CRAIG SNYDER
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A mortgagor who has conveyed all rights and interests in the mortgaged property is neither a necessary nor proper party to a foreclosure suit and may be denied intervention absent a deficiency decree.
[1] A mortgagor who has conveyed all rights and interests in mortgaged property is neither a necessary nor proper party to a foreclosure action unless a deficiency decree is…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when mortgagors have conveyed all their rights and interest in the mortgaged property to other parties such mortgagors are neither necessary nor proper parties to a suit to foreclose unless a deficiency decree is sought”
Court citing Rubin v. Kapell and Dennis v. Ivey regarding standing to intervene in foreclosure actions
Craig Snyder sought to intervene in a foreclosure action brought by JPMorgan Chase Bank regarding mortgaged property. Snyder had previously conveyed h…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Discretion Of The Court cases and more on FLexlaw
P.A. Bravo, P.A., and Paul Alexander Bravo, for appellant. Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP and Rebecca A. Rodriguez and Terrance W. Anderson, Jr., and Sophie M. Labarge, for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.230 (“Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.”); Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958) (stating that “when mortgagors have conveyed all their rights and interest in the mortgaged property to other parties such mortgagors are neither necessary nor proper parties to a suit to foreclose unless a deficiency decree is sought.” (citing Dennis v. Ivey, 183 So. 624, 185 (Fla. 1938))); Troncoso v. Larrain, 307 So. 3d 965, 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (determining that trial court did not abuse its discretion when denying motion to intervene because it “carefully considered all relevant factors to determine whether, it should, in its discretion, allow intervention, and, ultimately, denied relief” (citing Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. 1992))).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Dennis v. Ivey, 134 Fla. 181 (Fla. 1938)
- Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)
- Troncoso v. Larrain, 307 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)