KENYATA JERMAIN ROBERSON

v.

JAMES REYES, ETC.

1 We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(3); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.134; see also Nelson v. Junior, 227 So. 3d 737, 738 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). good cause determination for abuse of discretion. See Davis v. State, 162 So. 3d 91, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (explaining abuse of discretion standard as applied to a good cause determination under rule 3.134). The State argues for good cause in the delayed filing of charges because: (1) the substances were submitted at least by the log-in date of October 30 (13 days after the arrest and detention), and (2) the lab is busy and backlogged. A laboratory backlog and delay may constitute good cause. See id. at 92–93. Roberson takes issue with the fact that the State couldn’t say when it submitted the substances to the laboratory, and the only date given, October 30, 2023, would mean that the State waited 13 days to submit the substances to a lab that they knew was already backlogged. Such delay caused (or exacerbated) by the State, Roberson argues, can’t form the basis for good cause.2

2 The State in its reply offers that the substances were submitted to the lab for testing significantly sooner than October 30, 2023, based on documents ostensibly filed with the trial court after the November 20, 2023, hearing. Of course, the trial court did not and could not consider evidence not presented prior to or during the hearing. Because, based on the circumstances present here, the subsequent filing of the information moots the relief requested, we decline to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding good cause based on the information before the court. We caution the trial court, however, that reliance on a generic assertion of lab delay in the face of what was represented to the trial court as a significant, almost two-week delay in submitting the substances to the lab, without more, may fail to take into account “the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” Davis, 162 So. 3d at 93 (quoting State v. Boyd, 846 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 2003)). The State argues that any error in finding good cause was cured by the filing of an information on November 22, 2023, two days after the trial court’s good cause hearing. The State relies on Ford v. Campbell, 697 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), for the proposition that the filing of an information moots the relief requested. In Campbell, the State filed the information more than 40 days after the arrest, but before the trial court’s hearing on the defendant’s motion. Id. The First District held that “the petitioner is not entitled to release on recognizance because she waited until after the outer limit of forty days to file her motion and because the state cured the error by filing an information by the time of the hearing on the motion.” Id. at 1303. Here, Roberson brought the issue to the court’s attention on the 30th day, and the information wasn’t filed before the court’s hearing on the 33rd day (although it was filed before the 40th day). Therefore, Campbell isn’t directly analogous to our situation. Nonetheless, on the record before us, because the information was filed before the 40th day from arrest, and before our decision on the matter, we decline to grant habeas relief. Petition denied.