UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, ETC.

v.

WEST MEDICAL CENTER HEALTH CARE II, CORP., ETC.

Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed August 25, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-0143 Lower Tribunal Nos. 20-0134 AP, 13-3916 CC

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United Automobile Insurance Company, etc.,

Appellant,

vs.

West Medical Center Health Care II, Corp., etc.,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence D. King, Judge. Michael J. Neimand, for appellant. David B. Pakula, P.A. and David B. Pakula (Pembroke Pines); Corredor & Husseini, P.A., and Maria E. Corredor, for appellee. Before EMAS, LINDSEY, and GORDO, JJ. LINDSEY, J.

Appellant, United Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant below,

appeals a final judgment in favor of Appellee, West Medical Center Health

Care II, Corp., Plaintiff below. The final judgment, in the amount of $9408

plus pre-judgement interest in the amount of $4975.51, was awarded for

charges for medical services West Medical rendered to Jesus M. Vargas.

Mr. Vargas was an insured under a personal injury protection policy of

insurance (“PIP”) issued by United Auto.¹ The injuries are alleged to have

been received by Mr. Vargas, as a result of an automobile accident. Mr.

Vargas assigned his PIP benefits to West Medical.

Prior to entering the final judgment, the lower court entered an order

granting West Medical’s motion for final summary judgment on the issue of

whether the medical services were related to the accident, medically

necessary, and whether the charges for those services were

reasonable.² After

United Auto filed its Initial Brief, West Medical filed an Answer Brief wherein

it commendably confessed partial error as follows:

Upon review of the initial brief and the record on appeal, the appellee West Medical Center Health Care II, Corp., a/a/o Jesus M. Vargas, (“West Medical”), partially confesses error. Based on the current record, specifically the deposition testimony of Dr. Siegel, we agree that fact issues precluding summary judgment exist on the issue of medical necessity of post-IME cutoff treatment. For that reason, we agree that reversal is required and the case should be remanded for further proceedings.

* * * With regard to relatedness of further treatment after the IME cutoff, we partially confess error for the same reasons as discussed, supra, regarding medical necessity. However, West Medical continued to maintain, as it did in the lower

court that “there is no question of fact precluding partial summary judgment

with regard to the relatedness of the injuries to the accident” prior to the IME

cutoff date. We disagree.

Upon our review of the record, we find Dr. Siegel’s deposition

testimony was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether all the treatment rendered was both related to the automobile

accident and medically necessary. See Garcia v. First Cmty. Ins. Co., 241

So. 3d 254, 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“[I]f the record reflects the existence of

any genuine issue of material fact or the possibility of any issue, or if the

record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue might exist, summary

judgment is improper.” (quoting Holland v. Verheul, 583 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla.

2d DCA 1991))).³

Thus, the trial court erred in granting West Medical’s motion for

summary judgment on whether the treatment was related to the automobile

accident and medically necessary.⁴ As such we reverse the final judgment

and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.