DANNY L. CURRY
v.
CRESCENT BANK AND TRUST
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A trial court violates Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c) when it schedules trial fewer than 30 days after service of notice of trial, and such violation requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
[1] A trial court's sua sponte scheduling of trial fewer than 30 days after service of notice violates Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c) and constitutes reversible err…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Trial shall be set not less than 30 days from the service of the notice for trial.”
Citation to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c)
Curry was sued by Crescent Bank and Trust. The trial court sua sponte scheduled the case for trial only 17 days in advance, and Curry did not appear a…
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Opinion filed March1, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D22-0826 Lower Tribunal No. 18-24350 CC
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Danny L. Curry,
Appellant,
vs.
Crescent Bank and Trust,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Diana Gonzalez-Whyte, Judge. Renita Henry Law, PLLC, and Renita F. Henry (Ft. Lauderdale), for appellant. Andreu, Palma, Lavin & Solis, PLLC, and Jorge L. Palma, and Carlos Cruanes, for appellee. Before LINDSEY, MILLER, and GORDO, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Appellant Danny L. Curry appeals a final judgment entered against him in favor of Appellee Crescent Bank and Trust following a bench trial at which he did not appear. The trial court sua sponte and unilaterally set the case for trial 17 days in advance of the trial date. Curry claims that though he received notice, he was unavailable on that date and that he was unsuccessful in obtaining a new trial date from the trial court.1
Because the trial court noticed the case for trial only 17 days in advance of the trial date, we reverse and remand for the trial court to vacate the final judgment and set the case for a new trial in accordance with Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c), which requires that a “[t]rial shall be set not less than 30 days from the service of the notice for trial.”
Reversed and remanded with instructions.