STATE OF FLORIDA
v.
DONALD ROBIN WILLIAMS

Fla. 4th DCA | 2021-09-15
No. 21-0372
Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2021) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

Section 322.34(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes, unambiguously requires a minimum sentence of ten days in jail for a third driving while license suspended conviction.


Headnotes

[1] Section 322.34(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes, unambiguously imposes a mandatory minimum ten-day jail sentence for a third driving while license suspended conviction.

[2] When a defendant's guilty plea is predicated upon a trial court's promised sentence that is later determined to violate mandatory sentencing requirements, the defendant m…

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Facts & Procedural History

Williams was convicted of driving while license suspended for the third time. The trial court imposed a sentence that did not include the mandatory te…

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Opinion of the Court

The State appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court on appellee for his third driving while license suspended conviction (“DWLS”). It contends that the trial court failed to impose the mandatory ten-day jail sentence required under section 322.34(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2020). For the reasons stated in State v. Lebrun, No. 4D21-330 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 15, 2021) (issued this same date), we reverse, as the statute is clear and unambiguous, requiring a minimum sentence of ten days in jail. As in Lebrun, however, because appellee’s plea was based upon the trial court’s promised sentence, the trial court must first allow appellee to withdraw his plea. See Goins v. State, 672 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 1996).

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. CONNER, C.J., WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.


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