MICHAEL PRADA
v.
GUSTAVO POL RAMIREZ
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Michael Prada appeals from a default final judgment granting specific performance to Gustavo Pol Ramirez. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a clerk's default was improperly entered because Ramirez was aware that Prada was represented by counsel and intended to defend the action, which precluded entry of default under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(a).
The court held that entry of a clerk's default is not appropriate when the plaintiff knows the defendant is represented by counsel who intends to assert matters in defense of the cause of action. Here, the record unequivocally demonstrated Ramirez's awareness of Prada's representation and settlement negotiations, making the default entry improper.
[1] A clerk's default is not appropriate when the plaintiff knows the defendant is represented by counsel who intends to assert defenses.
[2] Correspondence between counsel, including settlement negotiations, can constitute notice that a defendant is represented and intends to defend a suit on the merits.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[E]ntry of a clerk's 'default [as authorized under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(a)] is not appropriate in cases where the plaintiff knows that a defendant is represented by counsel who intends to assert matters in defense of the cause of action”
Establishes the governing legal standard that precludes default entry when defendant's representation and intent to defend are known to the plaintiff.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGustavo Pol Ramirez obtained a default final judgment against Michael Prada seeking specific performance. The record demonstrates that Ramirez was awa…
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1
Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 23, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-2274 Lower Tribunal No. 23-21516
________________
Michael Prada,
Appellant,
vs.
Gustavo Pol Ramirez,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William Thomas, Judge. Reizenstein & Sola, PLLC, Bhakti Kadiwar, and Philip L. Reizenstein, for appellant. The Bravo Law Firm, PLLC, and Jason Bravo, for appellee. Before SCALES, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ. MILLER, J. Appellant, Michael Prada, seeks relief from a default final judgment granting specific performance in favor of appellee, Gustavo Pol Ramirez.1 “[E]ntry of a clerk’s ‘default [as authorized under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(a)] is not appropriate in cases where the plaintiff knows that a defendant is represented by counsel who intends to assert matters in defense of the cause of action,’” Contreras v. Stambul, 306 So. 3d 1143, 1144 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting Gulf Maint. & Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 543 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)) (alteration in original), and here, the record unequivocally demonstrates that Ramirez was aware Prada was represented and seeking to engage in settlement negotiations when the clerical default was entered. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. See M.W. v. SPCP Grp. V, LLC, 163 So. 3d 518, 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (finding presuit contacts between counsel, including a letter and phone conversation, constituted notice that “defendant was represented by counsel and intended to defend” the suit on the merits); Apple Premium Fin. Serv. Co. v. Tchrs. Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am., 727 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“[C]orrespondence between counsel and a presuit settlement conference between counsel and
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Gulf Maint. & Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank OF Tallahassee, 543 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Reicheinbach v. Se. Bank, N.A., 462 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- EGF Tampa Assocs. v. Bohlen, 532 So. 2d 1318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)
- NCR Corp. v. Cannon & Wolfe Lumber Co., Inc., 501 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Apple Premium Fin. Serv. Co. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n OF Am. & Chase Bank of Tex. Nat'l Ass'n, 727 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Contreras v. Stambul, LLC, 306 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)