may find one or more of the defendants guilty or not guilty of any of the offenses charged should not affect your verdict as to any other offense or any other defendant. ' 2.

Trial A.

Sufficiency of the Evidence When a defendant challenges his criminal conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the government to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thomas, 987 F. 2d 697, 701 (11th Cir.1993) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). “ ‘In applying this standard all reasonable inferences and credibility choices must be made in favor of the jury verdict, and that verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support it....’” Pintado, 715 F. 2d 1501, 1503 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (quoting Davis, 666 F. 2d 195, 201 (5th Cir.Unit B 1982)). 1.

Conspiracy To uphold the appellants’ convictions, we must find that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:¹) a conspiracy existed;²) the appellant knew of the conspiracy; and³) the appellant voluntarily joined the conspiracy.

Mieres-Borges, 919 F. 2d 652, 657 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1633, 113 L.Ed.2d 728 (1991). “[Participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a ‘development and a collocation of circumstances.’ ” Khoury, 901 F. 2d 948, 962 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Malatesta, 590 F. 2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)).

After reviewing the record and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, we conclude that neither Diaz-Gonzalez, Freyre, nor Llerena has sustained his burden of showing that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he was guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.

Diaz-Gonzalez Diaz-Gonzalez contends that because he was present at the farm and not at the Botánica for cocaine processing, and since he was not at home when his clothes dryer was used to dry the cocaine, a rational jury could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he conspired to possess and distribute cocaine.

This argument is unavailing.

Substantial and compelling evidence at trial showed that Diaz-Gonzalez was a key player in the conspiracy.

Diaz-Gonzalez sparked the venture by referring Oliva to his son, Diaz-Acosta, knowing that Diaz-Acosta wanted to dispose of a batch of contaminated cocaine.

Diaz-Gonzalez’ commitment to the purification venture was clearly demonstrated.

He loaned his farm as a site for cocaine processing and as a storage facility for ten gallons of ether used in the decontamination process.

On February 5, 1991, Diaz-Gonzalez was joined at his farm by Oliva and Diaz-Acosta in a session to convert three kilograms of cocaine base into cocaine hydrochloride.

Diaz-Gonzalez’ dedication to the venture was further established by his visits to the Botá-nica during the pendency of the conspiracy.

In sum, Diaz-Gonzalez’ absence from the Botánica during cocaine processing there, and from his house while his clothes dryer was being used to dry the cocaine, does not defeat his conspiracy conviction.

Freyre Freyre argues that his mere presence at the Botánica was insufficient to convict him of conspiracy.

The cornerstone of Freyre’s argument is that any assistance given to Diaz-Acosta and Oliva at the Botánica was part of his legitimate job responsibilities as a Botánica employee.

The government, on the other hand, contends that Freyre’s activities at the Botánica more properly reflect his participation in the cocaine decontamination scheme.

These activities, the government maintains, show that Freyre knew of the conspiracy.

We agree. A reasonable juror could infer from a “collocation of circumstances” that Freyre knowingly participated in the scheme to decontaminate Diaz-Acosta’s cocaine.

Malatesta, 590 F. 2d at 1381.

The evidence at trial established that during the first cocaine purification session at the Botánica on January 30, 1991, Freyre fetched a rope to tie a sheet over a plastic garbage can in which the cocaine was soaking.

The sheet was used to filter the cocaine.

On February 6,1991, Freyre loaded a microwave oven into Oliva’s car which was later used to dry cocaine at Diaz-Gonzalez’ farm.

The next day, Freyre located a hose to add more water to the cocaine solution and put up a no trespass sign at the Botánica.

On February 12, 1991, Freyre, armed with a gun, helped turn over the plastic garbage can and rinsed away its cocaine residue with a hose.

Freyre’s testimony at trial undermined the theory that his Botánica activities were legitimate employee duties and cast doubt on his credibility.

His mainstay at trial was that he had been making a “little donkey” figurine while the cocaine was being processed.

When asked whether he was ever told that Oliva was cleaning cocaine at the Botánica, Freyre responded: “No, sir. I do not know what cocaine is.

And if he tells me, I still would not know because I don’t know what that is.”

On cross-examination Freyre explained that Oliva’s statement “I am getting the base out” referred to the base in which the Bota-nica’s cement images are placed, rather than to the cocaine base being processed.

In evaluating Freyre’s credibility, the jury could compare his claim that physical frailty prevented him from lifting the plastic garbage can with the cocaine solution and pouring out the contents with DEA Agent Curtis’ testimony that he had personally observed Freyre at the Botánica “carrying statues, hauling bags of cement, [and] carrying bags of gravel.”

Concerning the trespass sign that he erected immediately after a Hialeah Police detective had passed through an alley bordering the Botánica, Freyre testified: “I was going to put up that sign because a lady walked in to look at some molds and she almost fell down.... I had to give her a hand so she would not fall on the ground.

And I told her ‘Ma’am there is no insurance here.”

Freyre was also unable to explain why the statues made in molds lubricated with diesel fuel would not retain an odor. Credibility is a factual issue to be decided by the jury.

Parrado, 911 F. 2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1104, 111 S.Ct. 1005, 112 L.Ed.2d 1088 (1991).

In reviewing Freyre’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge, credibility determinations and all reasonable inferences are made in favor of the jury’s verdict.

Pintado, 715 F. 2d at 1503.

In this case, Freyre’s improbable testimony and evidence of his contribution to the decontamination venture were sufficient for the jury to convict him of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.

Llerena Like Freyre, Llerena posits that he was a legitimate employee at the Botánica who happened to be present when Oliva and the Diazes carried out activities in furtherance of the conspiracy.

While we are mindful that mere association with coconspirators, Correa-Arroyave, 721 F. 2d 792, 796-97 (11th Cir.1983), or presence at the criminal scene, Sullivan, 763 F. 2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir.1985), is insufficient to establish knowing participation in a conspiracy, our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that a reasonable jury could have found Llerena guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence showed that: (1) on January 30, 1991, Llerena helped to pour and filter the cocaine solution at the Botánica; (2) on February 7, 1991, Llerena strolled from the Botánica to a nearby hardware store and purchased a 32 gallon grey plastic garbage can; (3) later that day, a police detective on surveillance walked by the Botánica and noticed Llerena, Diaz-Acosta, and Oliva standing over the grey garbage can; (4) in reaction to the detective passing by Llerena yelled out “ten cuidado!” (“be careful!”); (5) on February 12, 1991, Llerena helped filter the cocaine solution at the Bota-nica as the surveillance device that confidential informant Oliva wore transmitted Llere-na complaining of stinging hands, admonishing Oliva to “stretch the rope well,” and in reaction to the powerful smell generated by the diesel fuel commenting “the odor is a bitch”; (6) when law enforcement officers converged on the Botánica on the afternoon of February 12,1991, Llerena resisted arrest and threw a plastic bag of cocaine from his pocket.

The jury reasonably could have inferred from the enumerated circumstances that Llerena knew of the conspiracy and voluntarily joined it.

Mieres-Borges, 919 F. 2d at 657.

Here we cannot say that the evidence implicating Llerena “proved nothing more than a mere relationship to a conspirator and a mere presence at the scene.”

Villegas, 911 F. 2d 623, 631 (11th Cir.1990). 2.

Possession with Intent to Distribute In order to sustain the appellants’ convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the government must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) knowing (2) possession of a controlled substance (3) with intent to distribute it.”

Morales, 868 F. 2d 1562, 1573 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Vera, 701 F. 2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir.1983)).

Our previous analysis of Diaz-Gonzalez’ role in the cocaine decontamination scheme enables us to conclude easily that there was more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Diaz-Gonzalez for the substantive crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine.

Count I of the indictment also charged Freyre and Llerena with possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of²¹ U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

The government, under 18 U.S.C. § 2, was permitted to show that Freyre and Llerena aided and abetted Diaz-Acosta, who was arrested with thirteen one-kilogram blocks of processed cocaine in the front of his car. To convict these defendants under aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2, the government must prove that Freyre and Llerena associated themselves with the venture and sought by their actions to make the venture a success.

Bascaro, 742 F. 2d 1335, 1364 (11th Cir.1984).

The evidence of Freyre and Llerena’s knowing contribution to the cocaine purification sessions at the Botánica was sufficient to support their convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine on an aiding and abetting theory of liability. B.

Jury Charge Defendant Llerena contests the district court’s decision not to include certain jury instructions in its charge to the jury.

First, he assails the district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on multiple conspiracies.

Second, he disputes its refusal to tender an instruction that a conspiracy cannot be founded upon family or blood relationships.

In reviewing jury instructions, we evaluate whether the entire charge, as a whole, adequately presented the law and the facts to the jury.

Elkins, 885 F. 2d 775, 788 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 1300, 108 L.Ed.2d 477 (1990). A trial court’s refusal to give a requested theory-of-defense instruction, however, is reversible error only if the requested instruction “(1) was correct, (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury, and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.”

Camejo, 929 F. 2d 610, 614 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied Setien v. United States, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 228, 116 L.Ed.2d 185 (1991).