ASSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA, INC., ETC.
v.
SECURITY PREMIUM FINANCE, INC., ETC.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appellate court denied a writ of certiorari challenging a protective order that prevented a second deposition of a corporate representative, finding no irreparable harm where the same areas of inquiry were already covered in the first deposition.
A trial court may issue a protective order under Rule 1.280(c) preventing a second deposition of a corporate representative when the same areas of inquiry were already covered in an initial deposition and no newly discovered evidence or developments justify the second deposition.
[1] A trial court may issue a protective order under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(c) to prevent a second deposition of a corporate representative when the same areas…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[R]ule 1.280(c) . . . gives the trial court significant discretion in determining whether such potentially cumulative depositions should occur[.]”
Court explaining the broad discretion trial courts have under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent cumulative depositions.
Assurance Group of America and Germaine Elizabeth Escobar sought to take a second deposition of Security Premium Finance Inc.'s corporate representati…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Florida Rule Of Civil Procedure 1.280(C) cases and more on FLexlaw
LOGUE, J.
Assurance Group of America, Inc. and Germaine Elizabeth Escobar seek a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court’s protective order, which prevents them from taking a second deposition of Security Premium Finance Inc.’s corporate representative. Petitioners, defendants below, argue that Respondent’s corporate representative is a material witness, and they will be irreparably harmed if they are prevented from taking the deposition. Petitioners identified eight areas of inquiry in their deposition notice, which they contend are different from the areas of inquiry on which they previously deposed the corporate representative. Respondent, plaintiff below, argues there is no irreparable harm because Petitioners already deposed their corporate representative once before, as well as deposing their marketing representative (in his individual capacity and not as corporate representative), and both witnesses testified concerning the same eight areas of inquiry.
While there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that expressly forbids a second discovery deposition, Rule 1.280(c) does allow a trial court, for good cause shown, to protect a party from discovery that would cause annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. See Medina v. Yoder Auto Sales, Inc., 743 So. 2d 621, 623 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “[R]ule 1.280(c) . . . gives the trial court significant discretion
4
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Medero v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 658 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hill, 388 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Efrain Medina v. Yoder Auto Sales, Inc., 743 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Sewell, 150 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
- Christa Adkins v. Sotolongo, 227 So. 3d 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)