SIGMUND T. JAWORSKI, PLAINTIFF,
v.
THE CITY OF OPA-LOCKA, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, DEFENDANT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that a question certified by a lower court regarding municipal liability for police misconduct was not properly certified because controlling precedent already existed in Florida law. The court declined to answer the certified question.
The question certified to this court is not one that falls within the rule for certification because there is controlling precedent in Florida law. Therefore, the court will not answer the certified question.
“Is a municipality liable for the alleged acts of its police officers in committing an assault and battery on the plaintiff after the plaintiff has been arrested for the commission of a misdemeanor, without warrant, when the acts committing the misdemeanor were not committed in the presence of the arresting officer?”
This quote states the certified question presented to the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff sued the City of Opa-Locka for assault and battery committed by police officers after his arrest for a misdemeanor. The plaintiff allege…
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The question certified to this court in the above stated cause for answer is as follows: “Is a municipality liable for the alleged acts of its police officers in committing an assault and battery on the plaintiff after the plaintiff has been arrested for the commission of a misdemeanor, without warrant, when the acts committing the misdemeanor were not committed in the presence of the arresting officer?”
It is our view that the above question is not such a question as falls within Rule 4.6, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., in that it does not appear that the question is without controlling precedent in this state. Chapman v. Slaff, Fla.App., 101 So.2d 413; City of Hollywood v. Peck, Fla.App., 57 So.2d 842; Schwob Co. of Florida v. Florida Industrial Commission, 152 Fla. 203, 11 So.2d 782.
The trial court under § 11 of Article 5 of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A., has the power to adjudicate the question which may be reviewed on appeal if desired.
For the reasons stated the question was not proper for certification.
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- Gertrude Chapman v. Slaff, 101 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)